

# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

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VOLUME XLIII

OXFORD  
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS  
LONDON : GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE

1949

*Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C. 4*

GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and CLASSICAL REVIEW are the organs of the Classical Association.

*For the present, THE QUARTERLY will be published in two DOUBLE numbers in April and October.*

*the times of publication of THE REVIEW are variable under prevailing conditions*

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G. T. GRIFFITH, M.A., Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge

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Volume XLIII

JANUARY—APRIL 1949

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LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE

GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Price for single numbers, 5s. 6d. net (5s. 8d. post free); for double numbers, 11s. net (11s. 4d. post free). Yearly subscription, 18s. post free; U.S.A., \$3.85. Combined yearly subscription for THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and THE CLASSICAL REVIEW, 30s. post free; U.S.A., \$6.30



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
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# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JANUARY—APRIL 1949

## LITERARY TEXTS FROM THE FAYÛM

THESE texts, the property of the Egypt Exploration Society, were purchased, together with other literary and documentary material, from a Greek lady at Medînet-el-Faiyûm by Dr. J. de M. Johnson in 1914. I am grateful to the Secretary of the Society for permission to publish them.

### I. PARAPHRASE OF AN EPIC POEM (?). 2nd cent. B.C.

Papyrus of fair quality.

Written along the fibres.

14·2 × 13·7 cm.

Arsinoite nome.

The papyrus is very badly worm-eaten; and the letters though clearly formed (where they are preserved) are so variable in size and so irregularly spaced that restoration is in places very difficult. The fragment deals with Hercules, his life and connexions. Col. i, ll. 9–12 appear to describe incidents in which his descendants are concerned; 15–22 his subjection to Eurystheus and the circumstances of the imposition of the Labours; at the lost beginning of col. ii the story of the First Labour (the Nemean Lion) was evidently described; then (after some of the other Labours have been expressly passed over) a meeting somewhere near the Corinthian Isthmus with Theseus and Pirithous is mentioned. At this point Hercules himself takes up the story.

One thing is certain: this is *not* a straightforward prose narrative of the career of Hercules, and it can hardly be scholia. The real nature of the piece seems to be given away by the lapses into *oratio obliqua*, ii. 5, 15. It is a paraphrase of a poem, and when the schoolboy (as the shaky and irregular writing, omissions (i. 20?; ii. 21) and dittography (ii. 14) suggest that he was) wrote *συναντᾶν* and *διηγείσθαι* he had at the back of his mind *λέγει ὁ ποιητής*. For paraphrase as a popular kind of school exercise see Beudel, *Qua ratione Graeci liberos docuerint*, pp. 51 ff. It is not possible to guess at the identity of the poetic original. The fact that events are described which were separated by wide intervals of time (story of Licymnius (?), i. 10; summoning of Hercules to Tiryns, ib. 15 ff.; return of Hercules from the expedition against the Amazons, ii. 3 ff.) seems to rule out a dramatic composition; an epic original seems most likely. The fragment contributes one interesting piece of mythological information not recorded elsewhere—a meeting of Hercules with Theseus and Pirithous somewhere near the Isthmus of Corinth after the former's return from his war with the Amazons. Our author at any rate does not believe the story, as some did (see variants on the story of Hercules' expedition in P.-W., s.v. 'Herakles'), that Theseus accompanied Hercules on his expedition. The exact position which this meeting occupies in the career of Theseus is uncertain: perhaps cf. Plut. *Theseus* 25: προσκτῆσάμενος δὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ τὴν Μεγαρικὴν βεβαίως τὴν θρυλουμένην ἐν Ἰσθμῷ στήλην ἔστησεν . . . καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα πρῶτος ἔθηκε κατὰ ζῆλον Ἑρακλέους, ὡς δι' ἐκεῖνον Ὀλύμπια τῷ Διὶ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν Ἰσθμια τῷ Ποσειδῶνι φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἄγειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας; where, however, there is no meeting with Hercules, and Pirithous does not appear. Such a meeting *does* take place, and Pirithous is present, ib. 30: Ἡρόδωρος . . . φησιν . . . τοῦ πολέμου (of the Lapiths and Centaurs) συνεστῶτος ἤδη τὸν Θησέα βοηθοῦντα τοῖς Λαπίθαῖς παραγενέσθαι καὶ τότε πρῶτον ὄφει γνωρίσαι τὸν Ἑρακλέα ποιησάμενον ἔργον ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ περὶ Τραχίνα πεπαυμένῳ πλάνης ἤδη καὶ ἀθλῶν· γενέσθαι δὲ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης καὶ πολλῶν ἐπαίνων ἀμφοτέροις τὴν ἐντευξιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν τις πρόσσχοι τοῖς πολλάκις ἐντυχεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἰστοροῦσι κτλ. Herodorus' version of the story, however, puts the meeting expressly at a later time than ours, and at a different

place. Perhaps our authority went on to relate that Hercules gave the captive Antiope or Hippolyte (see P.-W. for the different versions of the story) to Theseus on this occasion.

Col. i	Col. ii
	[....].[ ]μ[
	[...]τρω[το]ν τρων
	[δ]θλων· ὦν τ[ω]ας ἐπι-
	τελεσαντα, ψ[σ]τερον
5	[συ]ναγ[α]ν Θησ[ε]ι και
	Π[ε]μ[ρ]ιθω[ι...].ρο[...].μ[
	[...]οισ[...]. αναχω[ρειν?]
	περ[ε] τον Κορινθιων
	ισθμον [φ]εροντ[α] προς
10	Εὐρυσθε[α] τον της 'Ιπ-
	π[ο]λυτη[ς] ζ[ωστ]η[ρ]α·
	κ[αι] διερωτωσ[ε]ν αυ-
	τον προθεν π[ο]ιει-
	τ[αι] τ[αι] τημ π[ο]ρε[ε]αν·
15	[τ]ον δ' αὐτοῖς δι-
	ηγεισθαι τους
	ἀθλους, [π]ρ[ω-]
	τομ μεν ὡς τον
	ἐν τη Νεμειαι
20	λεοντα διεφθει-
	ρεν, δευ(τε)ρον δε ὡς
	την ὕδραν [τ]ην

'... with which Eurystheus the son of Sthenelus charged him, to satisfy (?) the spite of Hera. For the goddess is said to have sent to Eurystheus charging him to bring the hero (?) to Tiryns; ... she charged him (?) ... Now, when the [Nemeans?] sent to Eurystheus ... the first of the Labours. And (it is said that) having finished some of them, he subsequently falls in with Theseus and Pirithous, and ... journeys up (with them?) by the Corinthian Isthmus, bearing to Eurystheus the girdle of Hippolyte; and they ask him whence he is making his way; whereupon he recounts the Labours: first, how he destroyed the lion at Nemea, next, how he [slew] the Hydra ...'

i. 8 ff. These broken lines perhaps recorded the story of Tlepolemus: we might supply, ll. 9 ff. 'Ηλεκτρωνος νο/[θον παιδα Λι]κυμνιον/[... εἰς?] 'Ρόδον; cf. Apollodorus, *Bibl.* ii. 8. 2: Τληπόλεμος οὐν κτείνας οὐχ ἐκὼν Λικύμνιον ... φεύγων οὐν μετ' οὐκ ὀλίγων ἦκεν εἰς 'Ρόδον κακεῖ κατ'ῴκει.

15. ]ΙΟΥΣ: it is impossible to read ἀθλους, and μοχθους, which Mr. Roberts had suggested, is difficult.

20 f. I have not been able to reconstruct these lines. There is certainly no room for the ω of ἥρωα in l. 20; if, however, we read 'Ηρα/[κλεα] it seems impossible that the next line can have made sense. Possibly the writer omitted ω, or wrote it above the line.

21. ]ΤΑΣΣΕΝ: the letters preserved are quite clear except the N which looks a little like an Σ; only the foremost vertical limb, with a pronounced forward curl, being preserved.

22. προς 'Ε. δε πεμψαν/των των ἐν Νεμειαι? or perhaps προς 'Ε. δ' ἐπεμψαν / οἱ ἐν Νεμειαι.

ii. 7 f. It is unfortunate that the reading is doubtful here. ἀναχωρεῖν is by no means

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and γλα  
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i. l. 12:



certain; the second *A* looks more like a *Δ*, and if four more letters are to be read after the *Ω* the line will project far beyond the two lines which follow. But the writer does not care much about the length of his lines.

## 2. MEDICAL: OPHTHALMOLOGY. 2nd cent. B.C.

Papyrus of fair quality.

18.4 × 16.7 cm.

Written along the fibres.

Arsinoite nome.

Remains of two columns of a medical treatise; written with very black ink in an upright medium-sized book hand. The subject treated in the left-hand column, and probably in the right-hand column down to the paragraph at l. 8, appears to be the consequences of a severe injury to the eye. For a review of the views of ancient writers on such injuries and their treatment, see H. Magnus, *Augenheilkunde*, pp. 304 ff., 585 ff. This may set up a condition which may be 'continuous for (some) days', l. 6 (συνεχῇ ἀν[α..... ἡ]μερας). This condition is perhaps πυρετός: cf. Aëtius vii (ed. Hirschberg, *Augenheilkunde*), ch. 24: ὅταν δὲ βαθύτερον καὶ μείζον γένηται ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ τραῦμα, ὡς ἐκρῆναι κινδυνεύει τὰ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ὑγρὰ, προεκτέον, μὴ φλεγμονὴ ἐπυγένηται καὶ παρέπηται πυρετός.

Upon its termination (τελευτωντ[α, l. 2, κατὰ [τ]ὴν τελευτήν, 4-5) death may ensue with unexpected suddenness. If not fatal, the fever may be followed by γλαύκωσις, blindness from the morbid condition called γλαύκωμα. The normal course of the disease appears (? cf. φῦσει col. ii. 5) to be summarized, col. i. 11 ff.; the special case of its development through injury was perhaps discussed in the lost lower portion of col. i. The exact significance of the terms γλαύκωμα-γλαύκωσις and their relation to ὑπόχυμα-ὑπόχυσις at different periods of antiquity have been a matter of speculation for modern authorities on ancient medicine; see Magnus, op. cit., pp. 147 ff.; 279 ff.; 545 ff. This much seems to emerge from our text: that a condition called γλαύκωμα is caused by the presence of a pituitous humour in the parts about the pupil (? see n. on col. i, l. 13); and that a condition so describable can be caused by an injury. That ὑπόχυμα (suffusio) can arise *ex ictu* we know from Celsus vii. 18 f.; and ὑπόχυμα and γλαύκωμα are said by Oribasius v, p. 452 f. to have been (incorrectly) identified by οἱ ἀρχαῖοι; cf. Aëtius, ch. 43.

## Col. i

συνεχῇ ἀν[α..... ἡ]μερας  
τελευτωντ[α.....] πρὸς τῷ  
παραλογον[τ]ινα θ[ε]ανα[ο]ν πε-  
ποηκεναι, παρ[α]χρη[μα] κατὰ  
5 [τ]ὴν τελευτήν [πε]ποηκεναι  
το δὲ σ[υ]νολον, ὅ [μ]η τοσούτος  
[ὡ]σθ' οὐ[τ]ως θανα[τοῦ]ν, ὡς των  
ὑ[γ]ραν ἐν αὐτῷ [ε] συν[τριβεν]-  
των καὶ του τραυματος συν-  
10 θλα[σ]τ[ε]θεντος, γλαυκωσιν εἰω-  
θεν ποιειν· των γὰρ γλαυκω-  
ματων ὅταν τα περὶ τὴν  
[κο]ραν ὑγρον φλεγματωδες  
[τε] ὑπαρξῇ, καὶ τουτο ψυξιν  
15 [πο]ησῃ, γινόμενων (διο καὶ τη  
[χρο]αι ἐστ[ιν] ὑαλωδες καὶ τη[ε]  
[συσ]τασε[ε]ι, τῷ μὴ κατεργα-  
[ζ]εσ[θ]αι δ[ε] ὡς χ... νη. κ. ρ.  
[ε]ρευματ[ο]ς  
20 [π]ηρ. τ[ε]  
[θ]ο.

## Col. ii

πρωτου τ[ε]  
ἡ ἐστίν.  
τη κατεργα[σ]α  
δε καὶ των μ[ε]  
[.] των φυσει  
τοιουτων ..  
λογον γενο[υ]το  
χωρὶς δε του  
των φλεβων  
ἀρτηριων .κ.  
ἀλλὰ καὶ  
οὐλη[σ]α  
καὶ τ[ε]  
κρα[σ]α  
ρ.  
α[ν]

i. l. 12: τα: read τι? ib. l. 13 κο[ραν]: read κορην. ib. l. 14: ὑπαρξῇ: read ὑπαρξῃ.

'... (fever?) continuous for ... days; terminating ... besides having induced a somewhat unexpected death, to have induced it immediately upon (its) termination. Speaking generally, one which is not violent enough to be thus fatal, the humours being crushed together in it and the wound contused, is wont to induce *glaucomata*; for since *glaucomata* occur when something moist and pituitous is present about the pupil, and this [induces] cold (wherefore it is vitreous in [colour] and [consistency], by not producing the means of ...) ...'

i. 7 ff. ὡς των ὑ[γ]ρων κτλ: των ὑγρων used here in the special ophthalmological sense, and not as in l. 13 below.

8. ἐν αὐτῳι: apparently = ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, although it is surprising that the antecedent should have to be so far back, in the previous column.

11. συνθλα[σ]ιθεντος: cf. Aëtius, op. cit. ch. 22 (π. ὑποσφάγματος): ὑπ. λέγεται, ὅταν ἐκ πληγῆς τυνός μιν γέντων ἢ θλασθέντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς χιτῶσι τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀγγείων καὶ μετὰ τὸ χιτῶνος τὸ αἷμα ὑπέλθῃ κτλ.

12 ff. ὅταν κτλ. It seems necessary to assume some corruption or omission here. My reconstruction is by no means certain, but is not unduly violent and makes sense.

13. κο[ρ]αν: if this is right I cannot explain the departure from the normal form. φλεγματοδές: apparently 'pituitous': see L. and S.<sup>9</sup> s.v. φλεγματοειδής.

14. ψυξιν [ποσησι]: perhaps this 'chill' (cf. Arist. *Probl.* 862<sup>b</sup>: ἡ μὲν χολή ἐστι θερμόν, τὸ δὲ φλέγμα ψυχρόν) produces πῆξις of the displaced humour (cf. Orib. loc. cit.; Aëtius, ch. 43).

15 ff. τῇ [χροαί]... συστάσει: cf. (e.g.) Aëtius, ch. 1 (description of the structure of the eye and its ὑγρά): ἔνδοθεν μὲν πάντων τὸ περιεχόμενον ἐν τῇ κοιλότητι τοῦ ἀμφιβληστροειδοῦς χιτῶνος ὑελοειδὲς λεγόμενον προσέοικε γὰρ καὶ τῇ χροᾷ καὶ τῇ συστάσει τῇ κεχυμένη ὑέλῳ. (In our passage, however, the description is not of the ὑελοειδὲς *in situ*, but of a suffusion of humour, displaced by injury, from elsewhere in the eye, in the parts about the pupil (? see above).)

19. ]ερευματος: or possibly κρουματος, referring to the blow which has caused the injury.

### 3. MEDICAL: ON APOPLEXY (PROBLEMATA?). 2nd cent. B.C.

Papyrus of good quality.

7 × 6.7 cm.

Written along the fibres.

Arsinoite nome.

A small fragment of a medical work, written in a clear, firm semi-cursive hand with very black ink. The subject of apoplexy is dealt with in ll. 5-6. The fact that the ends of ll. 1 and 4 are left blank suggests that we have here a work in the form of question and answer: cf. P. Milan 15 (also on apoplexy); P. Aberdeen 11, both from the second century A.D.; cf. also the much earlier papyrus published by G. A. Gerhard, *Sitzb. d. Heidelb. Ak. d. Wiss., Abh.* xiii (1913); and see on this W. Jaeger; *Diokles von Karystos*, pp. 33 ff. Our fragment is too small for reconstruction, although we have some evidence for the approximate length of the lines; the papyrus is a palimpsest and bears clear traces of its original writing, in the same hand apparently, in one place, so that several letters in three consecutive lines can be made out. They read as follows: ... Διωνυσωπιπολ... / ... νανταρεω... / ... αργετ... Epic lines apparently; I have not, however, been able to identify them.

5 οἱ μ]εν ἐκ φύσεως ἀποπλη[κτοι εἰσιν, οἱ δε . . .  
 ]χοῦδρω[.....]ομεναδ[  
 ]σμου κατεχομενοις [  
 ]ε το παθος [

]ἀποπληκτοι γιν[ονται  
 ].. κισσοι μετ[

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4. Perhaps δια τινα αἰτιαν γινεταί το παθος. Cf. the text published by Gerhard, mentioned above, fr. 17, ll. 11 ff.

5 f. The sense seems to be that apoplexy can arise either from a natural predisposition to the disease or from some subsequently acquired condition, with which the κηροί mentioned in the next line are connected.

#### 4. ST. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA(?) 8th cent. A.D.

Leaf of a parchment codex.

28 × 38 cm.

Arsinoite nome.

Remains of a single leaf from a large vellum codex. The leaf is badly worm-eaten and the verso (on which the numeral  $\bar{B}$  is visible in the right-hand lower margin) has been stuck with dark-brown glue to a sheet of papyrus. It has proved impossible to read this side by photographic means or to remove the glue, which runs when moistened, without defacing the writing. A few letters here and there are legible; there is a reference to τροπή (cf. recto, col. i, l. 23) about two-thirds of the way down the second column; this column ends, apparently in the middle of a word, with the letters κφω. Mr. Roberts suggests some case of ἐκφώνησις.

The recto bears clear writing in dark-brown ink; the hand is a large bold uncial rather similar to the example published by Schubart in *Papyri Berolinenses*, plate 50 (A.D. 710). Enough of the text is preserved to place the subject beyond doubt. It is an apologetic work, in which the writer sets forth his theological position and justifies his acts; several expressions in the text which occur, in some cases as regular clichés, in the works of St. Cyril of Alexandria suggest that he is the author, although, as Professor Maas has pointed out, there are no peculiarly Cyrilline compound words. The impression of Cyrilline authorship is strengthened by the fact that the writer speaks as a high ecclesiastical authority (cf. i. 32 ff.; ii. 15 ff.) with power to grant or withhold communion, to approve or condemn; the theological views which he expresses also seem to agree with St. Cyril's.

The following abbreviations of *nomina sacra* occur: ΨΩ, ΘΥ, col. i, l. 13; ΟΥΝΟΥ, ib. l. 21. At the ends of several lines (i. 7, 14, 21; ii. 19(?), 20(?)), to save space, a final *N* is represented by a stroke above the preceding vowel; there is apparently an apostrophe in i. 21; a curved mark above an initial vowel in i. 37; ii. 11 perhaps indicates a rough breathing, although a very similar mark is used twice above *Y* in ii. 16 where the breathing is smooth; diaeresis is found with *I* in i. 9; 35. Low point is used in i. 9, 11, 15, 22, 37; ii. 10, 15, 16, 18; high point in i. 7; ii. 17. An initial *A* set out in the margin, in a mutilated passage, at ii. 8, perhaps indicates a fresh chapter. I am indebted to the Clarendon Press Reader for several suggestions.

#### Transcription:

##### Recto i

ΤΗΝΑΠΟΛΙΝΑΡΙΟΥΔΟ  
Ξ[.]ΝΚΑΙΤΗΝΝΕΣΤΟ  
[...].ΔΥΣ[...].Μ[...].ΗΓΟΥ  
[...].  
[...].ΤΟΥ  
[...].ΑΡΚΩ  
[...].ΜΕΝΩ\*  
[...].ΑΚΟΠΙΣΤΙΑΝ  
[...].ΠΟΜΑΙ.ΙΣΗΣΚΑΙ  
[...].ΤΗΣΑΣΕΒΕΙΑΣΕΙ  
[...].ΑΙ.ΣΤΕΥΩΝ.ΤΟΜΕ  
[...].ΣΜΟΝΗΔΥΑΔΑΤΩ  
ΜΟΝΟΓΕΝΕΙΩΤΟΥΘΥ

##### ii

ΚΑΙΣΩΤΗ.[  
ΒΑΙΩΣΕΣΥΜ[  
ΚΑ.ΕΠ...[  
ΜΑΙ...[  
ΑΥΤΗ[  
ΑΠ.[  
ΠΡΑ[ ]N  
ΑΦΙ[ ]  
ΛΑΜ...[ ]N  
ΤΙΑΡΙΟΥ.[ ]  
ΚΑΙΘΠΕ[ ]  
ΓΡΑΜΜ.[ ]E  
ΝΟΥΤΗ[ ]K

## Transcription:

## Recto i

## ii

15 ΚΑΤΑΤΗΝΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ  
 ..ΟΣΑΠΤΕΙΝ.ΚΑΙΤΟ  
 ΤΗΝΕΜΥΥΧΟΝΑΥΤΟΥ  
 ΚΑΙΠΑΝΑΓΙΑΝΣΑΡΚΑ  
 ΜΗΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗΝ  
 [...]ΜΟΛ.ΓΕΙΝ.ΛΗΝ  
 20 [...]ΤΙΑΣΜΟΝΟΝΧΩ  
 [...]Δ'ΗΕΞΟΥΝΟΥΤΗ  
 [...]ΞΙΝΕΣΧΗΚΕΝΑΙ.  
 [...]ΑΤΡΟΠΗΝΤΟΥ  
 [...]ΓΕΓΕΝΗ[...].  
 25 [...]ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜ[...].Ν  
 [...]ΤΟΙΣΟΥΝ[...].Σ..[  
 [...]ΜΕΝΩΝ[...].  
 [...]ΑΝΔΗΠΟΤΟΥΝ  
 [...]ΝΕΜΠΕΠΤΩ  
 30 [...]ΙΝΕΙΠΩΝΠΛΑ  
 [...]ΑΙΜΗΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ  
 [...]ΑΣ[...].ΦΑΣΚΑΙΜΗ.Ε  
 ΚΟ.[...].ΑΥΤΩΝ  
 ΜΗ[...].ΟΝΠΡΟΣ  
 35 ΪΕΜ[...].ΘΗΣ  
 ΚΑ[...].ΘΕΥΤΟΥΠΙΣΤΕ  
 ΩΣΕΧ[...].ΜΑΙ.ΗΝΤΟΕΝ  
 ΝΙΚΑΙΑΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝΤΕ

ΚΛΗΣ[ ]ΟΣ  
 ΜΟΙ.Δ..ΚΤ.[.....]Υ  
 ΤΟ.ΟΥΤΕΤΟΙΣΕΥΣ[.....]Ν  
 ΕΠΕΣΚΗΥΑ.ΕΥ.[.....]Ρ  
 ΚΑΙΑΝΘΗΤΟΝ.[.....]  
 ΔΙΑΤΑ.[...]ΤΤΟΝΤΑ[...]  
 ΠΑΡΗΜΙΝΕΚΚΛ.[...]  
 ΚΑΙΤΟΝ[.]ΑΤΑΥΤΗ[...]  
 ..ΧΡΙΣΤ.ΗΛΑΟΝΑ[...].Υ  
 ].Μ.ΤΕΥΩ[  
 ].ΣΝΟ[  
 ]..[

Ε[  
 .[  
 Μ[  
 Α.[  
 ΤΑΥ.[ ]ΩΣ  
 ΔΟΓΜ[ ]  
 ΤΗΚΑ[ ]Υ  
 ΗΜ.[ ]ΜΑΙ  
 ΚΑΤΑΚΕΚΡΙ[...].ΥΣΕ  
 ΩΝΓΑΡΚΑΙΜ[...].ΦΩΝ

## Recto i

## ii

την Ἀπολιναριον δο-  
 ξ[α]ν και την Νεστο-  
 ρ[ω]ν δυσ[φη]μι[αν] ἡγον-  
 μ[αι.....].  
 5 .[.....].του  
 .[ ]σ]αρκω-  
 [.....].[...].μενω(ν)  
 [...]κακοπιστιαν  
 [...]επομαι ἰσης και  
 10 [της αὐ]της ἀσεβειας εἰ-  
 [ν]αι πιστευων, το με-  
 [ρ]ισμον ἢ δυαδα τῶ  
 Μονογενει Ὑ(ι)ω του Θε(ε)ου  
 κατα την οικονομια(ν)  
 15 προσαπτειν, και το  
 την ἐμφυλον αὐτου  
 και παναγιαν σαρκα  
 μη ἀνθρωπινην  
 [δ]μολογειν, πλην  
 20 [ἀμαρ]τίας μονον χω-  
 [ρις, ἀ]λλ' ἢ ἐξ οὐ(ρα)νου τη(ν)  
 [ὑπαρ]ξιν ἐσχηκεναι,  
 [ἢ κατ]α τροπην του  
 [Λογου] γεγενη[σθ]αι

και σωτηρ[ιον εβε]-  
 βαιωσε συμ[βολον].  
 και ἐπι[  
 μαι ...[  
 αυτη[  
 απ.[  
 πρα[ ]ν  
 Ἀφι[ ].  
 λαμβαν[ ]ν  
 τιαριον α[ ]ν  
 και ὁπε[ ]  
 γραμμα[ ]μ]ε  
 νου τη[ ]κ-  
 κλησ[ια. ]ος  
 μοι· διωκτο[ν γαρ το]υ-  
 το· οὔτε τοις εὐσ[εβεσι]ν  
 ἐπεσκηψα· εὐη[θες γα]ρ  
 και ἀνηγον. [τους δε]  
 διαταρ[α]ττοντα[ς τη(ν)]  
 παρ' ἡμιν ἐκκλη[σια(ν)]  
 και τον [κ]ατ' αὐτη[ν φι-  
 [λο]χριστον λαον α[...].ν  
 [...]ματευω[  
 [ ]ισνω[



25	[....]φαντασμ[...]	[ ]..[
	[.....].τοῖς οὖν[...]	
	[....].μενων η[...]	
	[... οἱ]ανδηποτου	
	[.....]ν ἐμπεπτω-	ε[
30	[κ....]ν εἰπων, Πλα-	.[
	[νωντ]αι μὴ εἰδότες	μ[
	[τ]ας [γρα]φ[α]ς, καὶ μὴτε	α.[
	κομ[ωνιαν] αὐτων	ταντ[ ]ως
	μὴ[τε προσο]δῶν προσ-	δογμ[ ].
35	ιευ[ενος, της] ὀρθης	τηκα[ ]υ
	κα[ι ἀνο]θευτου πιστε-	ημ.[ ἡγου]μαι
	ως ἔχ[ο]μαι, ἦν το ἐν	κατακεκρι[σθαι] φύσε-
	Νικαία(ι) μακαριον τε	ων γὰρ καὶ μ[ο]ρφων

'The opinion of Apolinarius and the blasphemy of Nestorius I consider ..... the evil belief of those who ..... I believing that it involves equal and identical impiety to attribute partition or duality to the Only-begotten Son of God according to the Dispensation as not to acknowledge His animate and all-holy Flesh human (save only in its being free from sin), but (to assert) that it got its existence either from Heaven or by a mutation of the [*Logos*, .....] phantasm. To those therefore ..... having fallen [into] any [error?] whatsoever ..... having said, They do err, not knowing the scriptures, and accepting neither their communion nor their access, I am holding to the true and uncontaminated faith which the blessed and salutary *symbolon* in Nicaea has affirmed, ..... [(Nor have I .....)] the Church ....., for that would be the act of a persecutor; nor have I blamed the pious, for that would be foolish and absurd; but those who throw into confusion the Church here with us, and the Christ-loving laity who belong to it, [these] do I ..... I consider to be condemned; for of natures and forms .....

i. i. την Ἀ. δοξ[α]ν καὶ την Ν. δυσφημ[αν]: these two expressions occur, separately, many times in the works of St. Cyril; here they are combined because he is comparing the impiety of the two heretics.

9. Read ἐντρ[ε]πομαι? But if so I cannot complete the sentence.

14. οἰκονομα(ν): in the sense of 'Incarnation'.

19 f. πλην[ἀμαρ]τίας μονον χω[ρις]: cf., for example, Πρὸς Ἀλέξ. π. πίστεως, Migne P.G. lxxvii. 1113: ὁμοιώθη γὰρ ἡμῖν κατὰ πάντα, χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. There is a smudge of glue before πλην, which probably conceals a diacritical mark.

23. Cf. Hippolytus, *Contra haeres. Noët. 17 fin.* (P.G. x. 828): ἄνθρωπος τέλειος προελθὼν· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἢ τροπήν, ἀλλὰ ἀληθῶς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος. In l. 25 the space will not admit the supplement ἢ κατὰ.

25 f. Before τοῖς οὖν an infinitive meaning 'believe', 'assert' or the like seems needed.

29. ....]ν: supply πλανην or possibly δοξαν or μανιαν.

29 f.: ἐμπεπτω[κοσ]ν would not fill the space.

30 ff.: Πλα[νωντ]αι κτλ.: cf. Cyr. *Thesaurus* (Migne, P.G. lxxv. 77): πλανῶνται γὰρ ὄντως, μὴ εἰδότες τὰς γραφὰς μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ. Elsewhere in St. Cyril's works the quotation (Matthew 22. 29) is made more literally: πλανᾶσθε, μὴ εἰδότες κτλ. So P.G. lxxviii. 748; lxxiii. 184; ib. 312; ib. 345; lxxv. 125; ib. 432; ib. 542; ib. 1196; ib. 1293; lxxvi. 229; ib. 261; ib. 437; ib. 1144; lxxvii. 317. In some of these passages the reference is to one or more of the doctrines here condemned.

34. [προσο]δῶν: cf. Joh. Chrys. *In 1 Cor. Hom. 28. 2* (P.G. lxi. 233): καὶρὸν οἶδε προσόδου καὶ κοινωνίας.

37. το ἐν Νικαία(ι) κτλ.: i.e. the Nicene Creed.

ii. 9 f.: possibly the genitive of some word of Latin origin or ]ν|τι Ἀρκερίου.

13 f.: perhaps τη[. παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκκλη[σια·]; cf. 19 f. below.

18 f.: or [τον δε] | διαταρ[α]ττοντα [τη(ν)].

19 f. [τη(ν)] παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκκλη[σια(ν)]: αἱ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκκλησίαι is used by St. Cyril of the Churches of Egypt in general; the singular here (cf. αὐτη(ν) below) perhaps denotes the Church of Alexandria.

21 f. Some compound of Χριστός seems needed, for if the name stood alone it would presumably be abbreviated like the other *nomina sacra*.

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## CICERO, AD ATTICUM 4. 3<sup>1</sup>

BEFORE daybreak on 23 November<sup>2</sup> 57 B.C., about 11 weeks after his return from exile, Cicero wrote to Atticus and recorded for him, in diary form, events at Rome between 3 November and the date of writing. Clodius and his gangs were still causing trouble on the streets, interfering with the rebuilding of Cicero's house on the Palatine (§ 2), and even molesting Cicero himself (§ 3). Clodius was a candidate for the curule aedileship; if he were elected, he would succeed in evading the accusation for *vis* which had been brought against him by Milo;<sup>3</sup> he therefore made full use of his gangs to intimidate Rome and thus accelerate the elections. He was supported in this manoeuvre by the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, who planned to hold the *comitia* (for the election of curule aediles) by surprise; this plan, however, was being thwarted by the tribune Milo, who was ready to use his power of *obnuntiatio* (backed by a sufficient display of force) to prevent the elections being held.

The whole letter bears obvious traces of the excitement under which it was written: short staccato sentences throughout, with frequent ellipse of the main verb or use of the historic infinitive. This style sometimes increases the difficulty of establishing the text and interpretation. It is with two difficult passages that I mainly wish to deal (sections B and C below), but first I shall try to refute an ingenious theory which the latest editor of the Letters has put forward on a topographical point (section A).

### A (§ 4)

On 14 November there was a meeting of the senate (§ 3). Thereafter Clodius threatened the worst if the elections were not held; Milo retaliated by giving notice that he would 'watch the skies' on every day on which they could be held. The next date mentioned by Cicero (§ 4, *ad init.*) is 19 November; but, before going on to record what happened on 19 November, Cicero sums up the situation as follows: 'haec tamen summa: nisi Milo in campo obnuntiasset, comitia futura', a sentence to which I return below.

On 19 November, long before daybreak (actually, before midnight), Milo took up his position in the Campus Martius with a gang of thugs strong enough to prevent Metellus from disregarding his *obnuntiatio*; the result was that Clodius did not<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Professor E. Fraenkel for reading an earlier draft of this article and making some suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> For this date see B below (*ad init.*).

<sup>3</sup> For Milo's two attempts in this year to bring

Clodius to trial for *vis* see E. Meyer's long note in *Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 109-12 (summarized by Constans, p. 88, n. 1).

<sup>4</sup> Presumably neither did Metellus; this (I think) is the implication of Cicero's words *Milo*

venture to appear. Metellus then tried a trick: he said that next day he would proceed to hold the elections, not in the Campus Martius, but in the *comitium*<sup>1</sup> (on the northern side of the forum), his purpose being to divert Milo to the *comitium* long enough to enable himself to get the election-proceedings started<sup>2</sup> on the Campus Martius. Accordingly, on the morning of 20 November, Milo turned up before daybreak in the *comitium*; meanwhile, says Cicero, 'Metellus cum prima luce furtim in campum itineribus prope devius currebat; adsequitur inter lucos hominem Milo, obnuntiat.' In the last sentence most scholars since Malaspina (1563) have taken *inter lucos* as an equivalent of *inter duos lucos*, which was the name sometimes given to the depression<sup>3</sup> between the two summits of the Capitoline hill (viz. the Capitol on the S.W. and the *Arx* on the N.E.). Since *duos*, to judge from all other occurrences,<sup>4</sup> seems to have been an integral part of the name,<sup>5</sup> Wesenberg proposed to insert *duos* here, on the theory that *II* may easily have dropped out of the text in front of the first two letters of *lucos*.<sup>6</sup> However, Constans, the latest editor of Cicero's Letters, refuses to believe that the region called *inter duos lucos* can possibly be in question here; he adduces three arguments (p. 89, n. 1):

1. The topography is wrong: Metellus could have got into the region called *inter duos lucos* only by coming from the forum and ascending the *clivus Capitolinus*; but, if he did take this route, Milo, posted in the *comitium*, would have been certain to see him, and how, in that case, could Cicero have talked of Metellus using *itineribus prope devia*?
2. Milo caught up with (*adsequitur*)<sup>7</sup> Metellus and delivered his *obnuntiatio*; but it

*permansit* (sc. in *Campo Martio*) *ad meridiem* (obviously waiting for Metellus to appear). I do not think that the next sentence but one ('Metellus tamen postulat ut sibi postero die in foro obnuntietur') implies that Milo did use the *obnuntiatio* against Metellus on 19 November.

<sup>1</sup> At this time the meeting-place of the *comitia tributa populi* (which elected the curule aediles) was normally the Campus Martius; cf. Mommsen, *Staatsr.* iii, p. 382.

<sup>2</sup> The *obnuntiatio* had to be delivered 'non comitiis habitis, sed prius quam habeantur' (Cic. *Phil.* 2. 81).

<sup>3</sup> Dion. Halic. (*Antiq. Rom.* 2. 15. 4) definitely applies the name *inter d.l.* to this depression (*τὸ μεταξὺ χωρίον τοῦ τε Καπιτωλίου καὶ τῆς ἄκρας*), and explains it by the fact that, when the name was given, the hills on either side of it were covered with woods; to justify the use of the word *lucos*, we must suppose that these woods were sacred woods; and we must also suppose that the name was retained even after the woods themselves had disappeared. Dion. is relating the legend of Romulus' foundation of his *asylum* in this region; of the seven other occurrences of the name *inter d.l.*, it is remarkable that two (Livy 1. 8. 5, Vell. 1. 8. 5) are likewise in connexion with the foundation of the *asylum*, one (Cic. *Div.* 2. 40) implies the general associations of the *asylum*, and three (Vitr. 4. 8. 4, Ovid *Fast.* 3. 430, *C.I.L.* i<sup>2</sup>, p. 233) are in connexion with the *aedes Veiovis* in the same region; the other passage is Propert. 4. 8. 31.

<sup>4</sup> The Propertius passage is not really an

exception, since there *inter Tarpeios lucos* is a poetical variation of *inter duos lucos*.

<sup>5</sup> For this reason Jordan (*Comm. Phil. in hon. Mommsen.*, p. 364; *Krit. Beitr.*, p. 273) proposed to emend *lucos* in our passage to *vicos*, comparing Suet. *Iul.* 39. 4 'ad quae omnia spectacula tantum undique confluit hominum ut plerique advenae aut inter vicos aut inter vias tabernaculis positae manerent', where *vici* (streets inside Rome) are contrasted with the wider *viae* (roads inside or just outside Rome). This emendation is adopted by Müller (who stresses its palaeographical probability), but (a) *inter vicos* without qualification would not really repeat the idea of *itineribus prope devius*, and, if it is not intended to do so, it is quite otiose; (b) the preposition *inter* is not appropriate in our passage.

<sup>6</sup> It is just as probable that the word *duos* has dropped out in front of the very similar word *lucos*.

<sup>7</sup> One cannot refute this argument by taking *adsequitur* as the equivalent of *sequitur* (and so *inter <duos> lucos* of the route followed by Milo only); the meaning of *adsequi* in classical Latin is sufficiently established by such passages as Cic. *Off.* 1. 110 'nec quicquam (attinet) sequi quod adsequi non queas'. Nor would it help to suggest reading *sequitur* for *adsequitur* (*ad* being an erroneous dittography of the last two letters of *currebat*), since then the use of *sequitur* would be strained (the routes of the two being different), and in any case the context demands a reference to Milo's attainment of his objective.



does not seem that he could have done so elsewhere than in the place where the *comitia* were to be held, i.e. either in the *comitium* or in the Campus Martius; the *comitia* certainly could not be held in the region called *inter duos lucos*.

3. Cicero says expressly, at the beginning of § 4, that the *obnuntiatio* took place in the Campus Martius: *nisi Milo in campo obnuntiasset*.

It will be convenient to deal with these three arguments in the reverse order:

(a) The third argument is based on a misinterpretation of the Latin. With *haec tamen summa* Constans supplies a present (*est*); the conditional sentence he takes as an 'unreal' condition in past time. According to this view Cicero is looking back from 23 November (the date on which he wrote the letter) and giving his final summing-up to date; he is stating definitely that *Milo in campo obnuntiavit* (some time between 19 and 23 November), and that, had he not done so, the elections would have been held. A careful reading of the context will show that Constans is wrong. This is not the place for such a *final* summing-up, since Cicero at once proceeds to record the events of 19–23 November; only after doing so does he give his final summing-up of the situation as it presented itself to him on 23 November, using exactly the same words (*sed haec summa est*, § 5). What we have at the beginning of § 4 is an *interim* summing-up of the situation as it presented itself to Cicero or any other observer between 14 and 19 November; such an observer would, at any time between these two dates, have formulated the situation thus: '*nisi Milo in campo obnuntiaverit, comitia futura sunt*'. On this view nothing whatever is stated or implied about whether or not, on or after 19 November, Milo actually *in campo obnuntiavit*. With *haec tamen summa* we must supply *erat*, and the conditional sentence is not a 'past unreal' but a future condition transferred to past time.<sup>2</sup> So, correctly, Wieland:<sup>3</sup> 'wofern Milo seinen Einspruch nicht im Marsfelde thun würde, sollten die Comitien . . . ihren Fortgang haben'.

(b) Constans's second argument can likewise be disposed of without difficulty: we have no evidence to prove that an *obnuntiatio* delivered by a tribune to a consul who was on his way to hold an election was invalid, but, even if this were so, it would have been pointless for Metellus to rely on this technicality and continue on his way, undaunted, to the Campus Martius, because it was obvious that Milo would merely follow him and repeat his *obnuntiatio* there; the fact that Milo *inter <duos> lucos obnuntiavit* in no way implies that the *comitia* were to be held *inter <duos> lucos*.

<sup>1</sup> So too Shuckburgh, and already Manutius.

<sup>2</sup> This is a form of conditional sentence which is entirely ignored by nearly all the works on Latin syntax which I have consulted. I have found only two writers who even touch on the point: H. C. Nutting in *The Latin Conditional Sentence* (Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Phil. viii, No. 1), pp. 113 ff., 161 ff. (he calls it the 'futurum in praeterito' construction); F. Thomas in *Recherches sur le subjonctif latin*, pp. 239 ff. (some remarks on what he calls 'subjonctifs d'indétermination'). Yet examples are not particularly rare, though they are liable to be confused either with the 'past unreal' form or with the 'sub-oblique' form. No doubt some examples can be interpreted as 'past unreal' (e.g. Cic. *Mil.* 58 'quos nisi manu misisset, tormentis etiam dedendi fuerunt'), but our example is a clear instance where such an interpretation is inappropriate; it is impossible (*pace Webster*) in Cic. *Flacc.* 39 'si veras (sc. litteras) protulissent, criminis nihil

erat; si falsas, erat poena'. Again, no doubt some examples can be interpreted as 'sub-oblique' (e.g. Cic. *Verr.* 3. 70 'quantum Aponius edidisset deberi, tantum ex edicto dandum erat'), but this interpretation is impossible, e.g. in Hor. *Sat.* 1. 9. 36 'casu tunc respondere vadato | debebat; quod ni fecisset, perdere litem'; particularly instructive are the epistolary tenses in Cic. *Att.* 2. 24. 4 'nunc reus erat . . . Vettius de vi et, cum esset damnatus, erat indicium postulaturus. quod si impetrasset, iudicia fore videbantur' (representing *erit damnatus* and *impetraverit* transferred to the past; the former, in a *cum* clause, shows that the phenomenon is not confined to conditional sentences).

<sup>3</sup> Wieland's translation, based though it is on out-of-date texts and written in an expansive (almost verbose) style, is still very much worth consulting for the accurate interpretation of Cicero's Letters.

(c) Constans's first argument also is not convincing. The straightforward route for anyone coming from the forum (or anywhere south of it) and making for the *Saepta* part of the Campus Martius was through (or past) the *comitium* and along the street (called, at least later, *clivus Argentarius*) which skirted the eastern and north-eastern sides of the *Arx*; if Metellus was overtaken anywhere near the *inter duos lucos* region, this alone shows that he must have been using a route which (from the point of view of his objective) can very properly be described as *prope devium*, even if part of that route were the *clivus Capitolinus* itself. Moreover, it would be difficult for Constans to prove that Metellus could not have *hoped*, by using *itinera prope devia*, to get on to the *clivus Capitolinus* unobserved by Milo (posted in the *comitium*), especially as he would be aided by the twilight of dawn (*cum prima luce*); that he did not succeed is obvious (in fact he may well have been sighted by Milo's scouts in the neighbourhood of the spot where the *clivus Capitolinus* bends at the western corner of the forum).

Constans, therefore, does not succeed in demolishing the traditional interpretation; no more does he succeed in establishing his own. He thinks that the *luci* in question are two groves situated on the Campus Martius itself, one of them perhaps the *lucus Petelinus* (near the Tiber, outside the *porta Flumentana*), in which Livy (6. 20. 11; 7. 41. 3) tells us that the *comitia* were held twice in the course of the fourth century B.C.; Constans therefore believes that Metellus had attempted to reach the Campus Martius along the bank of the Tiber, and to hold the *comitia*, not in the *Saepta*, but 'in a more secret place, *inter lucos*'. But if Metellus had tried any such trick, Cicero must have commented on it more fully. Moreover, the *lucus Petelinus* is not mentioned after 342 B.C.; it is very doubtful if the grove still existed in Cicero's day. Equally doubtful is the continued existence of the *Aesculetum*, in which an assembly was held in 287 B.C. (Pliny, *N.H.* 16. 37), and the approximate position of which (in the Campus Martius) has been inferred from the discovery of an altar-inscription;<sup>1</sup> in any case there is no evidence that the *Aesculetum* was ever a sacred grove (*lucus*).<sup>2</sup> The only other evidence<sup>3</sup> I have discovered for the existence of any sacred grove on the Campus Martius is an inscription which mentions a *lucus Feroniae*; this *lucus* is usually connected with the temple of *Feronia in campo* mentioned in another inscription.<sup>4</sup> In view of this quite inadequate evidence for the existence of any *luci* (still more of *luci* large enough and dense enough to provide a 'secret place') on the Campus Martius in Cicero's day, it would be quite unjustified to prefer Constans's view to the traditional interpretation.

#### B (§§ 4-5)

The next day (21 November) was a *nundinae*, on which no *contio* (and so no *comitia*) could be held;<sup>5</sup> likewise on 22 November, for some reason which we do not

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Platner-Ashby, *Top. Dict.*, s.vv. 'Aesculetum', 'Vicus Aesculeti'.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. G. Stara-Tedde, 'I boschi sacri dell' antica Roma' in *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma*, xxxiii (1905) p. 195, n. 4. Constans's view, that the *luci* mentioned in our passage were sacred groves on the Campus Martius, had already occurred to Stara-Tedde (*ib.*, p. 214, n. 2), only to be rejected by him in favour of Jordan's conjecture *vicos*.

<sup>3</sup> No one now believes that the *aedes Bellonae Pulvinensis* to which a *lucus* was attached had any connexion with the Circus Flaminius (in the Campus Martius); cf. Platner-Ashby, s.v. 'Bellona Pulvinensis'.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Platner-Ashby, s.v. 'Feronia'.

<sup>5</sup> The question whether a *contio* could be held on a *nundinae* at this date has been unnecessarily complicated, I would suggest, by the usual interpretation of *Att.* 1. 14. 1 'tum . . . tribunus pl. Fufius in contionem producit Pompeium. res agebatur in circo Flaminio, et erat in eo ipso loco illo die nundinarum *παιγυρις*'. This passage has been taken (e.g. by Mommsen, *Staatsr.* i. 199, n. 3; Liebenam in P.-W., s.v. 'contio', c. 1151. 29; Constans, p. 89, n. 1; cf. How, *ad loc.*, p. 70) to show that a *contio* could be held on a *nundinae*. However, *nundinarum παιγυρις* may mean only 'a crowd of people such as gathers on a *nundinae*', and need not imply that the day in question actually was a *nundinae*. Kroll may have seen this point; at least, in his

know,<sup>1</sup> no *contio* could be held (*contio biduo nulla*). At the beginning of § 5 Cicero gives the date and the hour of writing the present letter: 'ante diem VIII Kal. (i.e. 22 November) haec ego scribebam hora noctis nona'. So Sjögren, following what may safely be inferred<sup>2</sup> to have been the reading of the  $\Sigma$  archetype; all other editors, following the  $\Delta$  class of manuscripts, give the figure as VIII (i.e. 23 November). In support of the reading of  $\Sigma$  Sjögren points out that Cicero is recording the events of each day in succession, in diary form;<sup>3</sup> since the last date mentioned (at the end of § 4) is 21 November, we should expect the present date to be 22 November. For once he can be proved wrong. His view would make Cicero write this letter at the ninth hour of night, i.e. between about 2.15 and 3.25 a.m.,<sup>4</sup> on 22 November, but on that day (the day after the *nundinae*) Cicero tells us that no *contio* could be held; why then, at the time of writing, was Milo already in occupation of the Campus Martius (*Milo campum iam tenebat*)? On the morning of 22 November Milo could lie in bed; it was on the morning of 23 November that he had to be up and doing, to forestall Metellus. This proves that Cicero wrote the present letter early on the morning of 23 November; therefore  $\Delta$  (for once) is right in reading VIII, and  $\Sigma$  is wrong in adding another vertical stroke (dates are often wrongly given in our manuscripts because it was so easy for scribes to make mistakes in the number of these strokes). Constans is justified in not following Sjögren<sup>5</sup> on this point; no more has he been followed by historians such as Meyer (*Caesars Monarchie*<sup>2</sup>, 114)<sup>6</sup> and Gelzer (article on M. Tullius Cicero in P.-W. vii. A.C. 931).<sup>7</sup>

Cicero goes on (using the Epist. Impf.) to describe the state of affairs at the time of writing. Milo is already in occupation of the Campus Martius; Marcellus, a candidate (presumably for the curule aedileship) and a neighbour of Cicero's, is snoring so loudly that Cicero can hear him. Then comes a very difficult passage, given thus by Sjögren: 'Clodi vestibulum vacuum sane mihi nuntiabatur, paucis pannosis linea lanterna. meo consilio omnia illi fieri querebantur ignari', etc. From the manuscript evidence given by Sjögren it would seem that the reading of  $\Omega$  (the common ancestor of  $\Sigma$  and  $\Delta$ ) was *paucis pannosi sine alanterna(m)*; the final *m* (which appears only in the  $\Sigma$  class) may be disposed of by supposing that it really belongs to the following word *eo* (where all subsequent editors have adopted Manutius's emendation *meo consilio* for the manuscript reading *eo consilio*<sup>8</sup>). *sine* certainly stood in  $\Omega$ , and *sine lanterna* was read

article on *nundinae* in P.-W., he does not quote this passage as an exception to the general rule that a *contio* could not be held on a *nundinae*.

<sup>1</sup> Constans (p. 89, n. 1 *ad fin.*) suggests an explanation.

<sup>2</sup> NV read XIII (= 17 November), which is obviously impossible, but points to VIII (the reading of RP) as the original reading of  $\Sigma$ .

<sup>3</sup> Another letter written in diary form is *Q.F.* 2. 3; this form sometimes helps us to establish dates in the text which are variously or erroneously given in the MSS. (cf. Sternkopf in *Rhein. Mus.* lvii (1902), pp. 629-31; Sjögren in *Eranos*, xi (1911), pp. 216-17).

<sup>4</sup> At this time the calendar was already in the disorder which was corrected only by Julius Caesar in 46 B.C. According to the tables of Drumann-Groebe (*Geschichte Roms*, iii, pp. 797, 773) *a.d. VIII Kal. Dec.* 57 B.C. corresponded to 4 November of the real year, when each Roman *hora noctis* was between 8 and 9 minutes longer than our hour.

<sup>5</sup> Of course Sjögren is nevertheless right in his view that Cicero is recording the events of each day in succession; the 22 November is included in *biduo*.

<sup>6</sup> Though Meyer gives the date as 23 December, by a slip.

<sup>7</sup> In the case of other such details the historians are not so well justified in ignoring the results of Sjögren's work on the text of Cicero's Letters; e.g. the date in 56 B.C. (*Q.F.* 2. 3. 2) on which Milo appeared for the second time before a *contio* to answer the charge of *vis* brought against him by Clodius, and on which there was something of a riot over the Egyptian imbroglio, is still given by Meyer (op. cit., p. 132), Gelzer (op. cit., pp. 934-5), Carcopino (*César*<sup>2</sup>, p. 773), and Ciaceri (*Cicerone*<sup>2</sup>, ii. 77) as 6 February, though Sjögren has quite conclusively proved (*Eranos*, xi (1911), 216-17) that it was really 7 February.

<sup>8</sup> Constans, however, says that RP read *eo contio*.



by all scholars till Bosius's edition of 1580 (and still, after Bosius, by Junius), either with the nominative *pauci pannosi* (so Malaspina, supplying either *inerant* or *nuntiabantur*) or with the ablative *paucis pannosis* (so Manutius,<sup>1</sup> who took *sine lanterna* with *paucis pannosis*; and so Junius, who, however, took *sine lanterna* as a second descriptive phrase, parallel to the Abl. Qual. *paucis pannosis*, with *vestibulum*). *sine lanterna*, however, does not account for the mysterious letter *a* which the manuscripts offer in front of *lanterna(m)*; Bosius's emendation, *linea lanterna* (which he attributed, like other conjectures of his own, to his mythical *Decurtatus*), does account for this letter. Junius, as we have seen, refused to be convinced by Bosius's emendation, Graevius had some doubts about it and proposed an alternative emendation of his own,<sup>2</sup> and Boot 'hesitated a long time' before deciding to adopt it rather than return to *sine lanterna*; but all other editors whom I have consulted have accepted Bosius's emendation, apparently without misgivings.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless this emendation involves grave (I would suggest, fatal) difficulties.

If we read *linea lanterna* we can take the words either as nominatives or as ablatives, and in theory we can combine either of these possibilities either with *pauci pannosi* or with *paucis pannosis*. There are thus four theoretical possibilities:

1. *pauci pannosi, lineā lanternā*. So T.-P. and Purser. How does one construe these two nominative phrases in asyndeton? One might supply *nuntiaba(n)tur* with each, but the result is surely impossibly weak. T.-P. take the words as 'nominatives without a verb', comparing (in § 3 of this letter) *clamor, lapides, fustes, gladii*, but that is a passage of vivid narration, whereas our passage is one of description (of the scene in Clodius' *vestibulum*). With this reading I think that the only possible solution is to put the four words *pauci—lanterna* in quotation marks, and to regard them as a verbatim quotation by Cicero of the report given him by his spies or scouts.

2. *pauci pannosi lineā lanternā*. Presumably one supplies something like *nuntiabantur illic esse*. Such an adnominal Abl. Qual. denoting an external characteristic like dress or other equipment is, according to Vandvik (*Gen. u. Abl. Qual.*, p. 66), extremely rare.

3. *paucis pannosis lineā lanternā*. This is obviously impossible. One cannot take *paucis pannosis* as a dative and supply *nuntiabatur esse*; even if one could, *paucis pannosis est lanterna* is not Latin for 'there are a few ragamuffins with a lantern'.

4. *paucis pannosis lineā lanternā*. So nearly all modern editors (including Sjögren and Constans). *paucis pannosis* is presumably Abl. Qual. (parallel to the adjective *vacuum*) with *vestibulum*. *linea lanterna* is presumably likewise Abl. Qual., but is it also to be taken with *vestibulum* (i.e. parallel to *paucis pannosis*) or with *paucis* (i.e. parallel to *pannosis*)? In other words, does the lantern belong to the vestibule or to the ragamuffins? The punctuation of editors (no comma after *pannosis*) suggests that they take it in the latter way, and so, expressly, Constans ('il n'y a qu'une poignée de gueux avec une lanterne de toile'); but surely this combination of two *Ablativi Qualitatis*, one subordinate to the other, is very awkward and would be very difficult to parallel in Cicero (even in his Letters). I conclude that, with this reading, both *paucis pannosis* and *linea lanterna* must be Abl. Qual. with *vestibulum*.

No matter which of these readings and interpretations is adopted, there are still two difficulties in fitting the words into their context:

<sup>1</sup> His note is: 'ut eorum qui Clodium expectabant ignobilitas et infima condicio notetur, qui sine lanterna noctu praestolarentur'.

<sup>2</sup> His note is: 'non improbo lectionem codicis Decurtati, sed vide an non magis apposite ad hunc locum scribatur *paucis pannosis una lanterna*.'

<sup>3</sup> The only modern note of misgiving I have seen is the remark of K. Springer (*Bursian*, ccxxv, p. 104): 'Wie, wenn Cic. geschrieben hat *sine lanterna*, "einige zerlumppte Kerle, lichtscheues Gesindel"?'.

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<sup>4</sup> e.g.  
924 ff.;  
142 ff.;  
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(a) They cannot be made to square with *vacuum sane*. If there were even a few ragamuffins in Clodius' *vestibulum*, whatever they were doing there (whether waiting for Clodius, as Manutius thought,<sup>1</sup> or keeping guard there, or anything else), and whether or not they had a lantern, then Cicero's scouts could not have reported to him that the *vestibulum* was *vacuum sane* ('absolument vide', Constans). This is a difficulty which no commentator has faced, and for which no solution can be produced.

(b) Who are the *illi* whose complaints Cicero goes on to report in the next sentence, still using the Epist. Impf. (*querebantur*)? Are they the *pauci pannosi*? It seems very improbable that Cicero's scouts had been so skilful at eavesdropping that they had managed to overhear the conversation of these few ragamuffins in Clodius' vestibule. Far more probably the *illi* are other people belonging to Clodius' party, or perhaps Clodius' party in general;<sup>2</sup> but, if so, it seems probable that there have dropped out of the text some words which made the *illi* reference quite clear.<sup>3</sup>

Two further difficulties arise from what we know of the Roman *lanterna*. All the books of reference<sup>4</sup> give much the same account of *lanterna*; only two points in this account concern us here, viz. (a) the use which the Romans made of *lanternae*, (b) the material of which the sides were made.

(a) We are usually<sup>5</sup> told that the Romans used *lanternae* both in their houses and for lighting their way out of doors in the dark. But the only authority which is ever quoted for the former use is our present passage of Cicero. The typical use of the *lanterna* can be seen from such passages<sup>6</sup> as Plautus, *Amph.* 149, 341, 406 (where Sosia uses a *lanterna* to light him home from the harbour), Lucretius, 2. 388 (cf. Bailey, ad loc.: 'The picture is of a man taking a lantern out into the rain'), and glosses<sup>7</sup> like '*lanternae . . . quas circumferunt ad praebendum lumen quod venti flatus adire non potest*'. The archaeological evidence tallies with this literary evidence: 'nearly all the lanterns represented on surviving works of art are found in the hands of slaves'<sup>8</sup> (*lanternarii*). Toutain is justified in saying 'les Romains faisaient surtout usage des lanternes pour sortir de chez eux la nuit'. It is no doubt true that, as he also says, 'on doit penser que les lanternes avaient leur emploi partout où il était nécessaire de préserver le feu contre le vent',<sup>9</sup> but it is difficult to believe that the *vestibulum* of a Roman *domus* in Cicero's day (whatever picture one conceives of it<sup>10</sup>) was such a place. That *lanternae* were ever used (in place of *lucernae*, 'lamps') indoors seems a dangerous conclusion to draw from our passage alone, when one considers the suspicions to which the text is open on other grounds. This consideration of the use which the Romans made of *lanternae* casts additional doubt on all interpretations (with whatever reading) which attribute the *lanterna* to the *vestibulum*; if one construes in such a way as to attribute it to the ragamuffins, then presumably these ragamuffins were

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *praestolarentur* in his note.

<sup>2</sup> So Shuckburgh ('his party complains') and Wieland ('die Clodianer schieben von dem allen die Schuld auf mich').

<sup>3</sup> The other possibility is to suppose that, with the word *lanterna*, Cicero leaves the subject of the *pauci pannosi* and goes on to talk about Clodius' party in general. I think that such a transition would be very abrupt, even in Cicero's Letters; but, if one does adopt this view, one should at least make *meo consilio* begin a new paragraph (only Wieland does so).

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Toutain in Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 2, pp. 924 ff.; Blümner, *Die röm. Privataltertümer*, pp. 142 ff.; Hug in P.-W., s.v. '*lanterna*'. The fullest and best account is the article on 'Antike

Laternen und Lichthäuschen' by S. Loeschke in *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxviii (1909), pp. 370-430 (a reference which I owe to Professor Beazley).

<sup>5</sup> e.g. by Blümner and by Hug.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Empedocles, fr. 84 (Diels) *πρόσθον νόεων* and some of the other passages quoted by Loeschke (loc. cit., pp. 413-18).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Goetz, *Thesaurus Gloss. Emend.*, s.v. '*lanterna*'.

<sup>8</sup> Loeschke (loc. cit., pp. 370-1).

<sup>9</sup> e.g. on board ship (Livy 29. 25. 11) and for signalling purposes; see some of the passages quoted by Loeschke. Fremersdorf (*Das Beleuchtungs-Gerät in röm. Zeit*, p. 14) remarks that lanterns were no doubt used in stables and barns.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Blümner, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.

making (or possibly had just made, or were just about to make) a journey through the street in the dark.<sup>1</sup>

(b) We are told that the material used by the ancients for the sides of a lantern was usually horn, rubbed down till it reached the necessary degree of transparency, but that lantern-sides were sometimes made of hide (*δέσμα*) or bladder (*vesica*),<sup>2</sup> or of linen or canvas treated with oil (*geölte Leinwand* Blümner, Hug); glass is first mentioned by Isidorus (about A.D. 600). The evidence is almost entirely literary; the archaeological evidence generally allows us merely to infer the use of some perishable material, though small traces of horn have been found in two surviving lanterns.<sup>3</sup> For the use of linen or canvas the same two passages<sup>4</sup> are always quoted: our present passage from Cicero's Letters (as emended by Bosius) and Plautus *Bacch.* 446 'it magister quasi lucerna uncto expretus linteo' (Lindsay's text). Now the Plautus passage is a notorious *locus difficilis*. The *paedagogus* Lydus is complaining about the refractory ways of modern youth; the recalcitrant schoolboy breaks his master's head with his writing-tablet (441), and when the master protests to the boy's father he receives no satisfaction or sympathy but is dismissed with insult added to injury; the line in question (if genuine<sup>5</sup>) describes the master's disconsolate departure from the paternal presence. The main difficulty lies in the word *expretus*,<sup>6</sup> for which Hofmann in his revision of Walde's *Lat. etymol. Wörterb.* (s.v.) can still find no satisfactory etymology or meaning; it is quite certain,<sup>7</sup> however, that the word cannot mean *circumdatus*, *velatus*, the idea being that the wretched *paedagogus* has his broken head bound in a *lintheum* like a *lucerna* (lamp inside a lantern) *lintheo velata* (covered by the canvas of the lantern-sides).<sup>8</sup> Quite a different interpretation was suggested by Lindström in *Eranos*, xiii (1913), 213 ff.; he follows the view which takes *expretus* to be the Past Part. Pass. of *exsperno* (paraphrasing *repudiatus*, *cum contumelia dimissus*), and he makes *uncto lintheo* refer not to the *geölte Leinwand* of which the sides of the lantern were made, but (as *uncto* much more naturally suggests) to the wick (*ἐλλύχνιον*); the point will then be that the hair of the *paedagogus* is dripping with blood as the wick of a lamp drips with oil (Lindström puts it thus in French: 'dédaigné le maître n'a qu'à s'en aller, ayant la mèche trempée comme celle d'une lampe'). Hofmann (loc. cit.) raises various objections to Lindström's derivation and interpretation of *expretus*, but on the other hand (s.v. *linum*) accepts his interpretation of *lintheum* as 'wick'. In fact, whatever *expretus* may mean (or be a corruption of), and whatever the point of comparing the *paedagogus* to a *lucerna*,<sup>9</sup> there is no reasonable doubt that *lintheo* in *Bacch.* 446 does mean 'wick', as do *linum* in later authors<sup>10</sup> (references in Lewis and Short), *linamentum* in Celsus

<sup>1</sup> No doubt like the unfortunate individual whose skeleton was found, with a lantern near by, in the *atrium* of a house at Pompeii (Loeschke, loc. cit., p. 385).

<sup>2</sup> Considered inferior to horn in Martial's day (Martial 14. 62).

<sup>3</sup> Loeschke, loc. cit., p. 371-2.

<sup>4</sup> Empedocles (fr. 84 Diels), comparing the eye to a lantern, uses *δδοναι* (l. 8) of the membranes which enclose the pupil. According to Loeschke (loc. cit., p. 417, n. 18), this implies that E. is thinking of a lantern with sides of *δδονη*, but such an implication is by no means necessary.

<sup>5</sup> It is bracketed by Leo, whose note is: 'versus non huc pertinere videtur ab origine'.

<sup>6</sup> Which elsewhere occurs only in the difficult notices in Paul. Fest. (p. 69 Lindsay) *expreta antiqui dicebant quasi expertia habita* and in Gloss. Ansil. EX 1044 *expreta: valde consumpta*.

<sup>7</sup> It is equally certain that Ussing's view is impossible: he made the line part of the father's speech (reading *sit* as the first word), and took the sense to be that, just as the light in a lantern is hemmed in by the sides and thus prevented from doing damage by burning, so the *paedagogus* must be (*sit*) restrained and prevented from beating the boy.

<sup>8</sup> Though this view is still served up by Ernout in his Budé translation ('la tête entortillée dans un linge huilé, comme une lanterne'; in his commentary on the play he is more non-committal) and by A. Thierfelder, *De rationibus interpolationum Plautinarum* (Teubner, 1929), p. 91.

<sup>9</sup> N.B. not a *lanterna*.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Pliny, *N.H.* 19. 17 (of *linum*): 'quod proximum cortici fuit, stuppa appellatur, deterioris lini, lucernarum fere luminibus aptior'.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. 2474.

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(4. 27. 1 B, Marx), and *linteolum* (the diminutive of *lintheum*) in Prudentius (*Liber Cathemerinon* 5. 18);<sup>1</sup> therefore this passage in the text of Plautus, whatever view one takes of its authorship, cannot be used as evidence for the use of *geölle Leinwand* (or of any other kind of *Leinwand*) for the sides of lanterns. This being so, the only evidence left is our present passage of Cicero, or rather that passage as emended by Bosius;<sup>2</sup> and surely, considering the other difficulties inherent in the passage, it is quite unsafe to base any conclusions on this emendation.

I would therefore suggest the following conclusions:

1. Bosius's emendation *linea lanterna* is more ingenious than convincing. It is probably safer, *faute de mieux*, to return to the old reading *sine lanterna*. In support of this it is perhaps not irrelevant to note that, according to Drumann-Groebe's tables,<sup>3</sup> the date on which Cicero wrote this letter coincided with the date of the new moon; if any ragamuffins were abroad before 'the ninth hour of night' on that morning, they would need a lantern, and the fact that they had none might well be mentioned by Cicero to reinforce *pannosi*, 'ut eorum ignobilitas et infima condicio notetur' (Manutius).<sup>4</sup>

2. This passage should not be used as evidence for the use of linen or canvas in the sides of lanterns; in fact, the evidence for this use completely disappears.

3. The corruption in the manuscript text of our passage is probably not confined to *sine alanterna(m)*. It would seem that some words, which made easier the transition to the next sentence, have dropped out<sup>5</sup> between *nuntiaba(n)tur* and *paucis*; if the last of these words was a verb ending in *-bantur*,<sup>6</sup> one might easily explain their omission.

4. This passage should not be used as evidence for *lanternae* being used indoors.

#### C (§ 6)

In writing to Atticus Cicero often concludes a letter, whose content is primarily political, with a paragraph about private affairs. So in our letter (Sjögren's text): 'nos animo dumtaxat vigemus . . . ; re familiari comminuti sumus. Quinti fratris tamen liberalitati pro facultatibus nostris, ne omnino exhaustus essem, illo recusante subsidiis amicorum respondimus.' In this text there are two emendations of the unanimous reading of the manuscripts: (a) *liberalitati* is an emendation of the earliest editors (adopted by practically all their successors) for the genitive *liberalitatis*; (b) *respondimus* is an emendation of R. Klotz (adopted by all subsequent editors except Purser) for the present *respondemus*; at first sight we should certainly expect a past tense in the main clause, to justify the past tense *essem* in the subordinate clause. At two other points emendation has been suggested: (a) *essem* was changed by some of the sixteenth-century editors (to agree with their interpretations of the passage) to the third person, either to *esset* (Bosius) or to *sit* (Ursinus); (b) the connective *et* has

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Olck in P.-W., s.v. 'Flachs', 2459, 2471, 2474.

<sup>2</sup> It seems possible that Bosius had Plautus *Bacch.* 446 in mind when he proposed his emendation. His note is: 'linearum lanternarum frequens hodie usus est apud nos, ut et cornearum, quae olim Punicae dicebantur'; the last phrase is obviously a reference to the *lanterna Punica* (the nature of which is uncertain) in another passage of Plautus (*Aul.* 566).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 13, n. 4, above.

<sup>4</sup> Similarly in Epicharmus (fr. 35 Kaibel) it is a mark of the parasite's poverty that he has no

λύχνος to light him home in the dark after a party (ll. 8-10; a passage which Kaibel misinterprets).

<sup>5</sup> For other omissions in this letter cf. § 3 <est in>, *interiore <parte>* (Sjögren), <Milo>; § 5 *usu(ru)s*; § 6 <quam>.

<sup>6</sup> This may have helped to produce the corruption which the MSS. offer in *nuntiabantur* (which was certainly the reading of Q); as an alternative to the usual correction *nuntiabatur*, I would, on this assumption, suggest *nuntiabant*, comparing (for the use of the general third person plural in an Epist. Impf.) *Att.* 9. 16. 1 'a.d. vi Kal. Caesarem Sinuessae mansurum nuntiabant'.

been desiderated: Kayser and Wesenberg inserted it before *ne*, Malaspina suggested inserting it before *subsidiis*.

Whatever readings are adopted, the resulting sentence is very difficult indeed. We may first dispose of two points which are certain:

(a) *subsidiis*, in a financial sense, is amply confirmed for Cicero (if indeed confirmation is necessary) by *Prov. Cons.* 28 'sine hoc subsidio pecuniae'; ib. 12 'qui se etiam nunc subsidiis patrimoni aut amicorum liberalitate sustentant' (where, as in our passage, *subsidia* and *liberalitas* occur together).

(b) *respondere*, of a debtor, is to 'answer the calls' upon him (just as *appellare*, of a creditor, is to 'dun'); i.e. to repay his debt. So it was explained in our passage by Gronovius, who quoted *Att.* 16. 2. 2 'quamquam enim reliqua satis apta sunt ad solvendum, tamen saepe fit ut ii qui debent non respondeant ad tempus', and, for its construction with a dative of the debt repaid, Seneca, *Epp.* 87. 6 'late possidet, sed multum debet; ... nominibus non respondet; si creditoribus solverit, nihil illi supererit.' Other examples are found in the Jurists; e.g. *respondere creditoribus, r. legatariis*.<sup>1</sup> This explanation of our passage was rejected by Ernesti (ad loc.), who apparently believed that *respondere* could have this financial sense in Cicero only when used absolutely (as in *Att.* 16. 2. 2, quoted above); Ernesti himself<sup>2</sup> (*Clavis Ciceroniana*, s.v. 'respondere') explained *respondere* in our passage as equivalent to 'paria praestare', 'gratiam referre'.<sup>3</sup> Ernesti's view has been rightly ignored by subsequent scholars; Gronovius's interpretation is certainly correct.

How are we to construe the sentence? Every phrase between *liberalitati* and *respondimus* (-emus) has been taken in several different ways:

1. *pro facultatibus nostris*

(a) *pro* = 'instead of' (*àvτi*). 'Instead of using my own resources, I have repaid (am repaying) Quintus' generosity by using financial help from my friends.' So Boot.<sup>4</sup> It is true that in Cicero (e.g. *Orat.* 154 '... ain' pro 'aisne', 'nequire' pro 'non quire' ... dicimus'), as, for example, in Plautus<sup>5</sup> and in Livy,<sup>6</sup> *pro* can mean 'instead of', i.e. be equivalent to a negative ('ain', non 'aisne', dicimus); but, I suggest,<sup>7</sup> only where the word which would, in this formulation, be negated is the subject or the object of a verb, not in our example, where it would be Instr. Abl. (i.e. if Cicero had said 'non facultatibus nostris sed subsidiis amicorum debitum Quinto fratri solvimus'). T.-P.'s vague doubt whether Cicero would have used *pro facultatibus* in Boot's sense is thus justified.

(b) *pro* = 'in view of'. So T.-P.<sup>8</sup>

(c) *pro* in a limiting sense. 'Only so far as my resources allow(ed).' So Manutius, Malaspina, Orelli,<sup>8</sup> Constans. This is the only natural interpretation.

<sup>1</sup> e.g. *Dig.* 28. 8. 10; 29. 4. 1. 9; cf. *Vocab. Iurisprud. Rom.* (or Heumann-Seckel *Handlexikon*) s.v. 'respondere'.

<sup>2</sup> So apparently had Casaubon before him; in a MS. note in the margin of his copy of Bosius's edition (now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford) he glosses *respondemus* by *pares sumus*, with a reference to *Att.* 4. 10. 2 'ut possim tibi aliquid in eo genere respondere'.

<sup>3</sup> One might have supposed that Ernesti took the construction to be similar to that in *Fam.* 15. 21. 3 'cui quidem ego amori ... amore certe respondebo' (*amore* there corresponding to *subsidiis* here), but it is doubtful whether he did (since he does not include the phrase *subsidiis amicorum* in his quotation of our passage). Perhaps he was thinking rather of *par pari respondere* (Plautus,

Terence, Cicero, *Att.* 6. 1. 22), though even that is once used of paying a debt, by Atticus *apud* Cic. *Att.* 16. 7. 6 'provide, si cui quid debetur, ut sit unde par pari respondeatur' (a passage which Ernesti *ad loc.* unsuccessfully tries to explain away).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Mnemosyne*, 1892, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. *Capt.* 546; *Curc.* 587; *Pseud.* 292; *Trin.* 1051.

<sup>6</sup> e.g. 3. 71. 7; 5. 52. 14; 22. 12. 12; 22. 39. 20.

<sup>7</sup> This is certainly true of all the examples I have examined from Plautus, Livy (even the *pro eo ut* construction in 22. 1. 2), and Cicero.

<sup>8</sup> T.-P.'s interpretation of the sentence as a whole is followed by Shuckburgh; Orelli's by How.

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2. *ne omnino exhaustus essem* has been taken

- (a) Closely with *pro facultatibus nostris* in sense 1 (c) above ('only so far as my resources allow(ed), so as not to be completely drained out'); so Manutius (whose note is '*fratri reddimus non quantum accepimus sed quantum nostrae facultates patiuntur*'; ne, si id fieret supra facultates, ipse deinde omnino exhaustus egerem'), but apparently no one since the sixteenth century.
- (b) With *recusante*, either (i) closely: 'on his refusing to allow me to be completely drained out'; so Wesenberg (*Em. alt.*, p. 99); there are about half-a-dozen examples of *recusare ne* in Cicero<sup>2</sup> and one in Caesar<sup>3</sup>, but the resulting word-order is very unnatural (especially in a conversational postscript to Atticus) and not fully supported by *Off.* 3. 100 ('Regulus') *sententiam ne diceret recusavit*; or (ii) less closely: 'on his refusing to take money from me lest I be completely drained out'; so Orelli; a parallel for this use of *ne* with *recusare* can be found in *Att.* 15. 21. 1, but the word-order is still unnatural.
- (c) With *subsidiis amicorum respondimus (-emus)*. So T.-P. and Constans (see below). Similar was the interpretation of those scholars who emended *essem* to *esset* (Bosius, Ernesti, Wieland) or to *sit* (Ursinus).

3. *illo recusante* has been taken in three ways:

- (a) Closely with *ne*; cf. 2(b)(i) above.
- (b) = 'on his refusing to take money from me'; cf. 2(b)(ii) above.
- (c) = *illo nolente, illo invito*; so T.-P. and Constans. This use of *illo recusante* is abundantly confirmed by such examples as *Att.* 2. 15. 1 (*nullo recusante*), *Balb.* 17 (*me recusante*), *Verr.* 3. 19 (*Siculo uno recusante; tota Sicilia recusante*).

4. *subsidiis* has been taken in two ways:

- (a) As Instr. Abl.: 'I have repaid (am repaying) Quintus' generosity by financial help from my friends.' So nearly all editors and translators.
- (b) As dative parallel to *liberalitati*, the two datives being in asyndeton (unless, on Malaspina's suggestion, one inserts *et* before *subsidiis*). 'I have repaid (am repaying) (i) the help which Quintus generously gave me, (ii) the financial help which my friends gave me.' So Malaspina, whose note is: 'Ne minor amicorum ratio quam fratris habita a Cicerone videatur, praesertim illo recusante, placeret *et subsidiis*. Neque enim obscurum est eorum quoque opibus sublevatum fuisse. Adde quod adiungitur *pro facultatibus nostris*; quod non verum esset omnino si accederent amicorum subsidia.' The last sentence is Malaspina's argument against (a) above, viz. Cicero could not have said that he had repaid (was repaying) Quintus so far as his resources allowed if he had really been borrowing from his friends to do so.

As sample translations of the sentence as a whole, the following may be quoted:

T.-P.: 'I have repaid (*respondimus*) my brother's generosity (considering the state of my finances) by the assistance of my friends, to prevent my being left absolutely penniless, though he protests.'

Constans: 'Cela n'empêche pas que j'aie désintéressé (*respondimus*) mon frère Quintus de son aide généreuse, dans la mesure de mes moyens: ne pouvant pas me dépouiller complètement, je me suis aidé, malgré sa résistance, du secours de mes amis.'

Orelli: 'Quinto pro meis facultatibus respondere paratus, iam, illo ideo recusante, ne si id facerem omnino exhaustus essem, subsidiis amicorum respondeo.' So

<sup>1</sup> Merguet (s.v. *ne*) lists four examples from the speeches (*Verr.* 2. 60; 5. 141, not really an example; *Cluent.* 150; 154) and one from the

philosophical works (*Off.* 3. 100); there is only one in the Letters (*Fam.* 1. 9. 12).

<sup>2</sup> Meusel lists only *B.C.* 3. 82. 5.

How: 'I am repaying (*respondemus*) my brother's generosity so far as my means allow, and now that he refuses money from me, lest I should be completely beggared, I am appealing to the aid of my friends.' This interpretation (a) assumes asyndeton, a connective being missing before *ne*; (b) takes *pro facultatibus nostris* as parallel to *subsidiis amicorum* (= *partim f.n., partim s.a.*). The objection to (a) is that asyndeton at this point is very difficult, since it would not be clear to a reader that there is a break here; the objection to (b) is that such parallelism between a prepositional phrase and an Instr. Abl. is exceedingly awkward, if not impossible.

I suggest that all these interpretations are wrong, and that the truth has lain buried since the sixteenth century. In the first part of the sentence I should follow Manutius (see 2(a) above); in the second part I should follow Malaspina (see 4(b) above), except that I should understand a connective, not (as he did) before *subsidiis*, nor (as Orelli did) before *ne*, but before *illo*; *illo recusante* I should take as in 3(b) above. The sentence then falls into two parts, with *Quinti fratris liberalitati* exactly paralleled by *subsidiis amicorum* (dative+genitive):<sup>1</sup> 'I have repaid (am repaying) (a) the generous help which Quintus gave me, so far as my resources allow(ed), this so as not to be completely drained out; (b) (on Quintus' refusal to take money from me) the financial help which my friends gave me.' Asyndeton in Cicero's Letters is too common to call for remark; in our sentence the natural place for a break is before *illo*, since then *illo*, the first word in the second part of the sentence, picks up *Quinti fratris*, the first words in the first part of the sentence. The result is a perfectly natural Latin sentence.

It is also excellent sense. It assumes that Cicero, in the financial difficulties brought about by his exile and its consequences, had borrowed money not only from Quintus but from his friends as well. This would be an entirely reasonable assumption, even if it were a mere assumption; but it is supported by adequate evidence. We know that, in the first two months of his exile, Cicero received hospitality from Sicca (*Att.* 3. 2; 3. 4) and from M. Laenius Flaccus (*Fam.* 14. 4. 2); at Thessalonica he lived for nearly six months (23 May–November 58) in the house of Cn. Plancius,<sup>2</sup> whose services to him may not have been confined to those of hospitality.<sup>3</sup> In October–November 58, in two letters to Terentia (*Fam.* 14. 1. 5; 14. 2. 3), he reveals the source from which he expects financial help to come ('si erunt in officio amici, pecunia non derit'), and therefore urges her not to open her own purse too recklessly. Atticus himself, of course, did his duty (Nepos, *Att.* 4. 4.<sup>4</sup>; Cic. *Att.* 3. 20. 2), and M. Iuventius Laterensis supplied Cicero's family with funds (*Planc.* 73). The most convincing evidence, however, occurs in a letter to Atticus (4. 2. 7) written about a month before our present letter: 'ac forensium quidem rerum haec nostra consilia sunt, domesticarum autem valde impedita. domus aedificatur, scis quo sumptu . . . reficitur Formianum . . . Tusculanum proscripsi . . . amicorum benignitas exhausta est in ea re quae nihil habuit praeter dedecus.' Whatever be the reference in *ea re*,<sup>5</sup> the last sentence proves, not only that Cicero had been borrowing from his friends, but also that this source has now, in his view, dried up; this sentence by itself should have been sufficient to discredit all interpretations of our passage which represent Cicero as still borrowing from

<sup>1</sup> Malaspina's argument (see 4(b) above) against taking *subsidiis* as Instr. Abl. is perfectly valid.

<sup>2</sup> References in Drumann–Groebe, *Geschichte Roms*, 5. 633.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero uses the words *liberalitas* (*Att.* 3. 22. 1) and *iuvare* (*Planc.* 26) of them.

<sup>4</sup> Nepos here uses the word *donavit*, but it

seems safe to assume that not all the friends who helped Cicero with money regarded their contributions as free gifts.

<sup>5</sup> The usual explanation is that given by T.-P. ad loc.: 'the whole proceedings connected with Cicero's recall, which required considerable expense, e.g. in the hiring of bands of gladiators to face the followers of Clodius'.

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his friends. These interpretations, moreover, make an improbable assumption about Cicero's financial position, viz. that now, nearly three months after his return from exile, it is no better at all than it was immediately after his return (*Att.* 4. 1. 3), and that therefore he still has to borrow from a number of friendly Peters before he can repay brother Paul; whereas we should expect his position to be already a little easier,<sup>1</sup> and that it did go on becoming progressively easier is shown by *Q.F.* 2. 4. 3 (March 56; i.e. four months later): 'vivo paulo liberalius quam solebam; opus erat.'<sup>2</sup>

Thus in November 57 Cicero feels himself in a position to repay some of his outstanding debts; since his means are still limited, he cannot repay them all at once. He therefore starts to repay Quintus so far as his means allow (taking care not to bankrupt himself), but when Quintus refuses, out of true brotherly *pietas*, to take the money, Cicero begins to repay some of the debts he owes to his friends. Nothing could be more natural: blood is thicker than water, even in repaying one's debts, but one's other creditors too have to be satisfied.

We are now in a position to deal with the question of reading in *respondimus* (-emus). Now that we have split the sentence into two parts, it becomes possible to retain the unanimous reading of the manuscripts, *respondemus* (present), despite the past tense *essem*. With *Quinti fratris liberalitati* Cicero was going to use the past tense *respondimus* (the process of repaying Quintus is over, now that he refuses to take the money); hence *essem*. But with *subsidiis amicorum* a present tense is necessary, since the process of repaying his friends is still going on. The apparent irregularity has a perfectly good explanation, and is particularly natural in a letter to Atticus; for such a past tense of the subjunctive after a present tense of the main verb, where that main verb denotes a proceeding which is not confined to the present but also extends to the past, cf. Kühner-Stegmann, ii. 2. 186, who quote, *inter alia*, *Att.* 1. 13. 3 'nosmet ipsi, qui Lycurgei a principio fuissemus,<sup>3</sup> cottidie demitigamur' (*d.* = demitigati sumus et demitigamur), Caelius *apud Fam.* 8. 10. 1 'hoc quo modo acciperent homines, quam probabilis necessitas futura esset, vereor etiam nunc' (*v.* = verebar et vereor).<sup>4</sup> In adopting the emendation *respondimus* Sjögren unnecessarily abandons his own sound conservative principles.

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<sup>1</sup> And this is surely the only sense which provides a satisfactory antithesis to *re familiari comminuti sumus*; that an antithesis was intended is shown by *tamen* (to which little attention has been paid).

<sup>2</sup> So all editors except Sjögren, whose punctuation (*opus erat* with the following sentence) will convince nobody.

<sup>3</sup> Differently interpreted by Schmalz-Hof-

mann, p. 702 (as representing *fueramus*) and by Boot, ad loc. (as conditional, which is certainly wrong).

<sup>4</sup> It is true that these two examples are easier, since *cottidie* and *etiam nunc* imply a backward time-reference; in our passage this backward reference would be clear to Atticus from the past tense *essem*.



## PROPERTIANA

I. I. 19 f.

at uos, deductae quibus est fallacia lunae  
et labor in magicis sacra piare focis . . .

pellacia Fruler.

HOUSMAN put the case against *fallacia* with characteristic trenchancy in an early paper (*Journ. Phil.* xvi, p. 25). 'I conceive', he wrote, 'that so far as Latinity is concerned the words *deductae fallacia lunae* may bear any one of three meanings. First they may mean "false pretence of bringing down the moon": a sense peremptorily forbidden by the context. Mr. Lucian Mueller points out that Propertius cannot look for help to those whom he holds and asserts to be impostors, and that argument is clinched by the *tunc ego crediderim* of 23: Propertius now doubts whether the power of magic be real or no, but turn Cynthia's heart and he will believe. Secondly *deductae fallacia lunae* may legitimately mean "deceiving men by bringing down the moon" on the analogy of Ov. *Met.* 13. 164 *deceperat omnes, | in quibus Aiacem, sumptae fallacia uestis*. But plainly this sense is no better than nonsense: if magicians bring down the moon as men believe them to do, then men are not deceived. Equally absurd is the third possible sense of the words, deceiving the moon and bringing her down. I know that *Pan deus Arcadiae captam te, Luna, fefellit | in nemora alta uocans*, but in what sense do magicians *fallere lunam*? What conceivable deceit do they employ? Manufacture a *cerea effigies* of Endymion I suppose and lay it on the mountain tops.'

All three interpretations have found favour with one or other of modern editors. Rothstein, Phillimore, and Enk adopt the first; Butler (edition of 1905 and Loeb translation) the second; Butler and Barber the third. Postgate is undetermined between (1) and (3). None attempt to answer Housman's criticisms, although Butler and Barber call his objections to (3) inconclusive, remarking, however, that 'the phrase is strange, and *pellacia* is an attractive correction which may well be right.'

The case against meaning (2) seems unanswerable. (3), though not in my view very probable, perhaps deserved to be dismissed less scornfully. It could be supported by Ap. Rhod. 4. 59 f. where the moon thus addresses Medea: ἡ θαμὰ δὴ καὶ σεῖο κίων δολίγησιν ἀοιδαῖς | μνησαμένη φιλότῆτος (sc. Ἐνδυμίωνος). I cannot, however, quote a Latin parallel nor yet an instance of *fallacia* with an objective genitive.

(1), always the most popular interpretation, seems to me natural and satisfactory, despite the logical difficulty. A poet with whom logical consistency is notoriously not a strong point may surely be allowed to write of 'the trickery of bringing down the moon' ('false pretence' is a little too emphatic) without implying such a settled conviction of the impotence of witches as would forbid his appealing for their aid—in which, however, he evidently puts no great faith (*tunc ego crediderim* . . .). There are passages elsewhere in Latin to show, if it needs showing, that men can associate magical performances with fraud and yet stop short of total incredulity. When Tertullian, apropos of the power of Christians to compel evil spirits to acknowledge themselves, writes *magia aut aliqua* (= 'some other') *fallacia fieri dicetis* (*Apol.* 23) and in another passage (*de Anima* 57) *quid ergo dicemus magiam? quod omnes paene: fallaciam. sed ratio fallaciae solos non fugit Christianos*, he does not mean that nearly all pagans disbelieved in the power of magic (which would have been grotesquely untrue) but only that their credulity was tempered with suspicion. So, too, in a declamation which throughout assumes the efficacy of magic the author of Ps.-Quint. *Decl.* 10. 16 speaks of guilty souls which when summoned to the upper world *uagae errantesque magica uanitate captantur*. Such ambiguities were not after all peculiar to

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the ancients; if Propertius could be challenged to say whether he believed in witchcraft or not he might reply like Madame du Deffand 'No, but I am afraid of it.'

The notion of *fallacia* is quite vague and it would certainly be a mistake to suppose, as did Freinsheim (on Curt. 7. 4. 8), that in Propertius' opinion 'non ipsam lunam sede sua detrahi, sed mortalium oculos uana specie deludi, ut id fieri arbitrentur'. I know of no reliable evidence for such a theory in ancient writers. The witch in Pet. Sat. 134 claims *lunae descendit imago | carminibus deducta meis*, but *imago lunae* probably means merely 'the moon' as apparently in Virg. Aen. 8. 23. A fragment of Sosiphanes (Nauck, p. 819) μάγους ἐπωδαῖς πᾶσα Θεσσαλὶς κόρη | ψευδὴς σελήνης αἰθέρος καταβάτις seems to suggest something of the kind, but is too corrupt for any fair deduction. In any case Propertius was no thoroughgoing rationalist.

1. 1. 33 f.

in me nostra Venus noctes exercet amaras,  
et nullo uacuis tempore defit Amor.

33 maesta Baehrens, uestra Richards, me non nostra Housman.

Butler and Barber's rendering of this much disputed passage, 'In my case the goddess whom we serve vexes my nights and fills them with bitterness', is in the main accepted by Professor Enk, who, however, prefers to translate *nostra Venus* with Ullman as 'the Venus whom I serve'. But (a) *in me . . . (meas) noctes* is an awkward combination and (b) *exercere* with an object signifying time invariably means 'employ industriously';<sup>1</sup> cf. examples in Thes. s.v. 1377. 50 ff., particularly Sen. Contr. 2. 5. 4 *sic uir et uxor noctes exercebant* (noctes Bursian, *ñte C, mentem T*), Fronto Ep. de Fer. Als. 3. 8 *noctes diesque negotiis exercebant*. That is, in my view, its meaning here: 'In my case (or, perhaps, 'against me') our goddess Venus works zealously through nights of bitterness, and Love is never idle nor faint.' The converse idea occurs in 3. 6. 34 *noctibus illorum dormiat ipsa Venus. amaras*, 'bitter' to Propertius.

1. 3. 24.

nunc furtiua cauis poma dabam manibus . . .

'Quidnam mouerit Butlerum et Barberum, ut manus datoris significari adnotarent, me praeterit' (Enk). Presumably they recalled that in v. 8 Cynthia's hands (*non certae* it is true) were employed in supporting her head. Nevertheless *cauis*, applied to the hands of the giver, is so utterly pointless that it is best to suppose that Propertius, like most of his editors, forgot what he had written sixteen lines previously. Taken as dative *cauis* may give a pleasing, though unnoticed, touch to the picture; Cynthia's hollowed hand suggested to her lover that she wished him to put something in it. Cf. Anth. Pal. 12. 212. 3 f. (Strato) τὴν χέρα μοι κοίλην προσεήνοχα· ὥς ἀπόλωλα· | μισθὸν ἴσως αἰτεῖς, Tib. 2. 4. 14 *illa caua pretium flagitat usque manu*, Arist. Thesm. 936 f. πρὸς τῆς δεξιᾶς, ἥνπερ φιλεῖς | κοίλην προτείνειν ἀργύριον ἣν τις διδῶ (cf. Eccl. 780 ff.). Other instances of the sort may be found in a footnote to § 494 of the Migne edition of Tertullian, vol. 1, and in Casaubon's note on Suet. Aug. 91 *cauam manum asses porrigentibus praebens*.

1. 8. 23.

nec me deficiet nautas rogitare citatos . . .

'*citatos*: appellatos; haec interpretatio elegantior quam si *citatos* accipias "properantes"' (Enk). Why? *solent nautae festinare quaeustus sui causa* (Cic. Ep. Fam. 16. 9. 4).

I do not know whether Postgate's statement (borrowed presumably from Lewis and Short (that *rogitare* is 'very common in Plautus and Terence, otherwise very rare' has ever been contradicted. It may therefore be worth noting that one meets the word twenty times in Livy (mostly as a present participle and in the first ten books), fourteen in Tacitus, six in Juvenius, twice in Virgil, once in Caesar, Sallust, Seneca

<sup>1</sup> Not merely *degere*, as Thes. represents. Cf. Sen. Contr. 8. 5 *ille annos suos exercuit, ego uici meos*.

the Younger, Silius (who also uses *erogito*, 10. 475), Valerius Flaccus, Suetonius, Hyginus, and Ausonius.

I may add in this connexion that Postgate's assertion on 1. 9. 29 that *ante* is nowhere else followed by *donec*, repeated by Professor Enk, does not survive acquaintance with Gell. 15. 27. 4 (quoting Laelius Felix) *quibus rogationibus ante patricii non tenebantur donec Q. Hortensius dictator legem tulit*, etc.; Claud. in *Eut.* 1. 152 ff. *sed uilior ante | obscurae latuit pars ignotissima turbae*, | *donec abundanti furiis*, etc.; Drac. de *Laud. Dei* 1. 106 f. *ante nec agnoscit dominum quicumque furentem*, | *donec in extremos gemitus* etc.: and that he was astray in his belief that *lassor* is followed by the infinitive only in Propertius (see his note on 2. 14. 12 and cf. Sen. *Tro.* 959 f. *lassabar in tot oscula et tantum gregem | diuidere matrem*).

1. 16. 43 f.

ante tuos quotiens uerti me, perfida, postes  
debitaque occultis uota tuli manibus!

'The natural interpretation is that the lover, when making his offerings, stood with his back towards the house to avoid attracting attention, and slipped them in by stealth behind his back' (Butler and Barber). I cannot agree. Such coyness would scarcely be characteristic of Roman love-making, and the picture of an embarrassed suitor fumbling with his hands behind his back 'to avoid attracting attention' is surely a little grotesque. The alternative is to accept (as does Professor Enk in his recent edition of the *Cynthia*) Passerat's view of *me uerti* as implying (no doubt semi-humorously) a ritual salute to the door. Messrs. Butler and Barber, who reject this interpretation as 'ingenious, but too far-fetched to be probable', seem to have misunderstood the nature of the ritual in question. It is not true that 'in acts of adoration the worshipper turned his back on the object of worship'. What did happen is described in Munro's note on Lucr. 5. 1199 *uertier ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras*. 'Vertier', he writes, 'refers to another habit of Roman worship: the suppliant approached in such a way as to have the statue of the god on his right and then after praying wheeled to the right so as to front it, and then prostrated himself: προσκυβεῖν περιπεπομένους'.<sup>1</sup> Suet. *Vitell.* 2 *capite uelato circumuertensque se, deinde procumbens*; Plaut. *Curc.* 69 *quo me uortam nescio*. P.A. *si deos salutas, dextrouorsum censeo*, Val. Flac. 8. 243 *sacrificas cum coninge uenit ad aras | Aesonides, unaque adeunt pariterque precari | incipiunt*. . . *dextrum pariter uertuntur in orbem*.<sup>2</sup> Propertius' editors add Pliny, N.H. 28. 25 *in adorando dextram ad osculum referimus totumque corpus circumagimus*. Ov. *Fast.* 3. 283 *atque aliquis, modo trux, uisa iam uertitur ara* probably belongs in the same galley (so H. J. Rose in C.R. 1922, p. 116). As for the plausibility of Passerat's explanation, it is relevant to point out that the Roman Catholic custom of saluting a sacred place *en passant* was familiar to the ancients: cp. Vitruv. 4. 5. 2 *si circum uias publicas erunt aedificia deorum, ita constituentur uti praetereuntes possint respicere et in conspectu salutationes facere*. To Propertius his mistress's house was a temple.

A ritual meaning was further attached by Volpi to *occultis manibus*, citing Plaut. *Amph.* 257 *uelatis manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suum* which may be supported from Hist. Aug. 26. 19. 6 *agite igitur, pontifices, . . . templum ascendite, subsellia laureata constituite, uelatis manibus libros euoluite*; but Professor Enk's comment '*occultis manibus* idem esse atque *uelatis manibus* pernego' is justified. He therefore interprets 'furtim'. But why, having openly saluted the door, should the lover try to make a secret of his gifts? I suggest that *occultis manibus* may be taken as dative: cf. 1. 3. 24 *nunc furtiua cauis poma dabam manibus*. The lover presents his gifts through the door which is not opened wide enough to admit him or even to let him see the person who receives them.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Numa* 14.



2. 8. 9 f. magni saepe duces, magni cecidere tyranni,  
et Thebae steterant altaque Troia fuit.  
steterunt Scaliger.

This is one of four passages where Butler and Barber feel constrained to accept Scaliger's substitution of the perfect for the pluperfect of the manuscripts (see their note on 1. 8. 36). They admit that *steterant* 'by itself might stand as a preterite' (cf. Ov. *Her.* 1. 34 *hic steterat Priami regia celsa senis*), but 'coming between *cecidere* and *fuit* it must be changed to *steterunt*'. Juxtaposition of perfect and pluperfect with no difference in meaning is not, however, unknown in Latin: cf. Man. 1. 774 f. *qui fabricauerat illum | damnatusque suas melius damnauit Athenas*, Vell. Pat. 1. 11 *hic est Metellus qui porticus . . . fecerat quique hanc turmam statuarum equestrium . . . ex Macedonia detulit*; Carm. Ep. (Bücheler) 1141. 8 ff. *non amor in fratres eius auarus erat. | cara fuit mater fuerant caraque sorores | et pia coniugio grataque semper erat*, Drac. *de Laud. Dei* 2. 773 f. *Petrus enim medicus fuerat, medicina cateruae | paupertatis erat*, Sid. Carm. 6. 4 *qui steterant fluuii quaeque cucurrit humus*, Housman on Man. 2. 877.

2. 16. 53 f. periuras tunc ille solet punire puellas,  
deceptus quoniam fleuit et ipse deus.

Editors have been baffled by the allusion. It may be to Sinope, whose story is thus briefly told by Apollonius (2. 947 ff.): *καὶ οἱ ὅπασσεν | παρθενὴν Ζεὺς αὐτὸς, ὑποσχέσθαι δολωθεῖς. | δὴ γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλότῆτος ἔλδετο· νεῦσε δ' ὄγ' αὐτῇ | δωσέμεναι, ὃ κεν ᾗσι μετὰ φρεσὶν ἰθύσειεν. | ἡ δὲ ἔ παρθενὴν ἡγήσατο κερδοσύνησιν* (cf. Val. Flac. 5. 109-113). If *deceptus* means 'disappointed', as it may, Asterie's case would also be in point; cf. Seru. *ad Aen.* 3. 73, Hyg. *Fab.* 53.

2. 21. 25 Iuppiter Alcmenae geminas requieuerat Arctos . . .

'*requieuerat*. "Slept" for two nights. The verb cannot be taken transitively, as it is possible to do in *Ciris* 233, Virg. *E.* 8. 4, and Calvus (cited by Seruius, *ad loc.*), since to keep the Bear shining through a doubled night is far removed from putting the Bear to sleep.' (Butler and Barber.)

*geminas Arctos* = 'for two nights' is not merely 'a highly artificial phrase' but absolutely unexampled and contrary to normal usage: cf. Man. 3. 382 *inde reedit geminasque ascendit ad Arctos*, id. 5. 19 *per geminas Anguis qui labitur Arctos*, Ov. *Met.* 3. 45 *geminas qui separat Arctos*, Val. Flac. 6. 40 *quod geminas Arctos magnumque quod impleat Anguem*, Sid. Carm. 22. 217 *geminam conuertis ad Arcton*, Prud. *Cath.* 5. 145 f. *credas stelligeram desuper aream | ornatam geminis stare trionibus*. In favour of the transitive use of *requiescere* I may add Vit. 8. 4. 1 *si ea aqua deferuefacta et postea requieta et defusa fuerit*. Why, then, is Jupiter said to have set the Bears at rest? Because in the normal course of things they turn round and the rest of the sky turns with them, whereas on this occasion, as Sosia remarks in the *Amphitryon* (273 ff.), *neque se Septentriones quoquam in caelo commouent, | neque se Luna quoquam mutat . . . neque nox quoquam concedit die*.

2. 23. 13 f. contra reiecto quae libera uadit amictu,  
custodum et nullo saepta timore, placet?

reieto] 'fortasse praetexto' Baehrens; neglecto tentauerat Broekhuizen.

In a note more erudite than illuminating Hertzberg proposes two interpretations of *reieto amictu*. (a) 'Domi relicta toga a meretrice'. (b) 'Fortasse tamen doctius etiam aliquid hic latet, ut reiectus amictus ricinium seu recinium interpretandum sit, solenne illud matronarum amiculum, de quo Fest. *L.* 17 *Qu.* 1312 (84.) p. 274. Müller . . . Nam Varro *L.L.* v. § 132 *ab eo quod dimidiam partem retrorsum iaciebant, ab reiiciendo ricinium dictum* censet. . . Sed quis in loco tam tenebricoso non caecutiatur?'

Of subsequent editors, Paley has the typically ingenuous remark 'These words

naturally refer to the custom of muffling the face for fear of being recognised.' Rothstein accepts Hertzberg's 'doctius aliquid', as apparently did Professor Butler in his translation (Loeb) 'her cloak cast back from her head'; but in conjunction with Mr. Barber he ignores the matter.

Hertzberg's first interpretation is not the most natural way of taking *reieto*, which in connexion with clothing usually means 'thrown back'. Besides, only unchaste women wore the toga (generally, it would seem, as the result of a judicial sentence: v. references in Daremberg and Saglio, s.v. 'toga', p. 348, n. 34); not to be wearing such a garment would therefore be no distinctive mark of a *meretrix*. The *tunicatus populus* of Hor. *Epist.* 1. 7. 65 refers, as Paley notes, to males. As for the *recinium*, is *solenne illud nobilium matronarum amiculum* the garment one would expect to find on prostitutes from the Euphrates and Orontes? In any case as a feminine dress it was *antiquissimum* (Varro, l.c.).

I believe Phillimore's translation 'with her mantle thrown back' to be correct (so, more or less, some of the older editors, e.g. Kuinoel 'non uelata, candida non tecto pectore'), but it requires explanation. The usual garb of a *meretrix* was the pallium or palliolum: cf. Mart. 9. 32. 1 *hanc uolo quae facilis, quae palliolata uagatur*. This might be worn either so as to conceal the shoulder or so as to reveal it: Tert. *de Pall.* 5 *umerum uelans (uel Salmasius) exponit uel includit*. Fig. 4102 in Daremberg and Saglio illustrates both modes. *Meretrices* would naturally favour the second: cf. Juv. 6. 589 *quae nudis longum ostendit ceruicibus aurum (armum Madvig)*.

2. 34. 51

harum nulla solet rationem quaerere mundi  
nec cur fraternis luna laboret equis.

Why is the moon said to be eclipsed by the sun? The traditional explanation has been most fully and plainly stated by Hertzberg, whose note may be summarized thus: 'The sun (or "horses of the sun") does not actively cause the obscuration of the moon but is prevented, by reason of the interposition of the earth, from lending her his light. Where a state or action ceases because of the withdrawal of a factor on which its continuance depends, poets sometimes treat this factor as the cause of the cessation. So Soph. *Ai.* 674 f. δεινὸν ἄγμα πνευμάτων ἐκώλυσε | στένοντα πόντον, Virg. *Ecl.* 2. 26 *cum placidum uentis staret mare*, id. *G.* 4. 484 *Ixionii uento rota constitit orbis*.'

This is certainly tenable. But the usage here assumed is only found in passages of quite unmistakable meaning, where any explanation of the causal ablative other than that intended by the poet can be immediately dismissed by the reader's common sense. Such freedom from ambiguity could not be claimed for the present phrase which, in its natural and obvious sense, implies that the moon's obscuration is due to the agency of the sun. A modern reader, who ought to have no doubts about the cause of a lunar eclipse, may sooner or later recollect that the earth, not the sun, is responsible, and cast about for an alternative interpretation. Propertius' contemporaries, to whom the true theory was only one of several then sanctioned by astronomers (cf. Lucr. 5. 762-70), would inevitably have taken him to mean what he appears to say. I would therefore suppose that Propertius is thinking not of eclipses properly so called but of the monthly occultations of the moon, a view which gains support from a passage of Curtius (4. 10. 5-6): *at illi, qui satis scirent temporum orbes implere destinatas uices lunamque deficere cum aut terram subiret aut sole premeretur, rationem quidem ipsis perceptam non edocent uulgus* etc. The moon loses her light every month, not because she is deprived of the sun's rays but because she comes too near them, *quot mensibus sub rotam solis radiosque uno die, antequam praeterit, latens obscuratur* (Vitr. 9. 2. 3) either, as Aristarchus held, because she reflects his light back at him, or because, having two halves, one bright the other dark, her shining side is attracted by his rays and violent heat (*radiis et impetu caloris corripi* Vitr. 9. 2. 2).



It is true that *laborare* like *deficere* usually refers to an eclipse proper rather than to *luna silens*, but it is easy to suppose that Propertius confused the two, as did Curtius after him.

For *fraterni equi* in this context cf. Man. 2. 96 f. *tu quoque fraternis sic reddis curribus ora | atque iterum ex isdem repetis*.

3. 6. 27 f.                      illum turgentis ranae portenta rubetae  
et lecta exsectis anguibus ossa trahunt . . .

exectis NL: exactis Fr: exsectis f25: ex sectis P: exsuctis Burman: e sectis Delrio.

Butler and Barber accept *exsuctis* with the comment 'exsectis is impossible; it means "cut out" not "cut open".' That is much too sweeping a statement. In later Latin the object of *exsecare* is sometimes not the part cut out but the person or thing from which it is cut. Cf. Col. R.R. 5. 11. 3 and *de Arb.* 26. 3 *arborem, quam inserere uoles, serra diligenter exsecato ea parte qua maxime nitida et sine cicatrice est*, Ap. Met. 9. 38 *mucrone gulam sibi prorsus exsecuit* ('positively gouged'),<sup>1</sup> Seru. ad Aen. 6. 803 *intellegamus ante eam (hydrum) sagittis fuisse confixam, post exsectam et adustam*, ibid. 7. 761 *qui natus erat exsecto matris uentre* (similarly ibid. 10. 316, Tert. *de Anima* 25, Amm. Marc. 29. 2. 17). Occasionally the meaning seems to be simply 'cut up' without any idea of extraction: Tert. *de Anima* 10 *medicus . . . qui sexcentos exsecuit ut naturam scrutaretur* and Quint. *Decl.* 8 *pr. exsecuit infantem* (cut the child up to inspect its entrails), though the taking out of parts to be examined may be implied. In Dictys the word is twice used simply for *secare*: *Bell. Tro.* 1. 15 *porcum . . . in duas partes exsectum*, ibid. 3. 7 *exsectis nervis* ('hamstrung').

Most of this evidence is, of course, too late to legitimize the usage in an Augustan poet were it not supported by the classical *exsecare aliquem* = 'to castrate', which provides a definite though isolated instance of the same sense in pre-Silver Latin. In the light of this phrase the absence of contemporary parallels may fairly be set down to accident. Propertius' line may, therefore, be rendered 'bones cut out from snakes and gathered up'; literally 'bones gathered after snakes have been cut up (for their extraction)'. I do not deny that *exsuctis* makes equally good sense and may, in fact, easily be right. But the manuscripts have been too readily deserted.

3. 21. 25 ff.                      illic uel stadiis animum emendare Platonis  
incipiam aut hortis, docte Epicure, tuis;  
persequar aut studium linguae, Demosthenis arma,  
libaboque tuos, docte Menandre, sales . . .

25 uel] aut Müller. studiis O: stadiis Broekhuizen.      28 libaboque Suringar: librorumque O.  
docte O: alii alia.

To the instances of *uel . . . aut* which I adduced in *Class. Quart.* (1945), xxxix, p. 121 may be added Col. R.R. 8. 15. 4 *sunt enim quibus cordi est uel in siluulis tamaricum aut scirporum frutetis immorari*, ibid. 11. 3. 50 *eum locum in quo uel cucumeres aut cucurbitae consitae sunt*, Cels. 2. 12. 1 *A lac uel asininum aut bubulum uel caprinum*, Quint. *Decl.* 13. 3 *ne uel aestiuus ardor aut hiberna uis grauidam penetraret alium (ne uel Schulting: ne om. BV, uel om. Mß8)*, Sedulius Carm. *Pasch.* 5. 97 f. *uel colaphis pulsare caput uel caedere palmis, | aut spueri in faciem*, Aus. *Epist.* 31. 43 *quid enim tenere uel bonum aut uerum queant*, Drac. *de Laud. Dei* 3. 525 f. *modicae uel laudis amore | aut certe fecere pie pro numine uano*, Veg. *Mil.* 3. 9 *uel infirmiores aut minus armatos*.

I ought also to have referred those who find a difficulty in applying *docte* to a comic poet to Man. 5. 475 *doctior urbe sua linguae sub flore Menander*.

<sup>1</sup> Or perhaps 'cut clean across': cf. Sid. Carm. 16. 12 *exciso gulture*.

3. 23. 16.

hospitium tota nocte parauit amor.  
parabit Heinsius.

*Parabit* (accepted by Richmond and Butler and Barber) is an easy change but not for the better. When one wishes to invite a guest in pressing terms, 'all is ready for you' makes at least as good a form as 'we shall get ready'. In case the correction be thought to mean 'love will furnish an entertainment' I may point out that *parare hospitium* is always used of preparing hospitality, not of actually furnishing it: cf. Cic. *Fam.* 9. 6. 2 *hoc ego idcirco nosse te uolui ut scires hospitium tibi ubi parares*, id. *ad Att.* 14. 2. 4 *Piliae paratum est hospitium*, Mart. 9 *pr. uale et para hospitium*, Sid. *Ep.* 8. 11. 3 (v. 32 f.) *occurras iubet, ante sed parato | actutum hospitio*.

4. 1. 57.

moenia namque pio coner disponere uersu . . .

munere n. pio c. d. uersus L. Müller.

'moenia . . . disponere Lit. "to arrange in order"; i.e. "to describe the growth of her walls"; a bold phrase without exact parallel' (Butler and Barber). I think the expression has been misapprehended. Propertius uses the figure by which a poet is said to do that which he describes. So in Man. 4. 878 *seminibusque suis tantam componere molem* means 'mundus quomodo ex elementis suis creuerit dicere' (Housman); so Virgil (*Ecl.* 9. 19 f.) asks *quis caneret Nymphas? quis humum florentibus herbis | spargeret aut uiridi fontis induceret umbra?* *Disponere*, then, means 'to lay out', as a builder: cf. Col. R.R. 1. 3 *aedificiorum quae ipsi disposuerint*, Sid. *Carm.* 2. 62 *sic te (sc. Constantinopolim) dispositam*.

4. 5. 39 f.

semper habe morsus circa tua colla recentes,  
litibus alternis quos putet esse datos.

alternis N, fr in marg.: alterius FlLP: dentibus alterius Heinsius.

Accepting Heinsius' conjecture Butler and Barber write '*litibus* can only mean "quarrels", not *amantium luctamina*, which is the sense required here. *alterius* has point (cf. 4. 3. 25), *alternis* little or none.' But the distinction between quarrels and *amantium luctamina* is hardly rigid; consider 3. 8. 21 ff. *in morso aequales uideant mea uulnera collo | me doceat livor mecum habuisse meam. | aut in amore dolere uolo aut audire dolentem, | siue tuas lacrimas siue uidere meas* . . . Even if the marks were given in sheer ill-humour (as apparently in 4. 8. 65, when Cynthia *imponitque notam collo morsuque cruentat*), they would none the less be evidence of the existence of a rival lover, which is what matters here. The objection to *alternis* is of greater weight; but the word seems to have as much point here as in Stat. *Th.* 11. 112 *uade, et in alternas inimica reuertere pugnas*. It implies, I think, that first one side then the other takes the initiative.

4. 5. 57 f.

qui uersus, Coae dederit nec munera uestis,  
ipsius tibi sit surda sine arte lyra.

ipsius O: istius 5 aere N.

I do not think that *ipsius* is meaningless, as Butler and Barber hold, though its force can more easily be felt than explained. It points an antithesis: 'Since he gives nothing that you want, retaliate by paying no attention to him.' Compare the use in such passages as Cic. *ad Att.* 13. 29. 1 (2) *ita male audio ipsum esse tractatum ut mihi ille emptor non esse uideatur*, Ov. *Am.* 2. 19. 36 *quod sequitur fugio; quod fugit, ipse sequor*.

4. 7. 25.

nec crepuit fissa me propter harundine custos . . .

That the guardianship of bodies before burial was a regular calling appears from Firmicus *Math.* 3. 9. 3 where a certain conjunction of Mercury and Saturn is said to produce, among others, *funerarios aut custodes mortuorum cadauerum aut sepulchrorum*

*ianitores*. Rothstein's suggestion that the *custos* sounded his rattle (cf. Butler and Barber's note) to scare away *striges* or other evil spirits seems to lack any evidence. True, as Butler and Barber point out, Apuleius (*Met.* 2. 21 ff.) has a story of a man who hired himself out to guard a corpse against witches; but this was a peculiarly Thessalian custom, unintelligible to strangers. The hero of the tale asks what it means and receives the answer '*oppido puer et satis peregrinus es, meritoque ignoras Thessaliae te consistere, ubi sagae mulieres ora mortuorum passim demorsitant.*' It is best to take Pliny's word (ap. Seru. *ad Aen.* 6. 218) that the noise was made *ne quis uiuus sepeliretur*.

4. 11. 37 f.                    testor maiorum cineres tibi, Roma, colendos,  
   sub quorum titulis, Africa, tunsa iaces . . .

tonsa 5 iacet 5.

The pentameter is usually supposed to refer to some unknown monument or coins 'on which Africa was represented as a female figure beaten down into the dust'. No doubt this is possible: or some such picture may have existed as that which Ti. Gracchus, the conqueror of Sardinia, dedicated in the temple of Mater Matuta (Liv. 28. 8-10). On the other hand, I suggest that the line may be understood metaphorically, 'beneath whose glories' (cf. Luc. 8. 413 *saevitia stimulata Venus titulisque uirorum*) 'you lie crushed.' For a somewhat similar expression cf. Eumenius, *Pan. Const. Caes.* 5. 5. *dent ueniam tropaea Niliaca sub quibus Aethiops et Indus intremuit.*

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## SLAVE COSTUME IN NEW COMEDY

THE article by Professor Webster on 'South Italian Vases and Attic Drama' in *C.Q.* xlii, pp. 15-27, raises problems for the reader of Roman comedy. Professor Webster takes the view that the Latin plays are good evidence for the costumes worn on the Greek stage; he even says (p. 20) that 'the Greek original of Sceparnio in the *Rudens* (429) certainly wore the phallus', thus reviving a suggestion of Skutsch which Marx (*Rudens*, ad loc.) thought *sehr kühn*.<sup>1</sup> It is also part of Professor Webster's argument that ancient works of art, in particular Italian vases and terra-cottas, afford faithful representations of the costumes worn on the Attic stage. 'It is certain' (p. 26) 'that the actors in Eubulus' *Auge* looked like the figures on the vase' (in Leontini).

Professor Webster thinks (pp. 21, 22, 26) that the possession of a mantle, shoes, and a staff indicates that the character in question is not a slave. Here we must distinguish between rustics such as Syricus and Davus, dressed in *διφθέραι* (*Epit.* 12 Capps; cf. Pollux 4. 119: 'wallet, staff, and goatskin are the wear for rustics'), or Sceparnio with his single tegillum (*Rud.* 575), and the town slave, who normally wears both pallium and tunic (*Amph.* 294, 368; *Aul.* 647; *Epit.* 1), and may on occasion wear a hat (*Amph.* 443) or a garland (*Amph.* 999, *Pseud.* 1287). So normal, indeed, is the pallium for slaves that they have a special way of bundling it round their necks when they are in a hurry (*Capt.* 778-9; *Ph.* 844). As for footwear, we hear little of it in New Comedy, except when someone removes his sandals before reclining on a couch. Possibly the wearing of the soccus or slipper was in general taken for granted in comedy, as opposed to the barefoot mime. At any rate one slave refers to his socci (*Trin.* 720).

Nevertheless it is usually assumed that the slave, like other typical characters of New Comedy, was readily identifiable by his appearance. Michaut (*Com. rom.* i. 413) thinks that slaves wore a distinctive short tunic; he is probably thinking of Donatus *de Com.* vii. 6: 'serui comici amictu exiguo teguntur'. In particular we are told that every slave wore one of the characteristic slave-masks, for illustrations of which we are referred to such works of art as the Naples relief (Pickard-Cambridge, *Theatre of Dionysus*, fig. 77), which shows a striking contrast between the handsome features of the young gentleman and the hideous grimace of the slave. 'The comic characters always wore masks of the grotesque kind' (Haigh, *A.T.* 263).

Certainly actors in New Comedy (I would add in Roman comedy as well) wore masks. Indeed it was the mask which indicated the character; and conversely a character could not change his mask without destroying his identity.<sup>2</sup> But in the *Captivi* the plot turns on the trick played by the young gentleman Philocrates and his slave Tyndarus (really Hegio's long-lost son). Each pretends to be the other, with the result that Hegio lets the master go and keeps the slave. How do we imagine such a trick to have been staged?

We are told in the prologue (37-9) that the two captives have exchanged clothes and names: each bears the likeness (*imago*) of the other for the time being. At line 251 Hegio confronts them, and is at once addressed in somewhat pert fashion by Philocrates, whom he takes to be the slave. It is impossible to suppose that Tyndarus is

<sup>1</sup> If, as all would agree in view of Cic. *De Off.* 1. 129, the Roman Sceparnio must somehow have made the line intelligible without the help of a phallus, may not the same be true of his Greek prototype?

<sup>2</sup> For example, when a character disguises himself to deceive someone who knows him already, he has to wear something over his face—

e.g. patches over one or both eyes (*Curc.* 392-400, *M.G.* 1178). But Sagaristio is unknown to Dordalus (*Pers.* 22); it is enough for him to wear a turban, chlamys, and girdled tunic (155, 463). Later on Dordalus comes upon him in his ordinary dress (789 ff.) and half-suspects who he is (829).

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wearing a typical slave-mask; if he were, how could Hegio take him to be Philocrates? It is equally difficult to suppose that Philocrates is wearing a typical slave-mask; for at 922 he will reappear in his true character as a free man; and the spectators must be able to recognize him. We have a description of his appearance (648): 'thin face, sharp nose, complexion fair, black eyes, hair a little reddish, curled in ringlets,' a description which Hegio declares accurate. This is how the man looked whom Hegio took to be a slave, but who is really a gentleman. Red hair is, indeed, common in the case of slaves (*As.* 400, *Ps.* 1218, *Ph.* 51; cf. Pollux's list of slave-masks, Robert, p. 3); but clearly a free man too may have red hair.

Elsewhere in New Comedy we have a slave mistaken for a free man. Harpax somewhat doubtfully asks the slave Pseudolus 'Are you Ballio?', adding the direct question 'Are you a slave or free?' (*Ps.* 607, 610). Pseudolus, we note, has red hair (1218). Menaechmus of Epidamnus, when rescued by his brother's slave Messenio, addresses him simply as 'young man' (*Men.* 1021-5). The slave Simia will do as well as—indeed rather better than—a free man to masquerade as a military character, *homo chlamydatus* (*Ps.* 727-8, 963); the important thing is that he has not been seen before by Ballio. This evidence suggests that some slaves, at any rate, wore masks which were not typical and unmistakable slave-masks. As for a typical slave-costume, the only evidence in favour of it is *Capt.* 37 (exchange of costumes) and *Amph.* 117 (*seruile schema*). Both these references occur in prologues, and are not supported by the ensuing action. We may suppose that when Tyndarus and Philocrates are on the stage together, Tyndarus' borrowed clothes look smarter than those he has lent to his master. Yet when Aristophontes meets and recognizes Tyndarus (*Capt.* 540) he makes no comment on the fact that the slave is wearing the clothes of a gentleman.

To judge by the text, characters can be identified at sight as men or women, as young or old. These distinctions may have been indicated chiefly by the mask, especially the hair. When stress is laid on the costume, it is usually in connexion with disguises, or with outlandish effects of some kind. The means used are simple: a broad hat marks the traveller, a chlamys and sword the soldier, a turban, chlamys, and girdled tunic the Persian, a pair of foreign sandals the Persian girl (*Pers.* 155, 463-4). The stress laid on such professional attributes as the cook's knife, or the fisherman's rod, hooks, or net (*Aul.* 417, *Rud.* 293-4, 913) suggests that the costume in itself was not enough to indicate the profession. It seems that the appeal to the eye was subordinate to the spoken word. We know who each new arrival is because we are told so in plain Latin. Conventions in costume are sacrificed, if need be; thus the convention that travellers wear a hat is disregarded in the *Menaechmi*, in order that Menaechmus from Syracuse may look exactly like Menaechmus of Epidamnus. On the other hand, the prologue to the *Amphitruo* tells us that the two gods as well as their human doubles will wear travelling hats. This seems designed to lead to the information that the two gods will wear distinguishing signs on their hats—a point which, incidentally, seems out of keeping with what follows. For although Mercury and Sosia wear petasi in the opening scene, nothing is said about Mercury's plume; and after the opening scenes the petasi are probably discarded. Certainly Mercury can scarcely have worn his petasus with his garland (999).

The evidence of the plays is that a slave might, like a free man, wear tunic, mantle, and shoes, that his mask might resemble that of a free man, that he might treat other slaves as his inferiors (as the elegant Tranio treats the rustic Grumio), that he might drink his wine (wearing a garland), have his love affairs, use imported perfumes (*Most.* 36, 42). The 'gentleman's gentleman' is part of our heritage from New Comedy; his appearance, if the text is any guide, did not differ greatly, perhaps not at all, from that of his master.

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## THE METAPHORICAL SENSE OF ΛΗΚΥΘΟΣ AND AMPULLA

THE application of λήκυθος and its derivatives and the Latin terms *ampullae* and *ampullari* to the turgid or elevated style of poetry or oratory has provoked such a variety of explanations amongst modern and ancient commentators that it would be a tedious business to examine them all in detail. The ancient commentators on Horace, *Ars Poetica*, ll. 93-7

interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit,  
iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore;  
et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri  
Telephus et Peleus, cum pauper et exsul uterque  
proicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba . . .

were not even in agreement on the question of the precise correspondence of the two words, for while Porphyryon said that *proicit ampullas* was imitated directly from the ληκύθειος Μοῦσα of Callimachus,<sup>1</sup> Pseudacron's note makes no reference to ληκυθίζειν at all, but merely connects the metaphor with the inflated appearance of the Roman *ampulla*. And though modern scholars do not question the fact that the two words do correspond in some degree,<sup>2</sup> there has been a wide divergence of opinion on the derivation and meaning of the metaphor. Ritter and Wilkins, for example, held that the meaning 'paint-pots' was indicated by the conjunction of ληκύθους with *pingere* in one of Cicero's letters to Atticus,<sup>3</sup> and that in Horace, *Epistles* 1. 3. 12-14

fidibusne Latinis  
Thebanos aptare modos studet auspice Musa,  
an tragica desaevit et ampullatur in arte?

*ampullatur* meant 'lays the paint on thick'. Wickham, while accepting the view that λήκυθοι were paint-pots, thought it possible from Pseudacron's note on the shape of the *ampulla* that Horace had contaminated the Greek metaphor with a Roman one, and 'either consciously or unconsciously put a turn on the phrase which did not originally exist'. The conclusion of Edmond Pottier, based on a somewhat cursory examination of the scholia on Aristophanes and the lexicographers, was that 'le sens véritable et original des mots λήκυθος, ληκυθίζειν traduits en latin par *ampulla*, *ampullari* est celui de phrases sonores, de couplets oratoires, lancés à toute volée et d'une voix vibrante'.<sup>4</sup> The conclusions of these scholars are not based upon a complete survey of all the instances of the metaphor's occurrence and fail to clarify the precise connexion with the famous tag ληκύθειον ἀπώλεσεν inserted by Aeschylus into the prologues of Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs*.<sup>5</sup> Many editors ignore the *Frogs* passage altogether; others, while suggesting that the metaphorical use of λήκυθος / *ampulla* may have become proverbial from the satire on Euripides' verses there (so Orelli), have not examined the implications of this connexion, if it existed.

Now, the existence of some connexion between Aeschylus' ληκύθειον and the later metaphorical use of λήκυθος and *ampulla* is highly probable, if only for the reason that

<sup>1</sup> For the actual words used by Callimachus see Schneider, *Callim.* Fr. 98 c, p. 267 and note on sect. C below.

<sup>2</sup> Some correspondence is suggested by Cic. *de Fin.* 4. 12 and Plut. *Mar.* 4. 17, 29. 13. Cf.

Poll. 4. 120 and Plaut. *Stich.* 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Att.* 1. 14. 3.

<sup>4</sup> 'Sur un vers d'Horace', *Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, vol. cxlii, p. 325.

<sup>5</sup> ll. 1198-1247.

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# THE METAPHORICAL SENSE OF ΛΗΚΥΘΟΣ AND AMPULLA 33

they have the association with literary criticism in common; and there are three possible kinds of connexion which may be tabulated as follows:

1. λήκυθος had no metaphorical sense in Athens before the *Frogs* was written and no metaphorical sense in the contest in the *Frogs*, and later use of the metaphor was prompted by simple reminiscence of the famous comic scene.
2. λήκυθος was first given a metaphorical meaning by Aristophanes in the *Frogs* and the metaphor was taken over from him by Callimachus, Cicero, Horace, and the rest.
3. The metaphor was in popular use before Aristophanes wrote the *Frogs*, ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν had a metaphorical meaning in the *Frogs*, and later writers were using a metaphor which had been merely popularized by Aristophanes.

Of these three alternatives I hope to be able to show that (3) is the correct one; but we can notice at the outset that if either (1) or (2) is correct, then the *Frogs* scene is the ultimate source of the metaphor and it is then highly suspicious that neither the Attic lexicographers nor the commentators on Horace ascribe the metaphor to Aristophanes. The only ancient commentator to connect any meaning of λήκυθος with the contest scene is the scholiast on Hephaestion, *Ench.* vi, which treats of the δίμετρον καταληκτικόν, τὸ καλούμενον Εὐριπίδειον ἢ ληκύθιον; and since he comments ληκύθιον δὲ φασιν αὐτό, ἢ δι' Ἀριστοφάνην σκώπτοντα τὸ μέτρον τὸ ἐφθήμερες Εὐριπίδου ἢ διὰ τὸν βόμβον τὸν τραγικόν· βόμβος γὰρ γίνεται περὶ τὸ ληκύθιον . . . it is clear that he did not regard Aristophanes as the *fons et origo* of the figure of speech, although he knew the *ἀγών* in the *Frogs* well enough to cite it as a possible source of the nickname given to the trochaic dimeter catalectic.<sup>1</sup> The *argumentum ex silentio* does not establish the truth of (3), of course, but it serves to emphasize the need for a complete survey of the evidence, a survey which I believe will show that (3) provides the only possible solution of the problem. And proceeding from there to an examination of the passages in which the metaphor is used, we can establish that its meaning is consistent, one and indivisible, even if it develops extraneous associations, and that it had nothing at all to do with paint-pots or with a *voix vibrante*; and that Pseudacron's note, while coming fairly close to the truth, does not give us the whole truth.

Let us start with Aristophanes' *Frogs*, and with the initial hypothesis that when Aeschylus fitted the tag ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν into the prologues of Euripides with such devastating effect, he was demonstrating the commonplace character of the younger poet's diction, whatever the other criticisms implied. It is an hypothesis which should not need defending, but it has been flatly rejected by Professor Gilbert Murray:

'Another quite absurd joke has been taken seriously by commentators. Euripides is quoting his prologues, and Aeschylus threatens to destroy the whole lot of them with a ληκύθιον. . . . Euripides quotes seven prologues, and in six of them, before he has finished the third line, Aeschylus interjects the words ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσε, "lost his little flask of oil", so as to complete both sense and metre. The effect is very funny, but the criticism amounts to nothing.'<sup>2</sup>

It is true enough that taking Aristophanes seriously is a dangerous occupation—and a ludicrous one, if all that the commentator can achieve by so doing is to make imperfect sense out of perfect nonsense. But the ληκύθιον jest does not lose much because it has a little point; the metrical criticism in this scene is serious enough, even though the instruments used, e.g. τοφλαττοθρατ,<sup>3</sup> are unconventional, and there is serious

<sup>1</sup> To connect the troch. dim. catalect., not an exclusively or typically tragic metre, with βόμβος τραγικός is, of course, nonsense. So too is the suggestion of Müller (*Eumenides*, p. 44) that the metre was called ληκύθιον 'from the smoothness

and lubricity with which it runs, like drops of oil from a flask'.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristophanes. A Study*, ch. v, pp. 122 ff.

<sup>3</sup> ll. 1286 ff.



criticism in the long passage ll. 905-70 in which Aristophanes draws the contrast between the high-flown style and lengthy words of Aeschylus and the commonplace language of Euripides. The latter had brought heroic characters down to everyday life, and his diction had descended to the same level to conform; this was the innovation which he flaunted before the exponent of the older school of thought in the altercation which preceded the contest proper.<sup>1</sup> The Aegyptus, Cadmus, and Pelops of his prologues, said Aeschylus, were characters of ordinary stature, described in ordinary language as doing ordinary things; and so one could take any everyday article, such as the oil-flask which most Athenians carried suspended from the wrist, or a mundane affair like the loss of an oil-flask, and fit it into his prologues without striking a discordant note. In order to make the tag *ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν* fit in this sense of the word, Aristophanes has, of course, to find Euripidean prologues into which it will fit without doing violence to syntax or metre. Into the first six prologues cited by Euripides it fits neatly enough; in the seventh and last case, the prologue of the *Melanippe Sapiens*, Aeschylus is interrupted by Dionysus before he can apply the *ληκύθιον* test, and there is some doubt whether he would have scored another victory, for if Gregory is right, the commencement of the *Melanippe* was

Ζεὺς, ὡς λέλεκται τῆς ἀληθείας ὑπό,  
"Ἐλλην" ἔτικτεν.<sup>2</sup>

But there is no reason why the fatal tag should not have fitted the third line as easily as it fitted the other prologues; Aristophanes cannot have been running short of prologues. In order to give the criticism its maximum effect, both serious and comic, Aristophanes has of necessity to find prologues which leave a space for object and verb at the end of a line. There is no need to suppose, then, that there is an implicit criticism of Euripides' word order, of his alleged habit of ending his sentences with object and verb; on this score, as Professor Murray points out,<sup>3</sup> the *ληκύθιον* would have wrought havoc with the opening of the *Eumenides* and four of the extant tragedies of Sophocles. As for Euripides' treatment of the iambic trimeter, the tribrach in Aeschylus' tag may be intended to exemplify Euripides' fondness for resolved feet,<sup>4</sup> which he cultivated as part of the process of bringing tragedy down to the level of ordinary life, but that must be all; it cannot be that Aeschylus is accusing Euripides of metrical monotony through excessive use of the penthemimeral caesura, as the scholiast on Hephaestion, cited above, seems to have been suggesting. The penthemimeral caesura was not, of course, more commonly used by Euripides than by Aeschylus, and, as Rogers observes, the latter has it eighteen times in the first twenty lines of the *Eumenides*.

The main charge, then, which Aeschylus hammers home with the *ληκύθιον* is that the 'slimming'<sup>5</sup> process applied by Euripides to tragedy had deprived his characters of dignity of diction and action. The *ληκύθιον* is the symbol of the commonplace, and any household article, preferably in the diminutive form,<sup>6</sup> would on the face of it have served Aeschylus' purpose equally well, as he says himself:

ποιεῖς γὰρ οὕτως ὥστ' ἐναρμόττειν ἅπαν,  
καὶ κωδάριον καὶ ληκύθιον καὶ θυλάκιον,  
ἐν τοῖς ἱαμβείοισι.<sup>7</sup>

If this is so, it is extremely improbable that the later use of *λήκυθος*/*amphulla* was nothing more than a casual reminiscence of the contest scene in the *Frogs*; it would

<sup>1</sup> οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χράμεθ', οἷς ξύνεσμεν, l. 959.

<sup>2</sup> Greg. Cor. *Rhet.* 7, p. 1312.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>4</sup> Hence, possibly, the appearance of *θυλάκιον* at the end of l. 1203. It may, however, be a case

of corruption by assimilation.

<sup>5</sup> l. 941.

<sup>6</sup> For Aristophanes' ridicule of Eur.'s diminutives see *Frogs* l. 942 and *Ach.* l. 398.

<sup>7</sup> ll. 1202-4.



have been a violent metaphorical *lucus a non lucendo* to apply to the bombastic or elevated style something which symbolized the very opposite.<sup>1</sup> It is true that this explanation of the origin of the metaphor has not been put forward explicitly by anyone; but it is the explanation which should have been put forward by those who held that the *Frogs* scene was the source, in this sense of the word. In actual practice, those who have held (1) to be correct have at the same time looked for characteristics of the *λήκυθος* to which the bombastic style bore a metaphorical resemblance. The illogicality of this position is best demonstrated with a 'woollen blanket' or 'leather purse': if Aeschylus had chosen either of the alternative weapons in his armoury for his onslaught on Euripides' prologues, what sort of explanations would have been forthcoming for a *Μοῦσα κωδάρζουσα* or *θυλακίζουσα* in Callimachus?

Although the woollen blanket and the leather purse would have served to exemplify the commonplace character of Euripides' diction as well as the oil-pot, there was a very good reason why the oil-pot was preferred to the other articles. Let us look at the evidence for the existence of some metaphorical sense for *λήκυθος* in fifth-century Athens. We have the word *ληκυθιστής* cited by Suidas from an unknown play of Sophocles, *Ληκυθιστής*: ὁ μικρόφωνος. οὕτως Σοφοκλῆς, where Meineke proposed to read *μακρόφωνος*. The word would appear to have been used in a contemptuous sense, like *ληκυθισμοί* in Plutarch 2. 1086 e, τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχίστα ῥήματα, βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας κ.τ.λ., and though it is conceivable for a tenuous voice to have been a matter for reproach, it is far more probable that the *ληκυθιστής* was a loud-voiced braggart. Meineke's emendation comes fairly close to certainty<sup>2</sup> when we find the synonym *κοιλόφωνος* given by Hesychius for the same word. Now although the citation from Sophocles is a single word from an unknown play and an unknown context, it tells us nearly all that we need to know; *ληκυθιστής*, and so, *a fortiori*, *λήκυθος* and *ληκυθίζειν*, were in use at Athens in the metaphorical sense of 'talking big' before the *Frogs* was produced, for Sophocles died in the same year, 405, and it was a metaphor with which the ordinary Athenian audience of the day was familiar enough.

To establish what characteristic of the *λήκυθος* suggested the metaphor we must go to the oil-pot itself.<sup>3</sup> *λήκυθος* was a generic term for a wide range of household vessels, made in various shapes and of various materials, and used for the storage of oil, wine, or perfume.<sup>4</sup> The *λήκυθος* given by Alcinous to Nausicaa was of gold<sup>5</sup> and was probably a larger vessel than that carried swinging from the wrist by the Athenian of the fifth century. Those mentioned in Ar. *Plut.* 810 would also be larger earthenware jars used for storing perfume in the house. Other materials employed were silver<sup>6</sup> and leather.<sup>7</sup> But it is evident from the *Frogs* that Aristophanes was not using the word in its general application; the *λήκυθος* or *ληκύθιον* (Aristophanes makes no distinction between them in the contest) was undoubtedly the small portable oil-flask, now conventionally called, for no very good reason, by the Dorian<sup>8</sup> name *ἀρύβαλλος*. The conjunction of the word with a woollen blanket and a leather purse in l. 1203 suggests that it was a piece of personal property, which Aeschylus imagines himself

<sup>1</sup> The illogicality of the nickname given to the troch. dim. catal. is, of course, comprehensible, and falls into a different category.

<sup>2</sup> Pearson, *Sophocles*, iii, fr. 1063 n., doubted this—needlessly, even if the meaning of the metaphor was not apparent.

<sup>3</sup> In this passage, and in the interpretation of certain passages of Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, I am much indebted to Prof. Rumpf of Cologne and Prof. T. B. L. Webster of London for their invaluable help. For the views expressed and for any errors I am, of course, alone responsible.

<sup>4</sup> See the article on *Aryballos* by J. D. Beazley, *B.S.A.* xxix, pp. 187 ff. and works cited there.

<sup>5</sup> *Odyss.* vi. 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Athen.* x. 451 d.

<sup>7</sup> See references given by Beazley, *op. cit.*, p. 194, n. 1; Watzinger, *Griechische Holzarkophagen aus der Zeit Alexanders des Grossen*, pp. 3, 5-7. For leather *ampullae* see Poll. viii. 2, Plaut. *Rud.* l. 756.

<sup>8</sup> It occurs in Ar. *Egu.* 1094, but its Dorian origin is attested by Bekker, *Anecd. Graec.* 444.

to be using as a rough-and-ready 'blunt instrument', whirling it on its strap and then dashing it against Euripides' prologues. Portable oil-pots may have been used as makeshift weapons in mock fights; according to Harpocration<sup>1</sup> the straps were so used in Menander's *Trophonius*. The aryballus at this period was spherical or nearly spherical, as it had been ever since the end of the seventh century, when the pear-shaped type of the proto-Corinthian period had gone out of fashion for good. This early change was probably prompted by utilitarian considerations, for the round aryballus, when swung up into the hand by the strap, would fit neatly into the palm of the hand, so that the oil could be easily poured into the other hand and rubbed on to the body. It was fitted with a wooden stopper,<sup>2</sup> and to minimize the risk of spilling and to prevent the strap slipping, the neck remained predominantly short and narrow. In other details, as one would expect, the vases vary considerably; the broad circular mouth characteristic of the Corinthian type was replaced by a narrower and often hemispherical one in the Attic type which ousted the imported article at Athens towards the end of the sixth century, and the potter varied the number and shape of the handles or introduced minor modifications of shape with an eye to the decoration. The main features of the vessel of which Aristophanes was thinking may be summarized thus; it was a portable pot containing oil, which might be perfumed if it was carried by women<sup>3</sup> (although women normally used the *ἀλάστρον*), it had a rounded body and a narrow neck and, therefore, if it were tapped by the hand or blown into, it could produce a hollow, resonant note, and if it were held upside-down on the open palm, the oil might make a gurgling noise as it trickled out. We can thus distinguish four possible sources for the metaphor, with the mental reservation that any two, or more, of them may have to be combined:

A. The gurgling noise made by the oil as it was poured through the narrow neck of the pot, a noise described by Pliny, *Ep.* iv. 30. 6: 'Nam illa quoque (sc. ampullae ceteraque generis eiusdem), quamquam prona atque vergentia, per quasdam oblectantis animae moras crebris quasi singultibus sistunt quod effundunt.' *λήκυθος* was the name given to this kind of noise according to Clearchus of Soli, quoted by the scholiast on Plato, *Hipp. Min.* 368 c: *λέγουσι δὲ λήκυθον καὶ τὸ μεταξύ τῆς λαυκανίας καὶ αὐχένος ἡχώδες, ὥς φησι Κλέαρχος*. Hesychius<sup>4</sup> has the same explanation, but does not give the reference to Clearchus. The testimony of the two may thus be independent and the citation may be verbatim, although the phraseology used by them is not quite identical.<sup>5</sup> I can see no good reason why the words *τὸ . . . ἡχώδες* should have been taken to mean the *βρόγθος*, Adam's apple;<sup>6</sup> the most natural meaning of this adjective used in the neuter as a noun is surely 'the gurgling noise', quite apart from the fact that no vessel has anything remotely resembling an Adam's apple, except perhaps a bottle with a 'glass-alley' in the neck. On the other hand, the use of the name of the vessel to denote a noise characteristic of it was easy enough; a similar process of identification, operating in the opposite direction, produced the onomatopoeic names for a *λήκυθος*, *βομβύλη* and *βομβύλιος*. The word *ληκυθίζων* also occurs in Pollux<sup>7</sup> to denote a kind of delivery used by the *βαρύστονος ὑποκριτής*, but since it comes between *περιβομβίων* and *λαρυγγίζων* I do not, like Pottier, think that its exact meaning can be inferred from the context; and although I believe that its proper place is in section C below, there is nothing in Pollux to preclude a relationship with A or B.

B. The hollow ringing noise, *βόμβος*, made by a pot on being struck or blown into. The scholiast on Hephaestion, *Ench.* vi, in a note on the nicknames given to the

<sup>1</sup> s.v. *αὐτολήκυθοι*.

<sup>2</sup> Watzinger, op. cit., pp. 4, 6, 7, 9 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See Beazley, op. cit., p. 186, n. 5, on the use of the aryballus and strigil by women.

<sup>4</sup> s.v. *λήκυθος*.

<sup>5</sup> Hesychius has *τοῦ λαυκανίου*.

<sup>6</sup> e.g. by Nachod, Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. 'Lekythos', and Liddell and Scott.

<sup>7</sup> *Onomast.* 4. 114.

trochai  
applied  
ἐκ τοῦ  
Καλλίμ  
were ex  
Homer  
hollow  
tinkling  
terms  
Acharn  
applied  
pounded  
κομπολ  
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B.C. for  
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and de  
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special  
Sophoc  
than as  
κιθάρα,  
training  
to βόμβ  
noise ca  
the reso

C.  
Porphyr  
machus  
grandia  
quasi in

<sup>1</sup> *Il.* 1  
and *Od.* 1

<sup>2</sup> *l.* 38.

<sup>3</sup> Papy

*Oxyrh.* 1

*l.* 16; Dic

<sup>4</sup> *l.* 96.

<sup>5</sup> *l.* 58.

hardly b

not thin

παρεποίη

κομπαστή

<sup>6</sup> *De*

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trochaic dimeter catalectic, traces a connexion between the oil-pot metaphor as applied to tragedy and the ring of an empty vessel: βόμβος γὰρ γίνεται περὶ τὸ ληκύθιον ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου αὐτῷ ἀέρος κινουμένου, ἢ ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἀνδρὸς ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου· διὸ καὶ Καλλίμαχος Μοῦσαν Ληκυθίαν τὴν τραγωδίαν λέγει. If he was right, λήκυθος/ληκυθίζειν were exact equivalents of κόμπος/κομπάζειν. κόμπος = 'boast' was metaphorical, for in Homer it is used generally of any dull noise<sup>1</sup> and in later Greek more particularly of a hollow noise made by an empty vessel or instrument; in the *Rhesus* it denotes the tinkling of bells,<sup>2</sup> and later still κομπεῖν, κομπάζειν, and κομπασία were the technical terms for the process of ringing a jar to test its soundness.<sup>3</sup> Similarly in the *Acharnians* we find the verb κομπολακεῖν (which, incidentally, is the very word applied by Euripides in the *Frogs* to the 'pompous' diction of Aeschylus<sup>4</sup>) compounded with λήκυθος to form a comic name for Lamachus, κομπολακίτης (or κομπολάκυθος).<sup>5</sup> Sets of bronze vases designed to produce resonances (κόμποι) at a predetermined pitch were in use in Greek theatres at least as early as the second century B.C. for the purpose of improving acoustics, for Vitruvius,<sup>6</sup> advocating their use in Roman theatres, mentions that L. Mummius, who captured and plundered Corinth in 146 B.C., transported the bronze vessels which he found in the theatre to Rome and dedicated them in the temple of Luna on the Aventine. Vessels of this kind, intended to reverberate in a large theatre, must have been of a size which even the generic term λήκυθος could hardly cover, and since they were unknown in fifth-century Athens, cannot be relevant here; but it is noteworthy that Phrynichus, a lexicographer of the second century A.D., derives the λήκυθος metaphor from the practice of students of voice-production, who threw their voice 'as it were' into λήκυθοι when they wanted to produce a hollow note.<sup>7</sup> If he is not thinking simply of the professional actors speaking into the 'amplifier' in the theatre, it may be that the use of small jars to train would-be public speakers and actors in the production of special effects was as early and as well known as the use of the pebble by Demosthenes. Sophocles' ληκυθιστής would be most easily explained as one who uses a λήκυθος rather than as one who makes a noise like a λήκυθος, on the analogy of κιθαριστής from κιθάρα, but on the other hand we have no evidence that jars were used for speech-training in fifth-century Athens. Whether this explanation or the simple reference to βόμβος τραγικός of the scholiast on Hephaestion be accepted, this characteristic noise cannot, of course, be completely dissociated from visual characteristic C, since the resonant note of a jar depends on its shape and size.

C. The spherical body of the oil-pot. Of the ancient commentators on Horace, Porphyry connects *ampullas* in the *Ars Poetica* with the ληκύθειος Μοῦσα<sup>8</sup> of Callimachus, but Pseudacron comments: 'Proicit ampullas: fastuosa verba, id est irata, grandia, inflata verba: omittit orationem tumidam. Adhuc enim ampullas vocamus quasi inflata vasa.' He does not mention any noise typical of the *ampulla*. Apparently

<sup>1</sup> Il. II. 417, 12. 149 (a boar whetting its tusks) and Od. 8. 380 (the stamping of dancers' feet).

<sup>2</sup> l. 383.

<sup>3</sup> Papyr. Lond. Ined. No. 2327 (3rd cent. B.C.); Oxyrrh. Papyr. Grenfell and Hunt, vol. xiv, 1631, l. 16; Diog. Laert. vi. 30.

<sup>4</sup> l. 961.

<sup>5</sup> l. 589. See Müller, *Ach.*, p. 108 n. There can hardly be a pun on Lamachus' name, and I do not think this is what the schol. meant by παρποιήσεν καὶ παρέπλασεν ὄνομα ὄρνιθος διὰ τὸ κομπασιῶν εἶναι Λάμαχον.

<sup>6</sup> *De Architectura*, 5. 6.

<sup>7</sup> ληκυθίζειν . . . ὁπότεν βούλονται οἱ φωνασκοῦντες κοῖλον τὸ φθέγμα ποιεῖν, ὥστε εἰς ληκύθους προίεμενοι (Bekker, *Anec. Graec.* 50. 8). Cf. Hesych. s.v. ληκυθιστής.

<sup>8</sup> The words ληκ. Μοῦσα have been supplied by Schneider from the schol. on Hephaest. vi to fill a lacuna of 14 letters in the text. The fragment of Callimachus is given by him as ἢ (ἢ?) τις τραγωδὸς μοῦσα ληκυθίζουσα but whether ἢ or ἢ is read, τις seems weak. Did Callimachus write ἢ τρίς τραγωδός, with the τρίς not only strengthening the adjective but also alluding to the production of tragedies in trilogies?



for him it was purely visual; the swelling phrases of the grand tragic style were compared to the inflated body of the jar.

D. The fact that the pot often contained perfumed oil or paint for use as a cosmetic. This explanation is not to be found in any ancient commentator, and I doubt whether it would ever have been put forward by any modern one but for the single passage in Cicero's letter to Atticus: 'Totum hunc locum, quem ego varie meis orationibus, quarum tu Aristarchus es, soleo pingere, de flamma, de ferro (nosti illas λήκυθους), valde graviter [Crassus] pertexuit.'<sup>1</sup> Cicero is reporting to Atticus the general tenor of the speech made by Crassus before the Senate in January 61 B.C., a speech in which he lavished praise on the achievements of Cicero's consulship in Cicero's own best manner, in order to depreciate the magnitude of Pompey's victories in the east and set the successful general at variance with the successful statesman. Some editors,<sup>2</sup> though not all, presume that the parenthesis looks back to the verb *pingere*, and for parallels for the metaphor drawn from painting cite 'claris coloribus picta oratio'<sup>3</sup> and 'meus autem liber totum Isocrati myrothecium atque omnes eius discipulorum arculas ac non nihil etiam Aristotelia pigmenta consumpsit'.<sup>4</sup> But were λήκυθοι ever used for paint? Aryballi were occasionally carried by women as perfume-jars, but neither they nor the generic λήκυθοι are mentioned anywhere as being used for any kind of paint, either as a cosmetic or for any other purpose; the narrow neck of the aryballus at least made it unsuitable for liquids of a greater consistency than oil.<sup>5</sup> It may be that Cicero meant his λήκυθοι to be perfume-jars and used *pingere* loosely of cosmetics in general; the *pigmenta* in *ad Att.* 2. 1. 2 may include perfume as well as paint, just as the *pigmentarius* was the Roman equivalent both of the *χρωματοπώλης* and also of the *μυροπώλης*.<sup>6</sup> If so, 'claris coloribus picta oratio' is, of course, a different metaphor, but the passage from *ad Att.* 2. 1. 2, with *myrothecium*, *arculas*, and *pigmenta* all referring to perfume, will support λήκυθοι = 'perfume-jars' and also prove that Cicero did not shrink from the admission that his own style was at times meretricious. But whether paint-pots or perfume-jars are preferred, or whether the distinction is not insisted upon, there is a serious difficulty: neither the aryballus nor the generic λήκυθος was characteristically a container for paint or perfume, and so why should Cicero have preferred λήκυθοι here to, say, *μυροθήκιον* or *ἀλάβαστρον*?

Of these four possibilities, A and B, being unusual qualities rather than unusual quantities of sounds produced by jars, give us the wrong kind of metaphor. No doubt tragedy in its most elevated mood did demand a hollow (or even gurgling?) manner of delivery which was not characteristic of comedy; and, though Horace's *sesquipedalia verba* points to a peculiarity of style rather than of delivery, with his *ore tumido* and *desaevit*, and with the *κοιλόφωνος* of Hesychius, explanation B fits fairly well. Similarly his *proicit* ('discards') might well be said of an actual jar used for speech-training, though it is a little strange that, if the practice of using jars in this way was common enough for the expression to pass into wide metaphorical use, the only direct reference to it that we have occurs in the second century A.D. But Sophocles' *ληκυθιστής* and Plutarch's *ληκυθισμοί*, which were terms of reproach applied to a loud-voiced braggart, point either to an unusual volume of sound or, like Horace's *sesquipedalia verba*, to words of an unusual length, unless we commit ourselves to the view that the metaphor's meaning in literary criticism is different from its meaning as a term of opprobrium. A passage in Strabo, in which *θέσεις ληκυθίζειν* is contrasted

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 'Non tamen omnino Marci nostri λήκυθους fugimus' (Pliny, *Ep.* 1. 2. 4).

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Tyrrell and How. Forcell. and Boot translate 'swelling phrases'.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. *Orat.* 3. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2. 1. 2.

<sup>5</sup> For rouge, at least, the cylindrical pyxis was used. See Rogers, *Eccles.* 1. 929 n.—a rouge-pot from Naucratis.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Philoxenus, Glossary.



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with φιλοσοφείν πραγματικῶς,<sup>1</sup> lends support to the 'quantitative' view; Strabo records that the pupils of Aristotle, after the loss of their master's books, were compelled to abandon systematic philosophy and reduced to dealing in commonplaces, and the most natural meaning for ληκυθίζειν here is surely to amplify (as in C), although D, to deck out meretriciously, cannot be altogether excluded. Similarly in Vergil, *Catalepton* 5, ll. 1-2

ite hinc, inanes, ite, rhetorum ampullae,  
inflata rhoso\* non Achaico verba,<sup>2</sup>

the appositional phrase *inflata . . . verba* clearly points to C, even though the second line is corrupt and no satisfactory emendation has been proposed.<sup>3</sup>

I believe that what was likened to the spherical body of the aryballus was primarily the inflated cheeks of anyone blowing at a fire, playing the flute or, by an extension of the metaphor's use, mouthing words 'a foot-and-a-half long'. When the cheeks are filled with wind and the lips pouted for blowing, the face bears a striking resemblance to the aryballus with its spherical body, narrow neck, and flattened lip. That λήκυθος and λήκυθοι were in common colloquial use at Athens for the inflated cheeks is suggested strongly by certain passages in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, ll. 877-1111, passages which have been generally misunderstood. The scene illustrates some of the ludicrous results of the new social legislation passed by the assembled women, whereby any man is obliged to make love to any woman on demand, the only stipulation being that, in cases where there are more than one claimant, the aged and the ugly shall have priority. A young man is accosted by the first old woman and asked for a kiss:

Γρσ. ἀλλὰ πρόσαγε τὸ στόμα.  
Νεαν. ἀλλ' ὦ μέλ' ὀρρωδῶ τὸν ἐραστήν σου.  
Γρσ. τίνα;  
Νεαν. τὸν τῶν γραφέων ἀριστον.  
Γρσ. οὗτος δ' ἔστι τις;  
Νεαν. ὃς τοῖς νεκροῖσι ζωγραφεῖ τὰς ληκύθους.<sup>4</sup>

The young man's retort has been universally taken to mean quite simply that the only lover the woman can expect is an 'undertaker's assistant', the painter who painted the funeral lecyths<sup>5</sup> customarily placed on Attic tombs, or depicted on tombstones, in Aristophanes' day.<sup>6</sup> This is undeniably the general sense of the joke, but it is not sufficient to explain why Aristophanes thought it necessary to introduce the elaborate reference to funeral λήκυθοι and the painter who decorated them, a superfluous piece of detail if the young man means merely that the old woman is fit for the grave rather than love-making. There are three points which should be noted. In the first place the young man's jest on the funeral lecyth is the reply to a request for a kiss. Secondly, the most striking feature of the three old women, a feature to which there are four direct allusions,<sup>7</sup> is that their cheeks are daubed with white-lead (ψιμύθιον) and rouge (ἐρχουσα), which, like the κροκωτοί that they are wearing, are intended to convey the impression of youth. The young man calls the third old

<sup>1</sup> Bk. 13. 1, § 54.

<sup>2</sup> This passage was apparently unknown to Pottier, who calls Horace's *ampullae*, as well as *ampullari*, ἀπαξ λεγόμενον.

<sup>3</sup> The reference seems to be to the distinction between the Asiatic and Attic schools of oratory. Cf. 'Attici pressi et integri, Asiani inflati et inanes', Quint. 12. 10. 16.

<sup>4</sup> ll. 993-6.

<sup>5</sup> Rogers takes them to be oil-pots buried with

the dead, comparing l. 538, but ἐπιθείσα there points to a vase on, not in, the grave.

<sup>6</sup> When the *Ecclesiazusae* was produced (393? —see Rogers's Intro.) Attic graves were no longer being decorated with the white-ground lecyths typical of the 5th century but with marble lecyths or στήλαι with pictures of white lecyths painted on them, but the above interpretation is not thereby affected.

<sup>7</sup> ll. 878, 904, 929, 1072.

woman a *πίθηκος ἀνάπλεως ψιμυθίου*<sup>1</sup> and the second one a *φρόνην ἔχουσαν λήκυθον πρὸς ταῖς γνάθοις*,<sup>2</sup> meaning that the cosmetics are superimposed on the wrinkles so thickly that their cheeks look as distended as those of an ape or a toad, although another point of the comparison with an ape may be their hairiness, as Blaydes notices, citing as parallel

ἐπὶ τῷ προσώπῳ δ' αἱ τρίχες φορούμεναι  
εἴξασι πολιαῖς ἀνάπλεω ψιμυθίου.<sup>3</sup>

Thirdly, funeral lecyths were decorated with red outline paintings upon a white ground, cloaks, however, and other garments often being depicted in full; the two colours characteristic of these vases are the same as the colours of the cosmetics on the old women's cheeks. There is thus a strong probability that *ὁς τοῖς νεκροῖσι ζωγραφεῖ τὰς ληκύθους* means not only 'the man who paints vases for the dead' but also 'the man who paints the cheeks of old women who have one foot in the grave', and that the young man is refusing to kiss the old woman for fear of smearing the painter's work and daubing his own cheeks with rouge and white-lead in the process. He repeats the joke towards the end of the scene before being dragged off into the house by two of the old women:

ὦ τρισκακοδαίμων, εἰ γυναῖκα δεῖ σαπρὰν  
βινεῖν ὅλην τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν,  
κᾶπειτ' ἐπειδὴν τῆσδ' ἀπαλλαγῶ, πάλιν  
φρόνην ἔχουσαν λήκυθον πρὸς ταῖς γνάθοις.<sup>4</sup>

Here the alternative interpretation suggested by Blaydes, that the old woman was laid out on the stage as if for burial with a funeral lecyth at her head, will not do; the women are not lying down, for they are both said in 1093-4 to be dragging the youth towards the house-door. Furthermore, the youth's parting words, addressed to the audience

καὶ τήνδ' ἄνωθεν ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ σήματος  
ζῶσαν καταπιτῶσαντες εἰτα τῷ πόδε  
μολυβδοχοήσαντες κύκλω περὶ τὰ σφύρα  
ἄνω 'πιθεῖναι πρόφασιν ἀντὶ ληκύθου.<sup>5</sup>

make it plain that it is the woman herself who is compared to a vase and who is to be set on his tomb if he does not survive his ordeal. In this scene Aristophanes develops two variations of the metaphor for comic purposes, beginning with a funeral lecyth, which was larger than an aryballus and had a cylindrical body, and ending with an allusion to a *λουτροφόρος*, the shape of which was similar to that of an old woman standing with arms akimbo.<sup>6</sup> But the confidence with which he elaborates the jest presupposes that *λήκυθοι* = cheeks was a common colloquialism. Significantly enough, the scholiast and Suidas, while ignoring the cosmetics, both render *ἔχουσαν λήκυθον πρὸς ταῖς γνάθοις* 'with swollen cheeks'; the former glosses with *ὠδηκυῖα*, and Suidas<sup>7</sup> has *λήκυθος δέ, τουτέστι διωδηκυῖα τὸ πρόσωπον*.

There are two further passages which, while adding little by way of substantial evidence to the arguments already given, do not, at any rate, conflict with them. The first is from the *Frogs*, ll. 1220-1; the third prologue, that of the Sthenoboea, has just

<sup>1</sup> l. 1072.

<sup>2</sup> l. 1101. The variant *Φρόνην*, the name of several Greek courtesans (see Blaydes ad loc.), is pointless.

<sup>3</sup> Eubulus ap. Athen. p. 557.

<sup>4</sup> ll. 1098-1101.

<sup>5</sup> ll. 1108-11.

<sup>6</sup> For an illustration see *Jahrb. d. Archaeol. Inst.* xlix (1934), p. 224, fig. 19: a *στήλη* showing a *λουτροφόρος* flanked by two *λήκυθοι*.

<sup>7</sup> s.v. *Φρόνη*.

received the *coup de grâce* from the oil-flask, and Dionysus now advises Euripides to shorten sail before the oncoming storm:

Δι. Εὐριπίδη—

Εὐρ. τί ἔσθ' ;

Δι. ὑφέσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

τὸ ληκύθιον γὰρ τοῦτο πνευσεῖται πολὺ.

In the attack on the preceding prologue Aeschylus is represented as using the oil-flask as a cudgel; the sudden change to the metaphor of a storm at sea may be dictated by nothing more than the Athenian liking for nautical language, but the gale which Aristophanes had in mind was probably a boisterous blast from the cheeks of Aeschylus, the acknowledged master of the 'long-winded' style. The second is a fragment of the fourth-century comic poet Alcaeus, too short and incomplete to allow us to establish the sense with anything like certainty. It is a single line, cited in the *Etymologicum Florentinum*: ἐπίχαλκον στόμα· τὸ τοῦ αὐλοῦ διὰ τὴν φορβεῖαν· Ἀλκαῖος Κωμωδοτραγωδία· ἦλλει δ' ἐπίχαλκον τὸ στόμα λήκυθόν τ' ἔχων.<sup>1</sup> If the comment of the compiler of the *Etymologicum* is rejected, the fragment lends itself equally well to half a dozen different interpretations: the στόμα may have been the mouth of the flute, parts of which were, in Horace's day at least, made of metal, giving the tone a harsher, trumpet-like quality,<sup>2</sup> or the mouth of the φορβεῖά, although there is no evidence one way or the other that it ever had a metal rim, or even the mouth of the player, to which the epithet ἐπίχαλκον might have been applied metaphorically in much the same way that χάλκεος is to ὄψ in *Iliad* 18. l. 222;<sup>3</sup> λήκυθος, for all we know, may have been the name given to the sound-chamber (δλμος) and mouth-piece (ὀφόλμιον) of the flute, which bear a close resemblance to the aryballus in shape,<sup>4</sup> or even to the bell-like attachment which was fitted into the end of the ἔλυμος or *tibia Berecynthia* and acted as an amplifier.<sup>5</sup> If, on the other hand, his comment is accepted (and in the absence of any other evidence it must carry some weight), the στόμα was the mouth of the player, fitted into the bronze mouth of the φορβεῖά, the leather strap which was passed round his cheeks and back of his head, controlling the direction and force of his breath and at the same serving to maintain the flute or flutes in position, and λήκυθον is most naturally taken to be some part of his body too. There is nothing to support Meineke's view that it means the vocal chords or Adam's apple, for flute-playing does not involve any extraordinary contortions of the larynx, and in the fragment of Clearchus which he compares τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς λαυκανίας καὶ αὐχένος ἡχώδες means merely a gurgling noise in the throat. 'Cheek' gives the easiest sense, for the main purpose of the φορβεῖά was to prevent the cheeks being blown out too far and direct a steady stream of breath into the mouth of the flute.<sup>6</sup> The line which followed our fragment, then, probably contained an adjective to be taken proleptically with λήκυθον, as ἐπίχαλκον must be with στόμα, meaning compressed, not, as Kock suggested, inflated. The same sense may be got from the line by reading τὸ στόμ' ἀλήκυθόν τ' ἔχων, with ἀλήκυθον (= with cheeks not distended) agreeing with στόμα; no such adjective occurs, but its formation could be paralleled, e.g. with ἄγαμος, and the difficulty of the omission of the article before λήκυθον would be obviated.

<sup>1</sup> I give the text of Kock, *Att. Com. Fragm.* i, p. 761 (cf. Meineke in *Hermes*, iii, p. 453), but on any interpretation the zeugmatic omission of the article before λήκυθον is awkward, though it might be paralleled.

<sup>2</sup> *Tibia non, ut nunc, orichalco vincta tubaeque aemula . . .* (Hor. *A.P.* 202).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. χάλκεον δέξυ βοῶν Hes. *Sc.* 243.

<sup>4</sup> See 'The Double Flutes' by J. Curtis in

*J.H.S.* xxxiv, pp. 89 ff. I am indebted to Prof. Rumpf for this suggestion.

<sup>5</sup> See Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, under 'Tibia'.

<sup>6</sup> So flute-playing without the φορβεῖά is applied metaphorically to uncontrolled passion in Soph. fr. 753 (Dind.). For an illustration of ληκυθισμός without the φορβεῖά see Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen*, iii, No. 516.



We can now dispense with the paint-pots or perfume-jars and see what Cicero meant by 'nosti illas ληκύθους'. The parenthesis must refer back not to *pingere*, from which it is separated by *de flamma, de ferro*, but to the words *de flamma, de ferro* themselves, and the meaning is 'You know the deep breaths which I expended on the "fire and iron" of the Catalinarian conspiracy', with a punning reference to the blasts of air directed by a blacksmith on a piece of iron in the fire. Atticus had criticized the rhetorical extravagances of the consular speeches, and Cicero does not hesitate to admit that he had been guilty of exaggerating the dangers which threatened the constitution in 63. The abrupt metaphorical transition from painting to iron-working is accounted for sufficiently by Cicero's eagerness to air his knowledge of the Attic idiom, but the process by which a metaphor drawn from vases developed a connexion with the blacksmith's shop needs comment. It was not originally suggested by any activity of the potter or any particular use to which the finished product was put, but simply by a visual resemblance, and so it was inevitable that it should pass through a second stage, in which it was used in widely differing contexts as a synonym for *φυσᾶν* and *φύσα*. There was a danger that its primary association would be completely obscured, a fate which befalls metaphors in any language. This tendency begins as early as the *αἰών* in the *Frogs*, where *ληκύθιον* develops an extraneous connexion with a storm at sea, but a better example is provided by a poem of Theodoridas of Syracuse (*flor. circa* 235 B.C.), in which the adjective *ἐπιλακυνθίστρια*, apparently derivative from a verb *ἐπιληκυνθίζειν* which does not occur anywhere, is used by *κατάχρησις* in precisely the same metaphorical context as *ληκύθους* in the letter to Atticus. The poem is an epitaph on Mnasalcas of Plataeae, an elegiast who drew the raw material for his bombastic poems from the dithyrambs of Simonides:

Μνασάλκεος τὸ σᾶμα τῷ Πλαταΐδᾳ,  
τῷ 'λεγειοποιῷ.  
ἂ Μῶσα δ' αὐτῷ τᾶς Σιμωνίδᾳ πλάτας  
ἥς ἀποσπάραγμα,  
κενὰ τε κλαγγὰν κἀπιλακυνθίστρια  
διθυραμβοχάνα.  
τέθνακε, μὴ βάλωμες· εἰ δέ κε ζόεν,  
τύμπανόν κ' ἐφύση.<sup>1</sup>

The epitaph is short but the interpretation difficult; *πλάτας*, if the correction of the manuscript reading *πλάθας* is right, must mean the rib or shoulder-blade<sup>2</sup> of Simonides, which the literary ghoul had been in the habit of dissecting. But the main problem centres around the word *διθυραμβοχάνα*; Stuart Jones in the new Liddell and Scott retains the old rendering 'funnel of dithyrambs'! but, although both *χώνη* and *χῶνος* do commonly mean a funnel or spout (the former being more common in this sense), the expression is strange enough to justify his exclamation mark. The funnel might have been used to fill the *λήκυνθος* with a liquid distillation of Simonides' dithyrambs, in which case *κενὰ κλαγγὰν* might refer to the gurgling noise made by the jar as it was filled, but how would the fragment, which is non-liquid, fit into the picture, and what would be the connexion between the distillation process and the inflation of a drum with which the epitaph is rounded off? The poem may be a pure piece of nonsense; but I do not think it is. Substitute, for 'funnel' or 'spout', the translation 'melting-pot' (in this sense *χῶνος* is more common than *χώνη*) and consistent sense can be made out of it; Mnasalcas' method of turning out elegiacs was to put a dithyrambic fragment of Simonides in the melting-pot, fill his cheeks with breath to bursting point, so

<sup>1</sup> *Anth. Pal.* xii. 21. I give Jacobs's text, but for modifications of dialect.

<sup>2</sup> The meaning 'sheet of paper', given by the editors, is both unparalleled and unnecessary.



that they made inarticulate noises (κενά κλαγγάν),<sup>1</sup> and then blow (ἐπιλακνύσσεια)<sup>2</sup> the fragment into something ten times more turgid; and if he had gone on living and blowing, the finished product would have been as big and as devoid of content as a dithyrambic drum.<sup>3</sup> Here, too, the original association between the inflated cheeks and the aryballus has been forgotten, and ἐπιλακνύσσεια is used as a κύριον ὄνομα in the common figure which compared the labours of the poet to the work of the smith in the forge.

There is no trace in either of the two passages of Horace of any such contamination, but Persius in the fifth satire seems to have interpreted his predecessor's *ampullae* and *ampullari* as a metaphor from the smithy. Persius opens the satire with an allusion to the extravagant language of poets who demanded a hundred mouths and a hundred tongues in order to do their themes justice, and is interrupted with a supposed objection from his master Cornutus: 'Yes, but you are not going to follow suit, are you? You are not going to write tragedy?'

Tu neque anhelanti, coquitur dum massa camino,  
folle premis ventos, nec clauso murmure raucus  
nescioquid tecum grave cornicaris inepte,  
nec scloppo tumidas intendis rumpere buccas.<sup>4</sup>

Persius may here be echoing Horace, *Sat.* 1. 4. 19-21:

At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras,  
usque laborantes dum ferrum molliat ignis,  
ut mavis, imitare,

but since he is thinking in particular of the writing of tragedy and not, like Horace in his satire, of just any genre of poetry, it is far more probable that his language is a reminiscence of the passages in the *Ars Poetica* and *Epistles* Book I in which Horace uses *ampullae* and *ampullari* of the elevated tragic style. The first twenty lines of the fifth satire are full of complimentary allusion to the *Ars Poetica*, as well as to the *Satires* and *Epistles*, as Jahn<sup>5</sup> notes, and I do not think it is straining the correspondence to see in Persius' 'scloppo tumidas intendis rumpere buccas' a reference to the *os tumidum* sometimes used by Chremes in comedy and the *ampullas* sometimes discarded by Telephus and Peleus in tragedy. The sudden release of the breath from the distended cheeks with a 'pop!' may, further, be suggested by the verb *desaevit* found in conjunction with *ampullatur* in Horace's letter to Julius Florus, where, if *ampullatur* is the Latin equivalent of *ληκνύζει* (= fills his cheeks with breath), *desaevire* must be the reverse process of expending one's breath rapidly. *Desaevire*, commonly used as a strengthened form of *saevire*, is found in Lucan<sup>6</sup> in the sense 'spend one's force', and so, too, in a passage on voice-production in Seneca's letters,<sup>7</sup> where, although the text is corrupt, it is clear that Seneca is warning his correspondent against expending his breath in a single rustic bellow.

The arguments set out above can now give us a comprehensive picture of the successive stages in the development and application of the metaphor. It may have come into use at any time after the end of the seventh century, when the spherical aryballus was introduced at Athens, as a colloquialism suggested by the shape of the cheeks when filled with breath for blowing the fire or playing the flute. By the time

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Pers. *Sat.* 5, ll. 11-12, cited below.

<sup>2</sup> ἐπιλακνύσσεια = the tragic Muse (Liddell and Scott) is worse than pointless.

<sup>3</sup> τύμπανον may be an internal accusative (cf. μέγα φωνᾶν) = 'a blast as big as a drum'.

<sup>4</sup> ll. 10-13.

<sup>5</sup> He compares l. 7 with *A.P.* 230 and l. 19 with

*A.P.* 302, to which might be added l. 8 (*A.P.* 91 and 187) and l. 14 (*A.P.* 47).

<sup>6</sup> 'Nec, dum desaeviat ira, Exspectat . . .'  
(bk. 5. 304).

<sup>7</sup> 'Modesta (sc. vox) . . . descendat, non decidat . . . et hoc indocto et rustico more desaeviat' (*Ep.* 15. 8).

of Aristophanes it seems to have become a slang expression for the cheeks, whether inflated or not. Sophocles' *ληκυθιστής* was probably an *ἀλαζών* talking in big, empty phrases, a development suggested by the analogous *μέγα φυσᾶν*;<sup>1</sup> and whether the citation is from a tragedy or a Satyric drama, it was doubtless a deliberate colloquialism. Plutarch's classification of *ληκυθισμοί* amongst τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχίστα ῥήματα suggests that the metaphor's proper place was in the vocabulary of comedy rather than tragedy. Its first application to literary criticism came in the year 405 with the production of the *Frogs*, where the tag *ληκυθιον ἀπώλεσεν* must inevitably have meant to the Athenian audience 'lost his wind' and pointed to the contrast between the simple language of Euripides and the massive compounds of Aeschylus; thence sprang the nicknames given to the tragic Muse, tragic actors, and, by an easy extension of the metaphor to rhetoric, the lengthy words and periods of the high-flown style of oratory. Being a colloquialism, it was always a humorous expression, but, as Pottier notices, it depended on the context whether it was used derogatorily of the turgid style, as in Theodoridas' poem, or approvingly of the elevated style matching the elevated theme, as by Horace; Horace's *sesquipedalia verba* and his comment on Titius' audacity in proposing to write tragedy or Pindaric lyrics carry an unmistakable tone of light ridicule, but he makes it clear in the *Ars Poetica* that *ampullae* are the tragic style *par excellence*, except where the misfortunes of the tragic character demand a lapse into *sermo pedester*. Horace was not responsible for the adoption of the metaphor from Greek into Latin, as Porphyryon asserted, for it had been used about thirty years earlier by Vergil in the *Catalepton* and was probably in popular circulation much earlier than that, but he may have coined the verb *ampullari* himself, on the principle which he laid down in *Ars Poetica*, ll. 52-3

Et nova fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem, si  
Graeco fonte cadent, parce detorta.

In popular use at Rome the metaphor may have retained the association with iron-working which first appears in Theodoridas, but Horace, who does not amplify it beyond his *os tumidum* and *desaevit*, seems to have seen in it nothing more than a connexion with the aryballus, a connexion he would know from the lectures on comedy and tragedy which he attended at Athens and which supplied much of the material for the *Ars Poetica*.

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<sup>1</sup> *Iph. Aul.* 125. Cf. Menander's οἱ φυσῶντες ἐφ' αὐτοῖς μέγα (Kock, iii, fr. 302).

## THE CODEX ETONENSIS OF STATIUS' *ACHILLEID*

THE most reliable manuscript of Statius' *Achilleid* is the Puteaneus (*P*), and its authority, against the group *QKC*, is frequently upheld only by the Codex Etonensis (*E*). The readings of this manuscript (Eton College library), which contains, apart from the *Achilleid*, Maximian, Ovid's *Remedium Amoris* and other poems, were collated by C. Schenkl, *Wiener Studien*, iv (1882), 96 ff., and were used by H. W. Garrod for the O.C.T. of Statius: Klotz in the Teubner 2nd edition merely notes the readings of Schenkl and of the Oxford text. Unfortunately these are neither complete nor always accurate; and the latter should be corrected as follows:

1. In three passages the Oxford text differs from the reading of *PEKQ* without noting the fact: *Ach.* i. 145 *Non superant* is not, as implied, the MS. reading, but Havet's conjecture: *PEKQ* have *nam superant*. 306 *PEKQ* have *impulsam* (*impulsam*), not *impulsum*. 680 *PEKQ* *ibi*, not *ubi*.

2. In the following passages the reading of *E* is wrongly reported by Garrod, the correct reading (minor misspellings of *E* omitted) being: *Ach.* i. 47 *tarde est iam plena* (*ple-in ras.*) 74 *adtolle* (*E*<sup>1</sup>: *da tollere E*<sup>2</sup>) *fructus*<sup>1</sup> 109 *que quisque sacrarat*<sup>2</sup> 124 *dextraque himo* (*i in ras.*) *summissus intrans* [*sic*!] 133 *ire feras*] *Inreferas* 185 *vari* 189 *q* (= *quod, sicut P*) 196 *achillem* 214 *hinc ex hunc . . . hinc* 215 *Hinc ex Hunc* 235 *Et recto* 401 *raptam* 429 *laxatur* (*s sub x*) 481 *ptrinxerit* (= *pertrinxerit*!—*recte Schenkl*) 516 *torques* 570 *lateri*] *alteri* 576 *amplexu et millena* (*-ill- in ras.*; *mille in marg.*) 586 *parenti* 594 *uius sup. lin. E*<sup>2</sup> 639 *nec* 643 *ablato* 653 *tuiuisa*<sup>3</sup> 656 *neptem* (*o sup. lin. E*<sup>2</sup>) 657 *om. sed pater* 717 *priamo frigusque* 753 *Lurea ex Laurea* 811 *et formae* (*sicut PKQ*) 869 *dori E*<sup>1</sup>: *ca add. sup. lin. E*<sup>2</sup> 871 *mittant* ii. 67 *inexenti* 117 *iubebar ex -bat*

3. In the following passages there is no mention of the reading of *E*, unimportant variants<sup>4</sup> again being omitted: *Ach.* i. 3 *Diva re refer* *canto* 4 *om. per* 5 *la/tentem* 33 *nova faucibus* 35 *om/nis* (*del. i*) 50 *miserando* 53 *diffusus* 56 *circum* (*om. que*) 57 *pladis/ipse* (*del. q.*) 58 *triciplici* 62 *patefeceris ex -erit* 67 *Na/vigat* 68 *Heu E*<sup>1</sup>: *Heu heu E*<sup>2</sup> 71 *has saltem*] *Assaltim* 85 *Aspicie* 87 *Undabit ex -vit* *vetabit ex -vit* 88 *tardabit* (*b in ras.*) 89 *manu*] *ma*<sup>u</sup> *operarii irrita* 91 *perisse* 95 *dimissa* (*sicut K*) 101 *conubilia* 107 *longa*<sup>o</sup> 108 *exusta* 113 *belli genalibus* *orni*] *ortu* 115 *inavia* 116 *virididis inertu* 123 *senis ex senes* 128 *dic*] *Sic* 131 *contuor*] *tueor* 132 *ubera ex libera* 136 *om. sub* 138 *illaentibus* 139 *ignotis* (?-iis) *ex ignotus divis in ras.* 140 *vt/orque E*<sup>1</sup> 144 *instringe* 146 *Invia*<sup>di</sup> 147 *nec ex non* 148 *vis*] *Lus* 153 *domos ex -us* 154 *fluvisque* (*sicut P*; *sim. ii. 117 fluvii*) 156 *pinus*] *puuis* 162 *coma sup. lin.* 172 *om. que* 183 *gaudia add. E*<sup>2</sup> *sup. lin.* 190 *crudo bebricia cestu* (*c in ras.*) 198 *undisonis per* (*-onis per in ras.*) 213 *fronde ex fronte* 214 *anxia*] *auxit* 220 *solita* 222 *Delphines* 225 *honor* 232 *diva* 240 *sevis* 263 *Verere* 264 *cena E*<sup>1</sup> 267 *ivente* 273 *puer add. E*<sup>2</sup> *sup. lin.* 275 *Nec quiquam mulcent E*<sup>1</sup> 276 *magna* 291 *om. et* 298 *gemis* 322 *portare ex -ate* 326 *rigenda* 339 *ergo manus sicoro gradumque* 343 *tactu ex tacta*

<sup>1</sup> *Da tollere fructus* (i.e. *fructum ferre*) might even be accepted, but *da pellere luctus* (*P*) seems the best reading.

<sup>2</sup> There is thus no MS. support for Menke's conjecture *sacrari*, accepted by Garrod and

Klotz.

<sup>3</sup> Thus *tu visa* is without MS. support.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. *e* for *ae* (commonly), omission or addition of *h*, *mi* for *mihi*, doubling of consonants or the opposite, misspelling of proper names, etc.

367 visum 368 cervice comisque *in ras.* 403 iura] ?Ira *E*<sup>1</sup> 425 Doma 443 fervent  
*ex -ens operta]* perta 447 Hecateia] hec atria 452 monte *ex -es* 461 Ille (*cf. P*)  
diffussaque 479 proprior (*sicut PK*<sup>1</sup>) 483 vincique] umque 484 coirent (*-rent in*  
*ras.*) 490 posceret *ex -erat* 493 Increpans *E*<sup>1</sup> chalcanta *ex -te* 500 sordet<sup>1</sup> 518  
deprehendit ordine cetus 529 temptes 533 ad pectora 534 crede (*sicut k*) 536 an-  
nususque 537 aras *ex arat* 539 vacat 540 si te trahit *E*<sup>1</sup> 553 que *om. E*<sup>1</sup> 561 u/na  
(*ex vana*) la/tenti 571 nunc lapsis 584 fuget 613 relictis 617 conis 629 an] at  
634 e/go 652 fedas 670 vita 672 uterum (*uter- in ras.*) 675 lerthei *E*<sup>1</sup>: -eia *E*<sup>2</sup>  
(*sim. ii. 30 lereidus, i. 693 lertheiades*) fexus 680 puppe (*sicut KQ*) 688 sequetur  
694 remis] retus 700 remanere *ex -eret arduo* (o *in ras.*) 701 praeveniret 702  
ignota//que 707 hostes *ex hostet* 719 *om. si* 721 Pelidem 727 ostensa (*ostenta*  
*KQ*<sup>1</sup>: ostentans *Q*<sup>2</sup>) 730 Europam (*om. que*) 733 ducor 756 ostro 758 natorum *E*<sup>1</sup>  
760 amazonis *E*<sup>1</sup> 761 intentus 762 perlibat 763 extimplo iacentis 765 pudoris]  
puris 767 n (*sed cf. ii. 128*) 773 fames *ex -as* 777 adhortos *ex -as* 785 Haud] Aut  
788 Europes 799 vix *ex vis* 825 Naidas 842 media 853 /rubebat 857 *om. est*  
867 voco 880 Mara (*r ex alia litt.*) 895 Grator es et 900 virginea natorum *E*<sup>1</sup>  
examine 917 abnueret<sup>2</sup> 927 et Xanthus] exanthus 933 teucrousque 950 signo  
ii. 7 suadent *ex -et* 13 lita 19 quesit eo 29 ardor] amor 37 suspesa 39 clamore-  
fugit 43 longum est 46 et zephrisque 50 Ida] hora 52 minerva 60 cedit 63  
misereque *E*<sup>1</sup> 64 spolia *E*<sup>1</sup> 65 Argos] agros *E*<sup>1</sup> 66 Unde rumore *ex -es* 70 viles  
(*sicut KQ*) 78 frigas 79 volitante 81 Quodsi 82 Deidamia e sede] e *add. E*<sup>2</sup> *sup.*  
*lin.* 88 iuven///ca 94 factu 99 sed] sus 115 exaustoque (*exhaustoque KQ*) 116  
*om. in* 122 lyncas] damnas 128 n bscula tellis (*a add. ante bs- E*<sup>2</sup>) 131 penes 132  
gaesa] tela citen' *E*<sup>1</sup>: *corr. E*<sup>2</sup> 134 balearius hautor (*auctor KC*) 136 inclusn(?)  
quotiens 146 inmisum (*in- in ras.*) senior 158 mirare 160 quo] q et medica-  
mina 162 inerbis 164 iure *E*<sup>1</sup>

It must be concluded that the scribe of *E* was very ignorant of Latin and careless at copying. Even the commonest words are misspelt (e.g. i. 692 *inanc* for *in hanc*), and the number of these misspellings is too great for them to be included. But this very ignorance may often be a help, since the scribe will have been less likely to make plausible emendations.

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<sup>1</sup> This is the reading of all except *P*, which has *sordet*; but *sordet* may well be right.

<sup>2</sup> This is the reading of all except *P*, and may be right.

IN his  
which  
sufferi  
We pi  
same f  
the tr  
knowle  
knowle  
followi  
ignora  
four v  
is mor  
in b27  
The th  
emotic  
Aristo  
from a  
The  
ἀπαθές  
ἀναγνώ  
wherea  
the co  
happy  
By  
fact is  
mere p  
who in  
done in  
and he  
is inter  
not int  
It  
due to  
best fo  
that th  
Nicom  
this ki  
depend  
of prob  
Aristot  
In  
defined  
<sup>1</sup> De  
2. 1382<sup>a</sup>  
<sup>2</sup> The  
in Eurip  
<sup>3</sup> Cor  
<sup>4</sup> Th



## TRAGIC ERROR

IN his discussion of the tragic act in *Poet.* 14. 1453<sup>b</sup>15 ff. Aristotle separates the pity which we feel at mere suffering (*πάθος*)<sup>1</sup> from pity roused by the way in which this suffering is or will be brought about. The revenge of an enemy is not in itself pitiable. We pity, if victim and agent are closely related to one another as members of the same family, but only if the *action* is of a certain kind. Four possible ways of presenting the tragic act are therefore distinguished: (1) *attempted* but not performed, *with knowledge* of the relevant facts (as by Haemon in the *Antigone*); (2) *performed with knowledge* (as by Euripides' *Medea*); (3) *performed but in ignorance*, recognition following later (Sophocles' *Oedipus*, Astrydamas' *Alcmeon*, etc.); (4) *attempted in ignorance* but not performed, since recognition occurs in time to prevent it. Of these four variations (listed in order of demerit) the first is censured on the ground that it is morally shocking without being tragic, since it lacks *πάθος*.<sup>2</sup> The second is mentioned in 1427 as the favourite of the older poets, but is here passed over without comment. The third is explicitly approved on the ground that it avoids moral shock and has the emotional *ἐκπληξίς* of the recognition. But for some reason which he does not state, Aristotle prefers the last, where recognition is in time to prevent the tragic suffering from actually taking place.

The inconsistency of this preference with his own objection to (1) *οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς γάρ* (1439) is perhaps not serious. *πάθος* is a necessary element in a plot without *ἀγαννώρισις* or *περιπέτεια*, and neither (1) nor (2) presupposes a complicated plot, whereas both (3) and (4) go necessarily with *ἀγαννώρισις*. But the inconsistency with the conclusion of the previous chapter, where he emphatically insists that the unhappy ending is right for tragedy, cannot be so easily explained.

Bywater<sup>3</sup> holds that even if the fatal act is done in ignorance, its occurrence in fact is to a certain extent *μαρὸν*. But the moral objection is brought not against the mere performance of the act but against the intention: we are shocked by Haemon, who intends without performing; we are *not* shocked by the performed act when it is done in ignorance. Aristotle expressly says of (3) *τό τε γὰρ μαρὸν οὐ πρόσεστιν* (1454<sup>a</sup>3), and he cannot say more than that. We are left with the paradox that when the crime is intentional, however shocking, it is better for tragedy that it should occur; if it is not intentional, it is not shocking, but it is even better for tragedy if it is prevented.

It will be the contention of this paper that Aristotle's preference for tragic action due to ignorance, and his consequent change of opinion on the kind of ending which is best for tragedy, correspond to a change in his moral and psychological theory, and that this can be seen from a comparison between some parts of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>4</sup> The approval of the act done in ignorance rests on the merits of this kind of action considered in itself; the wish that it should be prevented seems to depend rather on its relation to the rest of the action of the drama, viewed as a series of probable or necessary connexions.

### Aristotle's Account of Voluntary Action

In the *Eudemian Ethics* 2. 1223<sup>a</sup>21-4<sup>a</sup>7 it is argued that voluntary action cannot be defined in terms of the kind of desire that prompts it (*ἐπιθυμία*, *θυμός*, or *βούλησις*),

<sup>1</sup> Death or intense pain (II. 1452<sup>b</sup>11, cf. *Rhet.* 2. 1382<sup>a</sup>22, 5<sup>b</sup>13).

<sup>2</sup> The untragic effect of (1) is seen most clearly in Euripides' *Orestes*.

<sup>3</sup> Commentary, pp. 224-5.

<sup>4</sup> Those who do not believe with Jaeger

(*Aristotle*, p. 238) that the *E.E.* is an earlier work of Aristotle's, may still be interested to note the relation of the views which it contains to the psychology of drama. For the sake of convenience I shall allude to the author(s) of both *Ethics* as Aristotle.

since both the ἀκρατής and the ἐγκρατής act voluntarily, yet each of these acts from the kind of desire which the other inhibits, and inhibits the kind of desire which the other acts from. The only criterion of voluntary action is therefore *intention* (διάνοια). This argument is completed in 1225<sup>b1</sup>-16, where action δι' ἄγνοιαν is said to be involuntary, the daughters of Pelias being adduced by way of example.

In 1224<sup>a8</sup>-5<sup>a33</sup> two classes of actions which seem to be done *under compulsion* (βία καὶ ἀνάγκη) are considered. (1) When there is conflict in the soul between opposite impulses, as in the case of the ἀκρατής and the ἐγκρατής, the agent seems to be compelled in so far as his action implies the defeat and suppression of one or the other of these impulses. Aristotle rightly points out that this language is used on the analogy of the compulsion exerted by an external force upon inanimate or animate things contrary to their own natural movement. But, in the divided soul, either impulse is equally natural, and the ensuing action, if considered as the action of the whole soul and not that of a part merely, is therefore *voluntary*.<sup>1</sup> (2) When a thing bad or painful in itself is chosen under threat of a greater evil or for the sake of good, Aristotle decides after some doubt that, if the circumstances are outside the agent's control, he is acting under compulsion or at least not naturally, and so his action is *involuntary*.<sup>2</sup> 'Wherefore many hold that love too is involuntary, and some feelings of anger and natural tendencies, because their strength is even beyond nature, and we pardon them as naturally such as to do violence to nature.'<sup>3</sup> Although Aristotle does not commit himself to this view of the πάθη, he accepts the criterion: 'For *within his control* (our sole standard) means *what his nature is able to bear*. What it is not able to bear, not being within reach of his own natural desire or calculation, is not within his control.'<sup>4</sup> The words and actions of divinely inspired persons are not within their control, even if they intend them, and similarly with ἐπιθυμία.<sup>5</sup> 'So that even some intentions and passions are not within our control, or the actions which correspond to these intentions and calculations, but as Philolaus said, some λόγοι have the mastery over us.'<sup>6</sup>

Any tragic act performed without vice, but with knowledge, would fall into one or the other of these two classes, and there is nothing so far to suggest that Aristotle would have been shocked by a Euripidean Medea, or that he would have failed to condone the matricide of a conventional Orestes or Alcmeon as, according to his own definition, involuntary.

In the account of the same subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3. 1110<sup>a</sup> ff. a change of standpoint is immediately noticeable. Without consideration of ὁρεῖς, involuntary acts are at once divided into two classes, τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα, and (since ἀκρασία is later explained as a form of ἄγνοια) compulsory action is defined as οὐ ἡ ἀρχή

<sup>1</sup> 1224<sup>b21</sup>-9 ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκότερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὁρεῖν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκότερον ἀκοντά ποτε πράττειν· κενωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὁθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχὴν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκούσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφοτέρω ἐχομεν. The less accurate way of speaking is retained in *Rhet.* 1. 1369<sup>b5</sup> βία δέ, ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίας ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων.

<sup>2</sup> 1225<sup>a17</sup> οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ βία πράξει ἢ οὐ φύσει, ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ'

αὐτῷ ταῦτα.

<sup>3</sup> 20 διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν καὶ θυμὸς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκὸτα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.

<sup>4</sup> 25 τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὁλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷα τε, μὴδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὁρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῷ.

<sup>5</sup> 28-30. Cf. 8. 1248<sup>b33</sup> where some ἐπιθυμία is itself a divine ἐνθουσιασμός.

<sup>6</sup> 31 ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαι τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσίν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμοὺς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναι τινὰς λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν. Cf. 8. 1246<sup>b14</sup> ἀν ἰσχυρὰ ἢ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει καὶ λογίζεται τάναντία.

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ἔξωθεν, without mention of the quasi-compulsion experienced within the divided soul. The class of acts done from fear of a greater evil or from a noble motive (<sup>a</sup>4) is set apart as *mixed* but *nearer to the voluntary* (<sup>a</sup>11-14); these acts may be praised or blamed (<sup>a</sup>20, 22), but some are pardoned, 'when a man yields to pressure that is *beyond human nature* to resist and *which no one could withstand*'.<sup>1</sup> Appeal may therefore be made to human nature in general, but not to the individual nature of the agent, and in place of the digression on the strength of the πάθη or divinely inspired action (*E.E.* 2. 1225<sup>a</sup>20, 28) Aristotle significantly adds that there are some things such as matricide which one cannot be compelled to do in this way, and quotes Euripides' Alcmeon as a warning.<sup>2</sup>

Action διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν is discussed separately in 1111<sup>a</sup>25 ff., where Aristotle argues *against* the view that it is involuntary, and concludes with an assertion of individual responsibility on the ground that such passions are *human*: (b1) δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Action διὰ πάθος is not, therefore, βίαιον, nor as a rule in the class ὧν ἡ φύσις αἰτία,<sup>3</sup> but he later seems to allow that it is φυσικώτερον,<sup>4</sup> and that wrong acts tend to be pardonable in proportion as they spring from a natural impulse common to all or most men.<sup>5</sup> Passion which is unnatural in kind or in force (whether θυμός or ἐπιθυμία) may be beyond the control of the individual concerned, but it is not κατ' ἀνθρώπον.<sup>6</sup>

At the opening of this book involuntary acts were divided into those which are pardoned and those which are both pardoned and pitied (3. 1109<sup>b</sup>32). The latter are acts done (a) owing to ignorance of particular fact (δὲ ἄγνοια), carefully distinguished (1110<sup>b</sup>25) from those done (b) in ignorance but owing to πάθος, e.g. anger<sup>7</sup> or intoxication; and (b28) from those done (c) owing to ignorance of general moral principles. Only acts done in ignorance of particular fact can be involuntary, pardonable and pitiable,<sup>8</sup> and among the examples Aristotle cites Merope, who thought her son was an enemy (1111<sup>a</sup>12). Merope's attempt on her son's life was an instance of the fourth and best kind of tragic action (*Poet.* 14. 1454<sup>a</sup>5).

<sup>1</sup> 1110<sup>a</sup>23 ἐπ' ἐνόις δ' ἔπαυος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαυτὰ πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἀν' ὑπομείναι. Cf. 7. 1150<sup>b</sup>6-9 (Philoctetes). Failure to resist pleasure or pain is a form of ἀκρασία, but Aristotle denies that motives *compel* merely because their source is external to the agent, 1110<sup>b</sup>1-3, 9-11. Anger, though painful, is not a real exception (5. 1135<sup>b</sup>26 οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσις).

<sup>2</sup> 1110<sup>a</sup>26 ἐντα δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν παθόντι τὰ δεινότερα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονήσαι. Cf. 5. 1136<sup>a</sup>13. Alcmeon seems to have been put on trial for his life at Psophis and to have pleaded his father's command and curse of ἀκαρπία γῆς καὶ ἀτεκνία if he should disobey, and various other less cogent excuses, Eur. fr. 67-70 (Nauck).

<sup>3</sup> 1112<sup>a</sup>32-3, cf. 5. 1135<sup>a</sup>32 τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττοντες καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅλον τὸ γῆρᾰν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 1117<sup>a</sup>4, 7. 1147<sup>a</sup>16, 24 ff.

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<sup>5</sup> 7. 1149<sup>b</sup>4 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον δοσεῖ κοινὰ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινὰ· ὁ δὲ θυμός φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίων.

<sup>6</sup> 7. 1148<sup>b</sup>15-9<sup>a</sup>20. Cf. 1149<sup>b</sup>27 αἱ μὲν (sc. ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδοναί) ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεως καὶ νοσήματα.

<sup>7</sup> If an angry man wrongly thinks that he has received an injury (7. 1149<sup>a</sup>32-4), or if he strikes too hard and kills the assailant he intends merely to repel, he acts ἀγνοῶν but διὰ πάθος not δι' ἄγνοια. If the assailant is his unknown father, he acts δι' ἄγνοια, since his ignorance is independent of his anger, or even the cause of it.

<sup>8</sup> 1111<sup>a</sup>1 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκούσιως πράττει. Cf. <sup>a</sup>16 ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι. Whether this excludes all ignorance due to πάθος is not clear, but it excludes any for which the agent is himself to blame, 1113<sup>b</sup>24, 30 ff. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσι, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὅλον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια κτλ. ἀκρασία and unnatural πάθος are also excluded, see note 1, p. 52 below.



In *E.N.* 7. 1147<sup>a</sup>11-12<sup>1</sup> Aristotle attributes all apparent defeat of reason by πάθος, including ἀκρασία, to a temporary ἀγνοία of the minor premiss caused by the πάθος, and so extends class (b) above to cover any unwilling act of passion, whether the agent himself admits his 'ignorance' or not.

The ordinary difference between acting with knowledge and acting in ignorance is, however, retained whenever the question of responsibility arises. The ἀκρατής acts voluntarily, for 'in a sense' he knows what he is doing (1152<sup>a</sup>16). In 5. 1135<sup>b</sup>9 ff. ἀμαρτήματα and ἀδικήματα are similarly distinguished. The latter, done with knowledge but owing to anger and other necessary or natural πάθη, are not vicious since they are not premeditated, but they are voluntary and blameworthy (21). ἀμαρτήματα appear to be not only some involuntary acts of type (a) above, but also some passionate acts of type (b), the inclusive definition of both being that they are μετ' ἀγνοίας (112) ἀνευ δὲ κακίας (118). The further distinction between acting in ignorance and owing to ignorance is not made in the restatement of the voluntary which precedes in 23-28, and does not appear until 1136<sup>a</sup>5, where the line is drawn in a different place: 'Of involuntary offences, some are pardonable and others not. Those done not only in ignorance but also owing to ignorance are pardonable. Those which are done, not owing to ignorance, but in ignorance yet owing to passion which is *neither natural nor human*, are not pardonable.' This negative statement still leaves us in doubt whether acts done in ignorance but from natural and human πάθος are involuntary or pardonable.<sup>2</sup> If the agent is himself to blame for his πάθος, he cannot be excused. If he is not in any way responsible, the πάθος is unlikely to be natural and human in Aristotle's usual sense. We may, however, conclude that for the purpose of this classification any act done in ignorance is a venial ἀμαρτήματα, so long as it does not spring from vice or from unnatural and inhuman πάθος.

Aristotle's reasons for disapproving the second type of tragic act, preferred by the ancients, have now become explicit. Since the condition of pity is that the hero shall be ἀνάξιος and not come to misery διὰ μοχθηρίαν, the poet must, like the advocate, suggest some way of condoning his behaviour, by presenting him as not in the ordinary sense responsible for his action. But Aristotle will not now accept a psychological analysis which exhibits such acts as the matricide of Orestes and Medea's murder of her children as compulsory and involuntary.

Orestes may no longer be presented, as by Aeschylus and Sophocles, acting διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, since nothing could be worse than matricide and no good motive could ever justify it. Not to know what ought to be done in such a case argues μοχθηρία or πάθος that is barely κατ' ἀνθρώπων (1149<sup>a</sup>16). This is clearly shown in the Euripidean versions which we possess of the story of Orestes, and (if we believe Aristotle) of Alcmeon also.<sup>3</sup>

According to the *Eudemian* analysis, action διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον could be presented as compulsory on the score of conflict within the soul, or of the overpowering strength of certain emotions. Although Aristotle did not on either of these grounds class all passionate action as involuntary, he agreed that the standard of the voluntary for the individual is the capacity of his own nature. In the tragic presentation, abnormally strong passion may be attributed to the will of a deity, so that the action becomes involuntary also in the strict sense of being brought about by external compulsion.

<sup>1</sup> *E.N.* 5-7 = *E.E.* 4-6. I take a view to be 'later' when it does not follow directly from opinions expressed in the earlier parts of *E.E.* but seems partly a development, partly a modification of the changes in the earlier parts of *E.N.*

<sup>2</sup> See note 8, p. 49 above and 1, p. 52 below. Acts springing from abnormal πάθος may be in-

voluntary apart from being done in ignorance, cf. 1135<sup>a</sup>32, 7. 1148<sup>b</sup>31 ff.

<sup>3</sup> The need for Aristotle's insistence is shown by the sophistic composition *Dialexeis* 3. 9 (Diels, *Vors.* 5 ii. 410) φονεῖν δὲ τὸς φιλότατος δίκαιον· ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ Ἀλκμαίων· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτὸς ποιῆσαι.

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In the *Eudemian* account the error of treating a natural impulse, which compels only a part of the soul, as if it were an external force overpowering the whole, was carefully pointed out, but it is not until *E.N.* 3 that Aristotle plainly states that such *πάθη* are *human* and the responsibility of the human agent. For the moral philosopher the identification of a human *πάθος* with an external deity is a dangerous confusion, and if dramatic action is to proceed by probable or necessary steps as the outcome of human thought and character, direct divine intervention is clearly inadmissible.<sup>1</sup> But without it, even if the agent acts not strictly δι' ἑαυτὸν but under provocation from another, his act may be excused only if the provocation is so great that no human being could withstand it. Deianeira we may excuse,<sup>2</sup> but not Medea,<sup>3</sup> for whatever the provocation, an excess of feeling which led to intentional child-murder would not be human at all but *θηριώδης*. Even if such acts are consistent with the barbarian φύσις (1149<sup>b</sup>9-11), they cannot be made the basis of a general psychological theory, and the well-trained moral conscience cannot fail to be shocked by them.

According to the new theory of ἀκρασία (*E.N.* 7. 1147<sup>a</sup>14-17) action κατὰ πάθος, in a rational being, occurs only if the full use of reason is in some way suspended, so that the appearance of conflict between rival impulses is in fact illusory. The agent is to be regarded as acting in ignorance, even if (like Medea or Phaedra)<sup>4</sup> he persistently declares his own knowledge. This explanation rests, however, not on the experience and introspection of the agent himself, but on observation of the effects of πάθος on the body, from which its effect on the mind, apparent only in certain cases, is to be inferred. It is therefore quite unsuited to the dramatic presentation of the second kind of tragic action, for, even with the help of a Euripidean prologue, to predict that the agent's language will have no more meaning than if he were intoxicated or talking in his sleep would be, for dramatic purposes, merely abortive. The only alternative is to abandon altogether the act performed with knowledge, as based on a false psychology, and to present only clear cases of ἄγνοια caused by πάθος (as in the *Heracles* or *Bacchae*), followed by the return to knowledge and repentance of the agent.<sup>5</sup>

By suggesting that the murders of Clytemnestra and Eriphyle should be treated καλῶς (*Poet.* 14. 1453<sup>b</sup>24), Aristotle may be recommending the adoption of the new psychology even for stories which could, except for the unnatural character of the act, have been presented as μικταὶ πράξεις, though this would be clearer if we knew in what way Astydamos contrived to present an Alcmeon acting in ignorance (<sup>b</sup>33).<sup>6</sup> The second class of tragic acts will thus disappear from drama, and the third will include (a) involuntary acts done δι' ἄγνοιαν and in addition (b) some acts done in

<sup>1</sup> Apart from his rule for the use of the μηχανή (*Poet.* 15. 1454<sup>b</sup>3-6) Aristotle is silent on the role of the gods in tragedy. Cf. 6. 1449<sup>b</sup>36 ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων . . . πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοιαν καὶ ἥθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιγάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες.

<sup>2</sup> *Soph. Trach.* 545

τὸ δ' αὖ ξυνοικεῖν τῇδ' ὁμοῦ τίς ἂν γυνὴ δύνατο, κοινονοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γάμων;

<sup>3</sup> *Eur. Med.* 1339

οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνίς γυνὴ ἔτλη ποθ' . . .

<sup>4</sup> 1342

λέαιναν, οὐ γυναῖκα, τῆς Τυρσηνίδος Σκύλλης ἔχουσιν ἀγριωτέραν φύσιν.

*Cf. Rhet.* 1. 1375<sup>a</sup>6-8 καὶ τὸ θηριώδεστερον ἀδίκημα μείζον . . . καὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβούνται μᾶλλον ἢ θεοῖσι.

<sup>4</sup> *Eur. Med.* 1078, *Hipp.* 380. But even Medea thinks she will need to 'forget' in the moment of action, 1246-8. Both these heroines are suffering from the physical effects of πάθος. Cf. Gorgias' theory of the emotions, *Hel. Enc.* 15-19 (Diels, *Vors.* 5 ii. 293-4), esp. 19 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν (sc. ἔρως) ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἀμάρτημα μεμπτόν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομοστέον.

<sup>5</sup> *E.N.* 7. 1147<sup>b</sup>6 πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τοῦτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. In drama this must be observed by the spectator, if the earlier ἄγνοια is to be convincing. Cf. 3. 1110<sup>b</sup>18 τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἄπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ λυπῶν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

<sup>6</sup> <οὐ> τοῦ δοκεῖν μοι, τῆς δ' ἀληθείας μέλει is the only surviving fragment of this play.

ignorance but διὰ πάθος. If the latter are to be involuntary and pardonable, the agent must not be himself to blame for his πάθος, and it must not appear unnatural or inhuman. Yet the same difficulty remains, for, if due solely to natural or physical causes, such excess of feeling, though not θηριώδης, is still νοσηματώδης, and to a medically inexperienced spectator may seem either blameworthy or not κατ' ἀνθρώπον. In order to exonerate the human agent completely, the poet is still obliged to assign the cause of both πάθος and ἀγνοία to the deity, or to confine himself to action done strictly δι' ἀγνοίαν.<sup>1</sup>

All acts δι' ἀγνοίαν are involuntary, pardonable and pitiable, whether they occur κατὰ πάθος or not; we do not need to consider whether they would have been blameworthy, if the circumstances had been such as the agent supposed them to be.<sup>2</sup> No tragic act may be done by a vicious or extremely virtuous agent; many are done, like the parricide of Oedipus, at the prompting of anger. This may express a regular feature of his character, yet since his ignorance exists independently of it, both are shown in a natural, human and pardonable form. The course of the action is determined according to the general probabilities by human character and beliefs, and divine appearances, if such occur, can be suitably used ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος.

Morally our judgement of the agent is the same, whether the tragic act, proposed δι' ἀγνοίαν, takes place in fact or not. If it does, the emotional effect of the ἀναγνώρισις is in our opinion (and perhaps in Aristotle's) far the greater. Why, then, does Aristotle prefer that it should not take place, but be prevented by the ἀναγνώρισις?

### *The Limit of Happiness*

Tragedy is the presentation of action, life and happiness, and men are happy or the opposite according to their part in action (*Poet.* 6. 1450<sup>a</sup>16-20). The centre of every tragic plot is a *change* either from good fortune to bad or from bad fortune to good.<sup>3</sup> How, then, is this change related to the presentation of happiness?

εὐδαιμονία, the supreme human good, is not the same as εὐτυχία, but an activity of soul according to complete virtue in a complete life (*E.N.* 1. 1098<sup>a</sup>16). It depends, however, on goods other than itself as conditions and instruments (1099<sup>b</sup>27), and there are through life many *turns and chances* which can bring a man to misery.<sup>4</sup> No special theory of their origin is put forward, but since they may befall even the most virtuous, it can be assumed that they come about either from purely external causes (natural occurrences or the actions of other men), or by chance, or by any of the kinds of mixed or involuntary action discussed in *E.N.* 3.

<sup>1</sup> In the account of involuntary action δι' ἀγνοίαν in *E.E.* 2. 1225<sup>b</sup> it was said that a failure to use knowledge might sometimes count as ignorance in the required sense (<sup>b</sup>12-14). In *E.N.* we seem to be faced with a choice between acts done strictly δι' ἀγνοίαν and the involuntary but unpardonable acts done in ignorance from abnormal πάθος (5. 1136<sup>a</sup>5-9), which are also the basis of the new theory of ἀκρασία (7. 1147<sup>a</sup>11-17 ff.). We might have expected Aristotle to pardon an impulse which, though exaggerated and misdirected by temporary illness or insanity, is in itself natural (e.g. revenge on an enemy) and followed, after the return to knowledge, by pain and repentance. From the physiological point of view, however, there is perhaps little to choose between the various kinds of abnormality. The poet, by attributing the crisis to direct divine intervention, separates it from its physical or

moral antecedents in the life of the individual, and causes it to appear as a misfortune which might have happened to any human being. Neither moralist nor physiologist can accept this explanation, cf. Hippocrates, π. ἱερῆς νόσου.

<sup>2</sup> *E.N.* 5. 1135<sup>a</sup>28 ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκων, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. Cf. *Soph. O.C.* 992-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Poet.* 7. 1451<sup>a</sup>12-15, 10. 1452<sup>a</sup>16, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *E.N.* 1. 1100<sup>a</sup>5 πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστα εὐθηνόυντα μεγάλας συμφορὰς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γῆρας, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται. (Cf. 1101<sup>a</sup>6-13.) These are not discussed in *E.E.* (cf. 1. 1219<sup>b</sup>5-8), where εὐτυχία is treated as an alternative εὐπραγία depending on ἀρετὴς ἀλογος (8. 1246<sup>b</sup>37 ff.).

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In tragedy the course of the action proceeds as is probable or necessary, brought about by men who speak and behave as such men would. Purely external causes and chance are therefore excluded: if the hero falls into misfortune, the action of other men may contribute, but his own action, character and judgement will appear at least partly the cause of his own misery. To present him miserable δι' ἀρετήν would be morally unsuitable, διὰ μοχθηρίαν suitable but untragic. The alternative is that his fall should come about δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά (*Poet.* 13. 1453<sup>a</sup>10, δι' ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην \*16).

Too narrow a view of the meaning of ἀμαρτία here is precluded by Aristotle's list of suitable men: Oedipus and Thyestes (who are twice mentioned), Alcmeon, Orestes, Meleager, Telephus καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι (\*21). Although in 14 he approves a tragic act which is done in ignorance, he gives no reason to anticipate this in the earlier chapter.<sup>1</sup> In the *Ethics* ἀμαρτία is used (1) of a mistake in the practical syllogism, in either premiss, in deliberation or in action.<sup>2</sup> In *E.N.* 3. 1110<sup>b</sup>29 it is associated with ἀγνοία either of general principle<sup>3</sup> or of particular fact.<sup>4</sup> It is also used (2) in connexion with the special forms of ἀκρασία discussed in *E.N.* 7. 1147<sup>b</sup>31 ff., ὑπερβολαὶ πάθος which are blameworthy but not in any way vicious, e.g. ἀκρασία θυμοῦ, τιμῆς, κτλ. or the maternal affection of Niobe (8<sup>a</sup>33).<sup>5</sup> (3) In a general sense it denotes any action or expression of feeling which is not κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, whether the agent himself has, strictly speaking, deliberated or acts κατὰ πάθος (*E.N.* 3. 1115<sup>b</sup>15, cf. παιδικαὶ ἀμαρτίαι *E.N.* 3. 1119<sup>a</sup>34, *E.E.* 3. 1230<sup>b</sup>5-6).

Tragic error (οὐκ ὀρθὴ πράξις), with its twofold root both in ἥθος and in διάνοια, is shown not only in the single tragic act, but in the whole action of the play, both in so far as it is brought about by human judgement and motive, and in so far as it falls beyond human calculation and control.

Orestes acts on a wrong principle, and his anger exceeds the mean, but in so far as his will is dominated by Apollo, the result is δι' ἀμαρτίαν but not διὰ μοχθηρίαν. Medea judges the principle of her revenge to be right, but the means she takes show that her excess of passion is neither μοχθηρία nor ordinary ἀκρασία, but a form of compulsion. On Aristotle's considered view such acts are not involuntary or pardonable unless they are done in ignorance, and not from any πάθος that need be attributed directly to a supernatural cause.

Action μετ' ἀγνοίας may bring about misfortune either through a chance connexion, leading to a further result un contemplated by the agent, or by a misdirection of purpose or impulse in the act itself. Oedipus' encounter with his father at the cross-roads was the incidental consequence of the purpose to avoid slaying his father, owing to which he left Corinth. Since he might have been travelling for any number of other reasons, or in any number of different directions, the result is to this extent ἀπὸ τύχης. But there was also his impulse to attack an enemy, and without *this* impulse (contradicting his earlier purpose) the misfortune would not have occurred.<sup>7</sup> It is

<sup>1</sup> If Aristotle had meant what Bywater thinks (commentary, p. 215) it would have been much clearer if he had said δι' ἀγνοίαν, not δι' ἀμαρτίαν.

<sup>2</sup> *E.N.* 6. 1142<sup>a</sup>21 (φρόνησις) ἐστὶ ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτον. Opposed to ὀρθότης, <sup>b</sup>10. *E.E.* 2. 1226<sup>a</sup>36 διχῇ γνωμένης τῆς ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογισμένοι ἀμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἱατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πράξιν. Cf. *M.M.* 1. 1189<sup>b</sup>21 ff., *Phys.* 2. 199<sup>a</sup>33, *Poet.* 25. 1460<sup>b</sup>15, 17, *Probl.* 19. 919<sup>b</sup>25 ἀμαρτία δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ χειρόνος πράξις.

<sup>3</sup> διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἀδικοὶ καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ

γίνονται.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 4. 1427<sup>a</sup>35 τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν βλαβερὸν τι πράττειν ἀμαρτίαν εἶναι φατέον.

<sup>5</sup> *E.N.* 7. 1148<sup>a</sup>3 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία φέρεται οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἀπλῶς οὐσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδεὶς. Cf. *Rhet.* 1. 1374<sup>b</sup>7 ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. Cf. *E.E.* 1. 1223<sup>a</sup>37, 8. 1246<sup>b</sup>13.

<sup>6</sup> γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι <δ> οὐ δεῖ (sc. φοβεῖται), ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Phys.* 2. 197<sup>a</sup>21-5. The basis of the



therefore not merely δι' ἀτυχίαν but δι' ἀμαρτίαν. In the action of the play the same kind of sequence leads, without chance, to the ἀναγνώρισις which confirms disaster.

If δυστυχία were the result of a single act done in ignorance, it might seem to be ἀπὸ τύχης. If it were due only to the character and motive of the agent, it might seem to be ἀπὸ φύσεως. But in the tragic plot, where disaster is shown as the probable or necessary outcome, step by step, of the previous action, brought about by human thought and feeling but working in ignorance, we seem to have seen, not chance or nature or necessity, but the very meanstaking of the deity: in this series of connexions a superior purpose is revealed, working through the same action but with knowledge, taking its shape from the human calculation which it contradicts, and its content from the motive which it uses but directs to a different end.<sup>1</sup> In the light of such a whole each part of the action is seen both as a means to the same end and as an instance of the same activity: the ἀμαρτία of the human agent, as a blind impulse of revenge, becomes a divine urge against himself, and where as deliberate purpose it led through ignorance to disaster, it corresponds to a divine volition to bring this about.

In *E.E.* 8. 1247<sup>b</sup>18 ff. εὐτυχία is ascribed to ὀρεξις ἀλογος, either without calculation, or in spite of a bad calculation, or where no human calculation could have hit the mark. This habitual ὀρθότης is not διὰ τύχην but either διὰ φύσιν or a divine ἐνθουσιασμός (1248<sup>a</sup>33). But Aristotle propounds no similar theory of δυστυχία.<sup>2</sup>

In *E.N.* 1. 1099<sup>b</sup>14 he declines to discuss whether εὐδαιμονία is or is not θεόπεμπτος, and the μεταβολαί which may destroy it have no specific cause. In the tragic μίμησις they can be brought about only by involuntary and pardonable human action, where the pain of the agent, no less than the suffering of his victim, is part of the δυστυχία of tragedy. But, for the poet, the boundary between the voluntary and the involuntary (τὸ δὴ ἀγνοοῦμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοοῦμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ), the limit of purpose and of happiness, is still the shifting margin between the human and the divine.

If a just man is the friend of the gods,<sup>3</sup> his destruction, even as a means, can only be μαρόν. Even if he is no more than ordinarily virtuous, it is scarcely φιλόανθρωπον. If the poet is not an atheist, divine partnership in the action may eventually lead,

distinction between ἀμαρτήματα and ἀτυχήματα is the same, *E.N.* 5. 1135<sup>b</sup>16-19 ὅταν μὲν οὖν παρὰ λόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα . . . (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἐξ ὧθεν), i.e. an act is an ἀτύχημα only when injury was neither intended, nor the probable consequence of what was intended or of any impulse (e.g. not when an angry man strikes too hard, or when boiling is chosen as a means to rejuvenation, or when a dubious love-charm leads to death). The co-operation of external causes may make the tragic act itself hard to classify, but it seems probable that for Aristotle τὸ δι' ἀμαρτίαν μεταβάλλειν εἰς δυστυχίαν means, not the effect of the single act, but a certain sequence of events distinct from chance on the one hand and purposive action on the other, cf. *Poet.* 9. 1452<sup>a</sup>3-6. Except in the διπλοῦς μῦθος, which Aristotle expressly repudiates (13. 1453<sup>a</sup>12-16, 30-3), ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια must arise from ἀμαρτία. (Cf. ἀμαρτία in nature, *Phys.* 2. 199<sup>a</sup>33-4, and the injudicious diet of the carabus which leads to a περιπέτεια, *Hist. An.* 8. 590<sup>b</sup>12-18.) History also remarks these sequences, e.g.

the misfortune of the hitherto prosperous and prudent Chians, *Thuc.* 8. 24. 5 εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγως ἐσφάλῃσαν, μετὰ πολλῶν οἷς ταῦτα ἔδοξε, τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ ξυμπεριβῆσθαι, τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ξυνέγνωσαν.

<sup>1</sup> The repetition of the tragic motive may show human ἦθος, but it shows divine προαίρεσις. Aristotle cannot have been unaware of these implications, cf. *Poet.* 9. 1452<sup>a</sup>7 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα δοκεῖ ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπιτηδὲς φαίνεται γεγονέναι. For the impression of an overruling destiny conveyed by περιπέτεια see Lock, *C.R.* ix. 252.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *E.E.* 1. 1214<sup>a</sup>22-5; in the account of involuntary action (2. 1225<sup>a</sup>28) ἐνθουσιασμός is merely a psychological parallel, cf. *Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>7. Contrast the Pythagorean version, *Stob. Ed.* 1. 6 (Diels, *Vors.* 5 i. 478) περὶ δὲ τύχης τὰ δ' ἐφασκον εἶναι μὲν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον μέρος αὐτῆς γενέσθαι γὰρ ἐπινούαν τινα παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνίοις ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ εἶναι φανερώς κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν εὐτυχεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ἀτυχεῖς.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *lamb.* *V.P.* 137, 174 (*Vors.* 5 i. 468).

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after the harm has been done, to some sort of *eutuchia*. This does not, however, lessen but rather emphasizes divine responsibility for the previous suffering. Aristotle, no less than Euripides, refuses a moral compromise with the deity.

The *eutuchia* which he accepts in *Poet.* 14 seems to be partly a means to the dramatic presentation of danger and suffering due to involuntary and pardonable human action that is *not* also divine action or in any way part of a divine plan.

In comedy, but not in tragedy, danger and suffering may themselves be divinely designed as means to ultimate *eutuchia*.<sup>1</sup> In tragedy they are so far from being designed that direct divine intervention is often needed to ensure the happy outcome wished by the deity.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle prefers that it should follow upon *anagnōrisis* as the probable result of the preceding action (II. 1452<sup>b2</sup>). But this series of probable connexions does not appear as a single chain of divine volition for two reasons: the human impulse to revenge is not the motive of the god, nor is it a necessary precondition of *eutuchia* as it was of *dustuchia*. (Attempted murder is not the only way, or indeed the best way, of bringing about a recognition.)<sup>3</sup> The *hamartia* is therefore seen as a purely human activity, and the impression is given not of another purpose moving consistently through the action from the beginning, but rather of a *rescue* at that one point where the *anagnōrisis* forms a bridge between the mistaken intention of the agent, which is prevented, and the *eutuchia* to which that intention is (as if by divine providence)<sup>4</sup> a means. But the human agent, though he welcomes the result, would not have chosen those means to it, if he had known.

Just as *metabasis eis dustuchian* showed the counterpart of the *Eudemian eutuchia*, the affinity of the divine with the irrational in man for his destruction, not for his preservation, so by this *metabasis eis eutuchian*, but by this only, we are made to face the climax of misfortune which can, through the ordinary conditions of human life, depose even the virtuous man from his happiness (*E.N.* I. 1101<sup>a9</sup>–11). It is an *eutuchia* which shows, not the better part of *eudaimonia*, but its limitations, not the smooth favouring breeze of a divine *afflatus*, but the razor's edge.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout *Poet.* 14, as in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle assumes that imminent suffering is pitied no less than suffering which has actually occurred. Pity is felt for harm that may be either past or future, so long as it is *prōd' oimātōn*, and dramatic presentation can produce this imaginative visualization in either case.<sup>6</sup> Fear seems similarly to depend on *phantasia* rather than on foreknowledge of an unhappy end.<sup>7</sup> In spite of its prevention Aristotle thinks of Merope's attempt to kill her son as an example of involuntary action that is pitied, and we have Plutarch's word that it aroused intense fear, even in spectators who knew the story.<sup>8</sup> Emotional *latria* therefore requires no more than a vivid anticipation of *dustuchia*.

<sup>1</sup> Men. *Perikeiromenē* 44–50.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Eur. *Ion*, I.T. The whole situation may nevertheless be the *consequence* of earlier divine action.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *E.N.* 3. 1112<sup>b16</sup>–19. *hamartia* leading to *dustuchia* may be *katā tō anagkaion* either as divinely compelled (*βίαιον*), or as an indispensable means (*ἐξ υποθέσεως ἀνάγκη* *Phys.* 2. 199<sup>b34</sup> ff.), or as a natural process which is not interfered with (ibid. <sup>b26</sup>, *E.N.* 7. 1147<sup>a30</sup>). The events which lead to *eutuchia* may be *katā tō eikós*, but as far as the *anagnōrisis* we are more concerned with the probability that they will lead to disaster.

<sup>4</sup> *ἔοικε γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰκῇ γενέσθαι* (*Poet.* 9. 1452<sup>a9</sup>). So even *túchē* can wear a divine look (16, cf. *Phys.* 2. 196<sup>b6</sup>).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Eur. *Ion* 1510–17, I.T. 870–2.

<sup>6</sup> *Rhet.* 2. 1385<sup>b13</sup> *ἐπὶ φαινόμενῳ κακῷ*, not *ἐπὶ γενομένῳ*. 1386<sup>a34</sup> *ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν πρὸ οὐμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὡς μέλλον ἢ ὡς γεγονός· καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεωνότερα διὰ τὸ αὐτό*. Cf. *Phys.* 2. 197<sup>a27</sup>–30.

<sup>7</sup> *Rhet.* 2. 1382<sup>a21</sup> *ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ*. It can be roused by signs and associations (231, cf. pity, 1386<sup>b2</sup>).

<sup>8</sup> *E.N.* 3. 1111<sup>a1</sup>, 12. Plut. *de es. carn.* 2. 998 e (Nauck ap. ad Eur. fr. 456) *σκόπει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ Μερόπην ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸν ὡς φονέα τοῦ υἱοῦ πέλεκυν ἀραμένην καὶ λέγουσαν 'ὠνητέραν δὴ τὴνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμί σοι | πληγὴν' ὅσον ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ κίνημα ποιεῖ συνεφορθιάζουσα φόβῳ, καὶ δέος μὴ φθάσῃ τὸν ἐπιλαμβανόμενον γέροντα καὶ τρώσῃ τὸ μειράκιον*. If the story is known, fear must be a

Does it also require that the play end in *δυστυχία*? Given the *μῦθος πεπλεγμένος*, it does not. With *ἀναγνώρισις* and *περιπέτεια*, the release of pity and fear is aided both by *τὸ μανθάνειν*, the pleasure of any competent *μίμησις*,<sup>1</sup> and by *τὸ θαυμάζειν*, through which the tragic emotions are intensified.<sup>2</sup> The *ἀναγνώρισις* which confirms disaster is *ἐκπληκτικόν*,<sup>3</sup> but a near escape is no less *θαυμαστόν*,<sup>4</sup> and the pleasure derived from it, as both a consequence and a continuation of the emotion previously roused,<sup>5</sup> is not inconsistent with the *οἰκεία ἡδονή* of tragedy.<sup>6</sup>

By *πεπλεγμένη τραγωδία* the soul is stirred, not through sense or sympathy alone, but through its grasp of the relations of cause and effect, likeness and contrariety, in the ordered whole presented to it. If this contains suffering, through *ἀναγνώρισις* we review, in a single experience, what we have known and understood through the series of the tragic action: as the human agent passes from ignorance to knowledge and attributes his fate directly to the deity, so we, in this moment of intense feeling, accept *ἀμαρτία* as a function of the divine will that shaped his end.<sup>7</sup> But this *κάθαρος* is not a purely profane experience. Aristotle's alternative holds all the conditions of human suffering and human error, but, by a different outcome, rescues both man and God from a moral condemnation through which pity is roused for what is human only at the cost of misrepresenting what is divine.

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kind of *ἀκρασία*, cf. *οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ* who are *ἀκολουθητικοὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ* (*E.N.* 7. 1150<sup>b</sup>28) and require strong pleasure as *λύπης ἰατρεία* (1154<sup>b</sup>11-14). Cf. *de Div. per Somn.* 464<sup>b</sup>1 ff.

<sup>1</sup> *Poet.* 4. 1448<sup>b</sup>13, *Rhet.* 1. 1371<sup>b</sup>5-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Poet.* 9. 1452<sup>a</sup>2-5, cf. 6. 1450<sup>a</sup>33, 24. 1460<sup>a</sup>12-17. Wonder is the desire to understand, *Rhet.* 1. 1371<sup>a</sup>31-4 (cf. 1371<sup>b</sup>5-11), *Met.* 1. 982<sup>b</sup>17-19.

<sup>3</sup> *Poet.* 14. 1454<sup>a</sup>4, 16. 1455<sup>a</sup>17.

<sup>4</sup> *Rhet.* 1. 1371<sup>b</sup>10 καὶ αἱ περιπέτεια καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σφύζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων (sc. ἡδύ) πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστά ταῦτα.

<sup>5</sup> Through the realization of the persons on the stage and through memory, cf. *Rhet.* 1. 1370<sup>a</sup>27 ff.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. ἡ ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μίμησεως ἡδονή (*Poet.* 14. 1453<sup>b</sup>12). *κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς* (*Pol.*

1342<sup>a</sup>14) is only a part of this pleasure. If the theory of *κάθαρος* had implied the unhappy ending, Aristotle would not have needed to appeal to the evidence of actual stage performance in *Poet.* 13. 1453<sup>a</sup>27. The general explanation in *Pol.* 1342<sup>a</sup>4-15, written before the *Poetics* and perhaps before the *E.N.* (Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 266 ff.), may, however, belong to the earlier period when Aristotle still preferred the unhappy ending.

<sup>7</sup> To refer *ἀμαρτία* to a family curse, or to the agent's behaviour in a previous existence (cf. *Plat. Rep.* 10. 619<sup>b</sup>6-d1), extends but does not solve the religious problem, which arises from the direct relation of *ἀμαρτία* to a scheme of activity beyond the control of the individual.

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## SOUTH ITALIAN VASES AND ATTIC DRAMA

PROFESSOR WEBSTER's attempt (*C.Q.* xlii, pp. 15 ff.) to prove that south Italian vases of the middle of the fourth century can be used as evidence of Athenian theatrical arrangements of half or three-quarters of a century earlier leaves me unconvinced. It is true that, as he says, 'the plays' which the vases illustrate 'come from Athens'—at least, most of them probably did: but (1) a number of scenes on the vases are not scenes presented in the plays at all, but are scenes suggested to the painter by descriptions in messengers' speeches, or, quite possibly, by the story dramatized in the plays, but not by the Athenian poet's particular treatment of the story; (2) the plays—and the stories made popular by them—had been the common property of the Greek world for more than half a century, and there is no reason why Italian producers should have gone back to the original production in Athens, still less why Italian painters should have done so, even if they knew what the original production was like. (It is clear that Italian theatres of the fourth century were in various ways *not* like the fifth-century Athenian buildings.)

As for the conventional use by the vase-painters of the *aedicula* to represent a building (temple, palace, tent, or tomb), Professor Webster asks 'Where did the convention come from except from the theatre?' Why should it have *come from* anywhere? The intelligence of the vase-painters, unable to represent a whole building, was quite equal to taking a recognizable part of the building as a symbol for the whole, without going to the theatre for it. (Twentieth-century children of five years old have been known to do something very like this.) When one or two painters had made this modest venture, it might easily be accepted as a convenient convention by other painters, some of whom put rather more detail into their *aedicula* than others, not because a long-dead theatrical producer did, but 'out of their own heads'. The odd thing is that Professor Webster does not himself accept the vases as evidence for the theatre, if they cut across his preconceived ideas. He says that what is presented on the 'Jason and Pelias' vase—a palace with *paraskenia* but no central door—is 'unthinkable' in the theatre, and so, before he can use the picture with its *paraskenia* as evidence for the Attic theatre, he has to combine it with another which has a central door but no *paraskenia*. But the arrangement which he calls unthinkable may quite probably have been in use in some lightly-constructed wooden Italian theatre, contemporary with the vase, and the particular play, whatever it was, which the painter may have had in mind may have been acted in this. The suggested combination and the reference back to Athens of the fifth century are entirely conjectural and unnecessary.

The same must be true of the statement made in regard to a certain group of vases that 'the colonnade is the symbol which shows that the artist was thinking of drama and must therefore itself come from the theatre'. Were there no colonnades outside the drama and the theatre? or in south Italy? I fear that I must maintain my view that to use these fourth-century Italian vases as evidence for the structure of Athenian theatres in the fifth century is very unsafe. (I do not repeat other reasons given in my book.)

I hope to consider the phrygians vases and their bearing on the costume of Comedy in another connexion before long. In regard to these Professor Webster's article contains much that seems to me to be of great value.

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## THE EDUCATION OF THE THIRD CLASS IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

### I

PLATO pays little attention to the third class in his ideal city, regarding them as raw material on which the Guardians' exercise their art. But modern criticism is interested in them, for upon their treatment and opportunities our judgement of Plato's city partly depends. They are the great mass of the people, and centuries of Christian equalitarianism have made us regard their welfare as an important criterion of the city's value.

Plato's opposition to democracy must be taken as beyond repair. But it is reasonable to ask: Is his aristocracy at least one of merit? Is there equality of opportunity for any citizen of sufficient ability and worth to become a Guardian? Remembering the *γενναῖον ψεῦδος* (3. 414 c) we might spontaneously answer Yes: anyone who is found to have any gold or silver in his soul is to be promoted to the rank which he deserves.<sup>2</sup> But in reality what chance of promotion would a young craftsman have if he had not received any of the education described in Books 2 and 3? And it is disputable whether this is imparted to all.

Anticipating such a criticism, the late Professor Cornford, in the notes accompanying his English translation of the *Republic*, argued that the third class *must* receive at least a beginning of the education described.

'No explicit provision is made for their education; but unless they share in the early education provided for the Guardians, there could hardly be opportunities for promoting their most promising children to a higher order.' (p. 62.)

And again:

'The elementary education of Ch. IX will be open to all citizens but presumably carried further . . . in the case of those who show special promise.' (p. 151, note 1.)

This is a *a priori* reasoning, based only on the assumption of Plato's fairness and consistency. Through Cornford's careful scholarship the idealizing attitude of his generation towards Plato shows up here and there. There is no need to go the whole way with Prof. Popper. The only question is: What does the *Republic* in fact indicate about the education of the third class?

### II

There is, of course, no question of higher education for the craftsmen. For by the age of twenty (7. 537 b), when the most severe trials of pleasure and pain take place (3. 413-14), only Guardians are left in the field. These trials are meant to sort out the Rulers from the Auxiliaries; there is no mention of the rest at this or any later selection. So the discussion centres on the 'primary' education, at elementary and secondary ages. Cornford's contention is that all citizens enter this, at five or six or whenever it starts, and are weeded out as they climb up a stiff educational ladder.

Now the *Republic* contains no mention of this at all. It is nowhere stated that the third class joins in the primary education, nor is there any sign of selective tests for anyone before the age of military training, eighteen to twenty. On the contrary, there are diverse indications that the third class receive a different upbringing from their earliest years.

<sup>1</sup> 'Guardians': i.e. φύλακες, the two upper classes: ἄρχοντες, 'Rulers', and ἐπικούροι, 'Auxiliaries'. See 3. 414 b.

<sup>2</sup> ἀνὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φνῆ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακὴν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν (3. 415 c).

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(i) We might begin even before birth, with the marriage regulations meant to improve and maintain the breed of the Guardians' children (5. 58 ff.). This is the very foundation of the State, and neglect of it will lead to its decline (8. 546 d). The third class are let alone to marry as they please, so that their offspring would increasingly fall behind that of the Guardians in quality. That means that when they came to school age, even if they received the same schooling, few of them would be able to compete with the sons and daughters of Guardians. The scales are weighted from birth.

(ii) As soon as a batch of Guardians' children is born, those of the better parents are put in special crèches 'to be reared in the care of nurses living apart in a certain quarter of the city' (5. 460 c). The rest are to be quietly put out of the way (5. 460 c), 'thrust out among the craftsmen or farmers' (3. 415 c; cf. *Timaeus* 19 a). Thus the lead gained by the Guardians' children through selective breeding will be enormously increased by infant care and kindergarten education. And this is to be given not to 'the better children' but to 'the children of the better parents', τὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (5. 460 c) (the only modification of this is that children born defective (ἀνάπηρον) are to be rejected).<sup>1</sup>

(iii) I now come to the central point at issue, whether the weaker children ever receive anything of the education for Guardianship. It seems to me clear that they do not. On the face of it we should naturally draw this conclusion from the manner in which the account of the primary education is introduced: it arises out of the first mention of the Guardians in Book 2. 'Given those natural qualities, then, how are the Guardians to be brought up and educated?' (2. 376 c). There is no mention of the rest of the citizens at all.

This impression is confirmed by other considerations. 'Given those natural qualities, then' . . . οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. No one could be less keen than Plato to throw his pearls before swine. More than once in the *Republic* he insists on the importance of nature as a basis for fruitful education.<sup>2</sup> It would seem to him a waste of effort to educate everyone towards Guardianship. The small class of Guardians, supremely concerned as they are with imparting this education, have other tasks to do which would leave them no time for the vast and unprofitable burden of mass education for government. Moreover, although such an effort might be justified in a democratic State, it would seem unnecessary to Plato, because 'the mob' would never have a chance to use what they had learnt. The supposition that education is given which will never fulfil any function is contrary to the symmetry of Plato's mind. In the *Republic* everyone is to perform the function for which he is most fitted by nature; the natural corollary of this is that everyone is to be trained to perform that function and for no other purpose.<sup>3</sup> But there is positive evidence of the kind of education given to the third class. In Book 5 (456 d) Socrates states that the shoemakers have been trained to make shoes,<sup>4</sup> an example which shows that the craftsmen in general receive a technical education. This idea is confirmed in the recapitulation of the *Republic* given in *Timaeus* 19. Nothing could be clearer, nothing could be more logical from Plato's point of view.

<sup>1</sup> τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν σῆκόν οἴσουσιν παρά τινας τροφούς χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἐν τινι μέρει τῆς πόλεως, τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει (5. 460 c).

<sup>2</sup> 2. 375-6; 6. 484-6, the philosophic nature; 6. 494-5, especially the parable of the bald tinker, the soul unfit for culture. On the meaning of the fable of the metals see below, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> If it is asked, How is it that Rulers and

Auxiliaries receive the same primary education? the answer is that this is meant to strengthen that moral character which is required by both classes. In the higher education they part company.

<sup>4</sup> ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει, ἣν ψικίζομεν, πότερον οἶε ἡμῶν ἀμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξεργάζεσθαι τοὺς φύλακας τυχόντας ἢς διήλθομεν παιδείας, ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας; (5. 456 d.)

## III

Coming back now to the possibilities of promotion for the children of craftsmen, we can see that though this may be provided for in the constitution, it must remain practically a dead letter. In the passage where it is spoken of (3. 415 c), it is obscure at what stage promotion is supposed to take place.<sup>1</sup> The children of the third class would have their best chance of promotion at birth, but even this seems ruled out (see above, II (ii)). After that the gap between the classes becomes too wide to be bridged. A young craftsman of twenty, even if he had the necessary qualities of character, would not have had the intellectual background to enable him to benefit from the higher education.

If we would understand why Plato made provision for such promotions at all, we must go to the allegory of the metals and interpret it in the light of his views about human nature. Man is of gold, silver, iron, or brass from birth. All the time he is 'beneath the earth' during his primary education, he is being 'moulded and fostered', and his arms and equipment are being fashioned;<sup>2</sup> the most radical improvement to be expected is the re-orientation of his soul from darkness to light, as in the allegory of the cave (7. 514 ff.); but his substance is never changed. Therefore, when youths and maidens are 'born' from the earth at twenty, some who have had only technical education may still be gold or silver, and some who have had the Guardians' education may turn out iron or brass.

So Plato would not think that he was being unfair to the craftsmen in his 'just city'. The gold which might be in any of them would, he supposed, shine through even though their equipment was purely technical.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted on p. 58, n. 2. It is not clear whether *φύη* refers to natural birth or the 'birth' from the earth, at the age of twenty, mentioned in the allegory of the metals which has just been recounted.

<sup>2</sup> *καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην*

*πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ' ἂ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομεν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὀνείρατα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοὺς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη (3. 414 d).*

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# PERIPLUS MARIS ERYTHRAEI, REMARKS ON CHAPTER 47

CHAPTER 47 contains a sentence which has been the subject of a good deal of controversy and is manifestly corrupt. In the codex it reads as follows: *καὶ τούτων ἐπάνω μαχιδιώτατον ἔθνος Βακτριανῶν ὑπὸ βασιλέα οὖσαν ἴδιον τόπον καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁρμηθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τούτων ἄχρι τοῦ Γάγγου διήλθε κτλ.*

Attempts have been made to connect this sentence with the rulers of the Kushan dynasty. It has even been suggested that *οὖσαν* represents *Κουσαν* (Kennedy, *J.R.A.S.* 1913, p. 127): the suggestion naturally won no acceptance, but one may point out that in any case it failed to attack the real difficulty, which lies in the words (or word) *ἴδιον τόπον*. On that essential point, the views of recent editors have both varied and combined.

C. Müller (*Geog. Graec. Min.*, vol. i) makes the text read *καὶ τούτων . . . ὑπὸ βασιλέα ὄντων ἰδιότοπον. καὶ Ἀ. κτλ.* In his note (p. 293) he writes '*όντων ἰδιότοπον*] *οὖσαν ἴδιον τόπον* Codex: *ἔχον ἴδιον τόπον* Fabricius (sc. in his earlier edition of 1848): *possis οἰκοῦν ἴδιον τ.* Infra quoque legitur *ὑπὸ βασιλέα εἶναι*: alias hoc loco mallet *ὑπὸ βασιλεῦσιν ὃν ἰδιότοποις.*'

B. Fabricius in his later edition (Leipzig, 1883) makes the text read *καὶ τούτων . . . ὑπὸ βασιλέα ὄντων ἴδιον*. In his footnote (p. 89) he writes 'C. (d. h. Codex) und die Ausgaben vor meiner *ὑπὸ βασιλέα οὖσαν ἴδιον τόπον* was Rammsio Fol. 286 b durch "gente sottoposta à Re proprio" übersetzte . . . Ich vermutete ehemals *ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἔχον ἴδιον τόπον*. Doch das ist zu abweichend vom C. und daher habe ich jetzt *τόπον* gestrichen, da auch Müllers Schreibung *ἰδιότοπον* nicht zu rechtfertigen ist.'

Hjalmar Frisk, editor of the latest and best edition (*Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, xxxiii, 1927) makes the text read *καὶ τούτων . . . ὑπὸ βασιλέα ὄντων ἴδιον [τόπον]. καὶ Ἀ. κτλ.* The square brackets mean, in his notation, that *τόπον* figures in the manuscript but is to be omitted from the final text. Frisk's note (p. 117) is '*ἔθνος Βακτριανῶν, ὑπο βασιλέα ὄντων ἴδιον*. Ainsi avec raison Fabricius cf. 5, 15 *ὁ τόπος . . . τυράννοις ἰδίους διοικεῖται*. Le mot conjecturé par Müller *ἰδιότοπον* étant un *ἅπαξ* se condamne de lui-même.'

The result is that Frisk accepts from Müller the emendation *όντων* for *οὖσαν* and from Fabricius the omission of *τόπον*. He agrees, rightly, with Fabricius in rejecting Müller's *ἅπαξ* but he follows Fabricius, wrongly I think, in solving the difficulty by merely dropping *τόπον*. His parallel, which comes from ch. 14 (his reference is to page and line in his edition), is not at all persuasive, for the sentence from which he quotes actually reads *οὐ βασιλεύεται δὲ ὁ τόπος, ἀλλὰ τυράννοις ἰδίους καθ' ἕκαστον ἐμπόριον διοικεῖται*, i.e. it is drawing a contrast between localities administered by individual petty shaykhs and a country which has a king, and the sense of *ἰδίους* in this passage can furnish no true parallel to the phrase in ch. 47.

However, apart from the weakness of Frisk's parallel, this solution of merely dropping *τόπον* fails to answer an obvious question: how did this supposedly otiose *τόπον* ever get into the text? I believe that if one tries to answer that question one is led to a different and much more attractive solution.

We want, in fact, a final word for the original sentence which would be capable of being corrupted into *ἴδιον τόπον*. I suggest that the clue to such a word may be found in the fact that the chapter goes on to refer to Alexander and to two Greco-Bactrian kings, Apollodotus and Menander. I suggest that *ἴδιον τόπον* represents the name of another Greco-Bactrian ruler—no less a person than Diodotus.

His name could have been corrupted through the series *ΔΙΟΔΟΤΟΝ > ΙΔΟΔΟΤΟΝ > ΙΔΟΤΟΤΟΝ*. Thereupon that meaningless jumble could have been corrected, whether in one or in two stages, to *ΙΔΙΟΝ ΤΟΠΟΝ*.



It is admittedly a stupid method of correction, for it consists in turning a jumble of letters into two known words, regardless, however, of sense or grammar. I think, however, that some other traces of a corrector who espoused this method may be found in *Periplus M.E.* Indeed, *οὔσαν* may also bewray the same hand. I conjecture that this must have originally been *ῥσαν*: possibly at some stage a neuter participle *ὄν* (as conjectured by Müller) crept in and set the process of corruption going from which our supposed stupid corrector eventually extracted the senseless *οὔσαν*.

I would, therefore, propose to read the sentence: *καὶ τούτων ἐπάνω μαχημώτατον ἔθνος Βακτριανῶν. ὑπὸ (τὸν) βασιλέα ῥσαν Διοδότῳ καὶ Ἀ. κτλ.* With this reconstruction compare ch. 59: *ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Πανδίωνά ἐστιν.*

The parallel is exact, even to the absence of an initial connecting particle. I am inclined to restore the article *τὸν*, though it is incidentally rather curious that there are no articles in the phrase *μαχημώτατον ἔθνος Β.*

Such a restoration explains (as other conjectures do not) the origin of the otherwise inexplicable *τόπον*. It also makes sense of the context, which, having referred to the Bactrian nation, proceeds to recall their history. It does not specially refer to the Bactrian nation as they existed at the time of writing c. 110 A.D., whether under the Kushan or other rulers: the reference is more general, to the Bactrian nation which does still exist but which also followed Diodotus and his successors. One cannot but suspect that in the place of Alexander's name where it first occurs (*καὶ Ἀ. ὀρηθεὶς κτλ.*) there stood originally the name of the Greco-Bactrian king, probably Demetrius, who really did reach the Ganges, or of Demetrius' father, Euthydemus, and a copyist has changed it.

Another point in this chapter, which I consider needs further examination, is the meaning of the word *προχωροῦσιν* in the concluding phrase reading as follows: *ἀφ' οὗ μέχρι νῦν ἐν Βαρυγάζῳ παλαιαὶ προχωροῦσιν δραχμαί, γράμμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς ἐγκεχαράμεναι ἐπίσημα τῶν μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον βασιλευκότων Ἀπολλοδότῳ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ.*

Dr. W. W. Tarn (*Greeks and Bactrians in India*, p. 149) is certain that the word *προχωροῦσιν* here means 'circulating as current coin for buying and selling'. He relies for this on a passage in Sext. Empir. *adv. Math.* 1. 178, and firmly rejects Mr. Whitehead's view that the word should be translated 'come to light'. Moreover, he makes this translation of the word the foundation of his opinion that Apollodotus (but not apparently Menander, though why this difference is not clear) actually ruled Barygaza.

It seems to me that, even if one were convinced that Dr. Tarn was correct as to the meaning of the word, this is scarcely a firm foundation for the view that Greco-Bactrian rulers were ever sovereigns of Barygaza, at the mouth of the Narmada on the eastern side of the Gulf of Cambay. This is not the place to pursue this question further; I can only say that the passage in Strabo usually understood to refer to a Greco-Bactrian conquest of Surāshṭra seems to me to require at least some further examination.

However that may be, there are surely good grounds for questioning the meaning which Dr. Tarn gives to the disputed word in this particular passage and for preferring Mr. Whitehead's translation or something very like it.

It must be admitted that Frisk in his note on the word (p. 101) attributes to it in this passage the same meaning as does Dr. Tarn, citing likewise the reference in Sext. Empir. and another reference in Cosmas Indicopl. On the other point Frisk also notes (*ibid.*) '*προχωρεῖν* = être importé, expression stéréotype', adding that the word '*n'est pas non plus attesté chez aucun autre auteur*': and in two particular passages he remarks that it is best translated 'être courant, figurer (dans le commerce)'.

The verb *προχωρεῖν* is used very frequently in the *Periplus M.E.* with the preposition *εἰς* in phrases such as *προχωρεῖ εἰς τὸν τόπον* and the like. It is this use which translators have sought to render by the expression 'to be imported'. In all these

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passages, however, the rendering which fits equally well is 'to find a market': the preposition *εἰς* is perfectly understandable, since goods which find a market come into a market. It is to be noted also that the *Periplus M.E.* does also use the verbs *εἰσφέρεται* and *εἰσάγεται*, and there seems no reason to suppose that *προχωρεῖ* is used without some distinction of sense from these.

When we turn to the two particular passages where Frisk does admit the sense 'être courant, figurer (dans le commerce)', they do but confirm the opinion expressed above as to the passages where the verb is used with *εἰς*. These two passages are ch. 31 καὶ σώματα θηλυκὰ διὰ σπάνιν ἐκεῖ προχωροῦντα and ch. 51 καὶ τινα ἄλλα τοπικῶς ἐκεῖ προχωροῦντα φορτία τῶν παραθαλασσίων μερῶν. To these should, I suggest, be added ch. 14 ἐξαρτίζεται δὲ συνήθως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔσω τόπων τῆς Ἀριακῆς καὶ Βαρυγάζων εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ τοῦ πέραν ἐμπόρια γένη προχωροῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων. Lastly, a passage in ch. 13 is worth adding on account of a double occurrence with *εἰς* in both cases, the second instance having, in my opinion, so manifestly the sense for which I am contending, rather than the hitherto accepted sense: ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἐμπόριον Ὀπώνη, εἰς ἣν καὶ αὐτὴν προχωρεῖ μὲν τὰ προειρημένα· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἐν αὐτῇ γεννᾶται κασία καὶ ἄρωμα καὶ μοτῶ καὶ δουλικά κρείσσονα, ἃ εἰς Αἴγυπτον προχωρεῖ μᾶλλον.

I think, therefore, that the usage in the *Periplus M.E.* of this verb is really unmistakable. The correct rendering is always 'find a market', 'come into the market', 'enter into trade'.

Moreover, although Frisk says that this usage in the *Periplus M.E.* is peculiar to that work, there appear to be quite close parallels in papyri. This will be observed if reference is made to Preisigke, s.v. *προχωρεῖν*.

In these circumstances the meaning of *προχωροῦσιν* in ch. 47 ought, I contend, to be taken in accordance with the book's regular usage, and there is no real justification for importing another meaning from a different author. This contention is much strengthened by the fact that the *Periplus M.E.* gives to the word its own regular sense in relation to money in several places; cf., for example, a passage in ch. 49 only a few lines below our disputed passage, and still referring to Barygaza, *προχωρεῖ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἐμπόριον* (sc. Barygaza itself) *οἶνος . . . δηνάριον χρυσοῦν καὶ ἀργυροῦν*.

I may add that to me the word *παλαιαί* seems to carry an implication that these *δραχμαί* were not 'current coin'; but perhaps that is too subjective. It should also be pointed out that no particular stress should be laid on the expression *ἀφ' οὗ*. The preposition *ἀπὸ* is extremely common in the *Periplus M.E.* and has variable meanings: the English 'whence' would be an adequate translation of *ἀφ' οὗ* in this passage—'whence even now in Barygaza there come to hand old coins' etc.

I conclude, therefore, that the correct meaning of *προχωροῦσιν* in this passage is indeed very near what Whitehead suggested: his 'come to light' is perhaps rather too indefinite, but 'come to hand' seems to adapt the regular meaning of the word suitably to the context of this passage.

What I believe to be the truth is that the observer who reported this incident had found that these 'old' coins 'came to hand' in the money-changers' shops in Barygaza. In a place like Barygaza we must assume and allow for the existence of these money-changers, most probably then already organized into a guild (*Śreṇī*), if not forming a caste, and carrying on their business much as they can still be seen doing in any Indian city. Their business includes buying and selling bullion and coin of good metallic content. It is entirely understandable that good Greco-Bactrian coins were still turning up in their shops. They would come down from Sind maybe, but also from the north-west, along that very trade route from Proclais to which the next ch. 48 of the *Periplus M.E.* refers, and which Ptolemy probably describes, as Professor J. Ph. Vogel has shown (so far only in lectures in 1946 at S.O.A.S.). They would move about in the money-changers' shops and thence they would pass also into

hoards: and out of local hoards also they may have come into the Barygaza shops. There is no justification for regarding them, on account of this passage, as being at that time or as having been in the past local *currency* of Barygaza in the proper sense of the term. They were not, of course, being treasured as antiques! But they did form part of the still legendary hoards of India's economic life, and that fact decides nothing as to the region of their original circulation as currency.

To conclude these remarks, two general points seem to me significant in regard to ch. 47:

First, in ch. 47, it is self-evident that use has been made of written sources dealing with the Greco-Bactrian rulers. Here then is something more than the personal observation of a simple sailorman. Ch. 47 was composed by somebody who had read and remembered works now lost to us, telling of the conquests of those 'who were kings after Alexander'. The chapter is therefore one of the signs indicating that the book is not quite the simple composition nor the plain narrative which it has been considered to be.

Secondly, the contents of ch. 47 show that at some stage there intervened in the composition of the book a person who felt a definite interest in what the Greeks or Greco-Bactrians had done in India. The references to these matters in this chapter are really quite out of place in a plain manual of navigation or commerce. Somebody, however, was interested enough in these matters to work these remarks into this *Periplus* and to record the odd fact about the coins. One should allow for this special interest of some unknown observer or compiler when considering the reference in ch. 41 to 'signs of Alexander's expedition', which, however, raises a host of problems of its own not to be dealt with here.

J. A. B. PALMER.

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## ISOCRATES AND RECITATIONS

LITTLE has been said as to how Isocrates' *lógoi* were published. It is commonly assumed that they were written for a reading public but for greater effect were given a fictitious dramatic setting.<sup>1</sup> Such a generalization, although partly true, needs qualification. This article attempts to prove the following points:

- (a) Isocrates wrote for a listening, as well as for a reading, public.
- (b) Failure to recognize indications of this in his works has led to misinterpretation and mistranslation, especially of certain words used in a semi-technical sense.
- (c) There has been a tendency to confuse references to a real audience who will actually be listening to the *lógos*, with references to a fictitious audience introduced as a picturesque literary device.
- (d) The *Panegyricus* provides an example of this. It is not, as is generally supposed, addressed to an imaginary audience in Olympia or some other *πανήγυρις*, but to real audiences in Athens, as well as to an Athenian reading public.

The evidence of later writers and commentators on the question of recitations is often unreliable,<sup>2</sup> but contemporary authors show that in the fifth and fourth centuries it was not unusual in Athens and elsewhere for an author to read his works to an audience as a means of publication.<sup>3</sup> Such a reading is described in the opening scene of Plato's *Parmenides*.<sup>4</sup> Zeno is reading (*ἀναγιγνώσκειν*) his works, hitherto unpublished in Athens, to a crowded audience in a private house. There are too a number of references to readings of epideictic *lógoi*. The Platonic Hippias relates that he had given a public reading of an artistically composed *lógos* in Sparta and was just about to give a similar reading of the same work in Athens. He asked Socrates to come himself and bring others.<sup>5</sup> Prodicus, in Xenophon,<sup>6</sup> is said to have recited his epideictic composition on Heracles to a large audience (*πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται*). Alcidas, a contemporary of Isocrates, says that one reason which prompted him to compose an artistic written *lógos* instead of 'improvising' was the prospect of giving recitals to crowded audiences (*τῶν ἐπιδείξων εἴνεκα τῶν εἰς τοὺς ὄχλους ἐκφερομένων ἄπτομαι τοῦ γράφειν*).<sup>7</sup> Epideictic *lógoi* were intended to be read before an audience, as a play was intended to be exhibited in the theatre; like tragedies and comedies they would also be circulated in book form and read privately. The Greeks themselves were conscious of this analogy with the drama. The verb *ἐπιδείκνυμι* is used of the presentation both of *lógoi* and of plays,<sup>8</sup> and *ἀγώνισμα* can mean either the public reading of an epideictic *lógos* (as in Thuc. i. 22. 4) or the public performance of a play (as in Arist. *Poet.*

<sup>1</sup> e.g. G. Norlin, Loeb Classical Library, vol. ii, p. 192 n.: 'Isocrates, though writing for a reading public, habitually uses the language of a discourse to be delivered.' Subsequent references to 'Norlin' are to his translation in vols. i and ii of the L.C.L.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. not much weight can be attached to the ancient tradition about Herodotus' recitations. However, in view of other evidence (*v. infra*), we may reasonably accept Diogenes Laertius' statement (D.L. 9. 50) that Protagoras and Prodicus gave public readings of their *lógoi*, for which they charged fees (*λόγους ἀναγιγνώσκοντες ἡρανίζοντο*).

<sup>3</sup> Funaioli in his article on 'Recitationes' (*R.E.* i. A. 1) mentions the scanty evidence for such

readings in Greece: 'von bestimmten R. in engeren Kreisen wissen wir sehr wenig, nur eben genug, um das Dasein der Sitte im allgemeinen erkennen zu können, wenn auch im einzelnen der uns zur Verfügung stehenden anekdotenhaften Literatur nicht zu viel Wert beizulegen ist.' He disregards the most important evidence, particularly contemporary references to readings of epideictic *lógoi*. The subject of *ἐπιδείξεις* in general is treated in W. Schmid's article on *ἐπιδείξεις* (*R.E.* vi. 1).

<sup>4</sup> *Parm.* 127 c.

<sup>5</sup> *Hippias Maior* 286 e-b.

<sup>6</sup> *Mem.* 2. 1. 21.

<sup>7</sup> *De Soph.* 31 (Blass).

<sup>8</sup> e.g. Plato, *Symp.* 194 b, *Laches* 183 b.

1451<sup>b</sup>37). Like a play, an ἐπίδειξις was a 'spectacle'. Aristotle<sup>1</sup> speaks of the ἀκροατής of an ἐπιδεικτικός λόγος as a θεωρός, and Cleon, in criticizing the Athenians for treating speeches in the Assembly as ἐπιδείξεις, calls them θεαταὶ τῶν λόγων.<sup>2</sup>

Isocrates' λόγοι were directly descended from the epideictic compositions of the earlier Sophists mentioned above, but whatever ancient commentators may say, and these contradict each other, nearly everyone would now agree that Isocrates did not himself recite his works. There are, however, many indications in his works that he intended his λόγοι to be read to an audience by others. There are at least two passages in which specific reference is made to the actual reading of a λόγος before an audience. In *Ad Phil.* 26 f.<sup>3</sup> Isocrates contrasts ἀναγνινωσκόμενοι λόγοι, like his own, with λεγόμενοι λόγοι and complains that the former when read out (ἀναγνινώσκη τις) monotonously make a poor impression on the audience (τοῖς ἀκούουσιν). A similar sentiment is expressed in *Antid.* 1 init. and 12: χρὴ δὲ τοὺς διεξιόντας αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ὄντος μικτοῦ τοῦ λόγου καὶ πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς ὑποθέσεις ταύτας γεγραμμένον ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ἔπειτα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς λέγεσθαι μέλλουσιν ἢ τοῖς ἤδη προειρημένοις, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ζητεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπελθόντας ὅλον αὐτὸν διελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μέρος ὅσον μὴ λυπήσει τοὺς παρόντας. 'Those who are going through it (i.e. the *Antidosis*) must first bear in mind in giving their recitation<sup>4</sup> that it is a mixed work written with all these subjects in mind, secondly they must fix their attention even more on what is about to be said than on what has already been said, and finally they must not attempt to read through the whole of it immediately after they have come before the audience,<sup>5</sup> but only as much of it as will not bore those present.'

Isocrates says that reciters of his works must look ahead rather than back, in order that they may be able to adjust their tone, etc., to a change in the ὑπόθεσις and so avoid the monotony mentioned in *Ad Phil.* 26 f. Failure to take this passage as containing instruction to reciters leads to some impossible translations and gives no sense to the passage as a whole—e.g. Norlin translates τοὺς διεξιόντας αὐτὸν 'all who intend to acquaint themselves with my speech' and εὐθὺς ἐπελθόντας 'at the first sitting', and his rendering of the passage as a whole gives neither sense nor cohesion. There are several other references to an audience, apart from those in λόγοι with an imaginary setting; and even if expressions like οἱ ἀκροαταὶ and οἱ ἀκούοντες could be used in Isocrates' time, as they were later, to mean 'readers', this could hardly be said of οἱ παρόντες; e.g. in *Panath.* 6.

We may assume that readings of Isocrates' λόγοι were of varying degrees of formality, ranging from one friend's reading aloud to another, as Phaedrus in Plato reads Lysias' λόγος to Socrates, to a prearranged reading before a large audience on the lines of the recitations of the Sophists described above. Isocrates uses three verbs in connexion with the publication of his works, διαδίδωμι, ἐκδίδωμι, and ἐκφέρω. These are all used in a wide sense, and would include publication either in book form or by readings. He is probably referring to these two methods of publication in the *Evagoras*, when he is comparing λόγοι with statuary: τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξενεχθῆναι θ' οἷόν τ' ἔστιν εἰς

<sup>1</sup> *Rhet.* 1. 3. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Thuc.* 3. 38. 4.

<sup>3</sup> A similar contrast is found in *Ep.* 1. 2-3, but as it is an ἐπιστολή, not a λόγος, and consequently not meant to be read to an audience, τὰ γεγραμμένα is used instead of οἱ ἀν. λόγ. and there is no reference to the reciter.

<sup>4</sup> G. Mathieu (*Isocr.* iii, 'Les Belles Lettres', Paris 1942), who sees instruction to reciters in this passage, translates 'doivent d'abord la faire entendre'. This can hardly be got from the Greek and seems unsuited to the context. The meaning

'give a recitation or lecture' for ἀκρ. ποιῆσθαι is well attested. Cf. Hippocr. *Praec.* 12 (ἦν δὲ καὶ εἰνεκεν ὁμίλου θέλης ἀκρόασιν ποιῆσασθαι, οὐκ ἀγανκλῆως ἐπιθυμῆς) and Polyb. 32. 2. 5. For ἀκρ. meaning 'something listened to', i.e. a recitation or lecture, cf. also Alcidas, *De Soph.* 31 (Blass) and for later examples v. Stephanus, *Thes. Ling. Gr.*

<sup>5</sup> ἐπέρχομαι is here used in one of its regular meanings, 'come forward to speak before an audience'. Cf. *Paneg.* 15: ὅσοι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐπελθόντες διδάσκουσιν ὡς χρὴ . . .

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<sup>1</sup> *Evag.* τμήν in synonymou

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedr.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Phil.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 2

<sup>5</sup> Cf. τοῦ



τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὐφρονούντων διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσθαι παρ' οἷς...<sup>1</sup> Similarly in Plato's *Phaedo* Socrates hears someone reading a work of Anaxagoras and then gets hold of a copy.<sup>2</sup>

Even when a *lógos* was not primarily written for an Athenian audience, it was written to be read aloud as well as privately. As the *Ad Philíppum* is a *lógos*, not an *ἐπιστολή*, Isocrates assumes that it will be read to an audience consisting of Philip and others. He starts by referring to the *lógos* which is 'now about to be read to you' (*νῦν δειχθήσεσθαι μέλλοντος*).<sup>3</sup> He later<sup>4</sup> describes the poor impression that monotonous reading, etc., make on an audience (*τοῖς ἀκούουσιν*) and fears the *lógos* 'being read at the moment' (*τοῦ νῦν ἐπιδεικνυμένου*)<sup>5</sup> may suffer in this way. He ends<sup>6</sup> by referring to an audience in the plural (*δύων τῶν ἀκούντων*) as well as to its principal member, Philip (*σοι*). It would also be read to audiences in Athens. The reference in *Ad Phil.* 22 and 23 to a preliminary reading of it to friends or pupils will be discussed presently.

An examination of Isocrates' use of the verbs *ἀναγινώσκω*, *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, and *δείκνυμι* gives further evidence that Isocrates intended his *lógoi* to be read aloud to an audience. The verb *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, apart from its use in the wider sense of displaying one's accomplishments whatever they may be, had the narrower meaning, imperfectly recognized by L. and S., of 'reading aloud to an audience'. In Aristophanes, *Knights* 349, it is used of someone 'trying out' a forensic speech by *reciting* it to friends. Passages in Plato and Xenophon where it is similarly used have been cited above. Translators generally miss this semi-technical meaning; e.g. in Plato, *Phaedrus* 236e *ἐπιδείξειν* is generally translated 'show' or the equivalent (e.g. Thompson<sup>7</sup> renders it 'let you see', Robin<sup>8</sup> 'ne te sera par moi ni produit...', etc.). But the context makes it clear that it must mean 'read'. Phaedrus, who has just finished *reading* Lysias' *lógos*, threatens Socrates that he will not *read* him another nor tell him of another, unless he too delivers a *lógos*. Cf. *ἐπιδείξει* in *Theaetetus* 143a.

Translators of Isocrates have obviously been puzzled by the *passive* use of *ἀναγινώσκω*, *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, and *δείκνυμι* in certain passages. Investigation shows that all three verbs are used, with no perceptible difference in meaning, of a *lógos* being read aloud to an audience and refer to readings of his works which Isocrates envisages as taking place, e.g. the expressions *τοῦ νῦν ἀναγινωσκομένου* (sc. *λόγου*) in *Ad Phil.* 110 and *τὸν νῦν ἐπιδεικνύμενον* (sc. *λόγον*) in *Ad Phil.* 27 both mean the *lógos* 'which is now being read to you' (not as Norlin translates them respectively 'which is now before you to be read', 'which is now presented to you'). Similarly *ὁ μέλλον δειχθήσεσθαι λόγος* in *Panath.* 4 and *ὁ λόγος ὁ μέλλον ἀναγνωσθήσεσθαι* in *Antid.* 1 both refer to the *lógos* which is 'about to be read' to the audience. *ἐπιδείκνυμι* and *δείκνυμι* need have none of the sense of 'display' which the former has, for example, in *Evag.* 4 and frequently in Plato. In *Antid.* 57 *δειχθήσεσθαι* is used merely of extracts from Isocrates' earlier works being 'read out' in court and is synonymous with *ῥηθήσεσθαι* in 55. The noun *ἐπίδειξις*, however, retains a slightly derogatory sense of something showy and artificial; e.g. Isocrates goes out of his way to say that the *Ad Philíppum* is not an *ἐπίδειξις*,<sup>9</sup> but he refers to it as *τὸν νῦν ἐπιδεικνύμενον*,<sup>10</sup> and there are other similar cases.

This semi-technical meaning of *δείκνυμι*, i.e. = *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, is completely dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Evag.* 74. For this use of *διατ.* cf. *τὴν διατριβήν* in *Panath.* 19, where it seems almost synonymous with *ἐπίδειξις*.

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedo* 97 b, 98 b.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Phil.* 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 26-7.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *τοῦ νῦν ἀναγινωσκομένου* in 110.

<sup>6</sup> *Ad Phil.* 155.

<sup>7</sup> W. H. Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato*, 1868, p. 24.

<sup>8</sup> L. Robin, *Platon, Phèdre*, 'Les Belles Lettres', Paris, 1933.

<sup>9</sup> *Ad Phil.* 17 and 93.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* 27.

regarded by L. and S. and others, and its neglect frequently leads to mistranslations; e.g. in *Panath.* 270 ἄλλον δεικνύοντος (sc. λόγον) ἀκροατῆς γενέσθαι means 'listen to another reading out a λόγος', not, as Norlin translates, a λόγος 'submitted by another'; and in *Ad Phil.* 22 and 23 δείξεν and δειχθέντος mean 'read', not, as Norlin translates, 'show', and 'presented to them'.<sup>1</sup> Isocrates is here referring to a preliminary reading to friends or pupils. This form of 'try-out' is described more explicitly in the *Panathenaicus*.<sup>2</sup> Isocrates, dissatisfied with the preliminary draft of his λόγος, invited former pupils who were then in Athens to a reading; the λόγος was read to them (ἀνέγνωστο δ' ὁ λόγος) and was loudly applauded, meeting with the reception usually accorded to οἱ κατορθοῦντες ἐν ταῖς ἐπιδείξεσιν; Isocrates here refers to crowded recitals, such as those given in the great festivals, a form of reading of which he disapproved (v. *infra*).

The third point which this article attempts to prove is that scholars have confused references to real and fictitious audiences. The literary device of providing λόγοι with an imaginary dramatic setting was a favourite one of the period, but it has been ascribed too indiscriminately to Isocrates' works. If one leaves out of the question λόγοι assigned to other characters (i.e. the forensic speeches, and the *Archidamus*, *Plataicus*, and *Nicocles*), the dramatic fiction is only employed in the *Areopagiticus*, *De Pace*, and most of the *Antidosis* (i.e. 14 to the end; Isocrates calls the *Antidosis* a μικτὸς λόγος).<sup>3</sup> In all these cases the fiction is complete and obvious and is supported by a wealth of detail appropriate to the setting of the particular λόγος. In other λόγοι where there are references to an audience, Isocrates refers to the actual audience which will be listening to a reading of his work.

Scholars have generally assumed that the *Panegyricus* has the fictitious dramatic setting of an ἐπίδειξις declaimed at Olympia or at some other πανήγυρις.<sup>4</sup> Like the *Panathenaicus* it is certainly influenced by this genre of literature, but the setting is not fictitious and it is not that of a speech addressed to a Panhellenic audience. The whole tone of the *Panegyricus* with its repeated emphasis on ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις suggests an Athenian audience.<sup>5</sup> It is completely different from the *Olympiacus* of Lysias, where it is obvious that a Panhellenic audience is being addressed. In Lysias, *Ol.* 6, οἱ πρόγονοι are the ancestors of the Greeks as a whole: in the *Panegyricus* (whenever the word means 'our ancestors') they are invariably the ancestors of the Athenians. In *Paneg.* 70 ἐνθάδε corresponds to τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν in 68, the scene of the Amazon invasion, i.e. Attica; similarly ὁμοροὶ προσοικούντες ἡμῖν in 70 means 'bordering on Attica'. Further evidence that the *Panegyricus* is addressed to an Athenian public is found in *Ad Phil.* 128-9. Isocrates is here defending himself against the charge of overlooking Athens (παρὰ λυπὼν τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ πόλιν) in appealing to Philip to lead the

<sup>1</sup> Similarly in *Antid.* 265 δεικνυμένων refers to lectures delivered by the Sophists. (Cf. ἐπιδεικνυμένων in Plato, *Hipp. Mai.* 285c, used of Hippias lecturing and the use of the noun ἐπίδειξις, applied to Prodicus' lectures, in Plato, *Crat.* 384b.) Norlin's 'shown to us' and Mathieu's (in op. cit.) 'ce qu'on vous montre' miss this technical sense. This use of δεικνυμι is found in Alcidas, *De Soph.* 31 (Blass): τοῖς δὲ διὰ χρόνου μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀκροάσεις ἀφικμένοις, μηδὲ ποτε δὲ πρότερον ἡμῖν ἐν τετυχηκόσιν ἐπιχειροῦμέν τι δεικνύναι τῶν γεγραμμένων, and in later times δείξις was used = ἐπίδειξις meaning a 'recitation'; e.g. Athen. *Deipn.* 3. 98c: δείξιν δὲ ποτε λόγων δημοσίᾳ ποιούμενος.

<sup>2</sup> *Panath.* 233.

<sup>3</sup> *Antid.* 12.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, vol. iii, p. 74: 'Isocrates chooses to disguise his essay as a rhetorical show-piece declaimed at one of the great Panhellenic assemblies.' Blass, *Att. Ber.* ii, p. 251: 'Denn dass auch hier wenigstens in der Fiction die panhellenische Festversammlung in Olympia als zuhörend zu denken ist, unterliegt keinem Zweifel.' Most other commentators connect it with Olympia. Croiset actually states it was read there by Isocrates himself (*Histoire de la lit. grecque*, iv, ch. vii, p. 498).

<sup>5</sup> i.e. it is primarily addressed to an Athenian public although naturally, like other Isocratean λόγοι, it was also meant for wider circulation in the Greek world.

expedition against Persia. The charge, he says, would be legitimate if he had done so without first addressing his own country. In fact he had turned to Athens first but abandoned her when he found she cared less for τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος μαινομένων. Isocrates is obviously referring to the *Panegyricus*. His complaint is the same as in *Ad Phil.* 25 ff. As regards popular appeal, speeches read to an audience (ἀναγιγνωσκόμενοι λόγοι) cannot compete with platform oratory.

There is another point which I cannot recollect having been mentioned. The *Olympiacus* of Lysias and the *Olympicus* of Gorgias (as is shown by the single fragment quoted by Aristotle) both address the audience directly (ὦ ἄνδρες, etc.). In the *Panegyricus*, as in the *Panathenaicus* and Alcidas' λόγος 'On the Sophists', the audience is never directly addressed in the second person (e.g. *Paneg.* 187 we have αὐτοὺς οὖν χρή συνδιορᾶν, not ὑμᾶς). If Isocrates were pretending that the *Panegyricus* was a speech delivered at Olympia (or a similar festival), he would certainly have addressed the audience directly, as, for example, he does in the *De Pace*, which is supposed to be a speech delivered by Isocrates before the ἐκκλησία. One need not, however, conclude that the *Panegyricus* was meant only for a reading public. Alcidas' λόγος we know was meant to be read to an audience (v. *supra*). The ἀκροαταί in *Paneg.* 188 represent the real audience which Isocrates envisages as attending a reading of his work.

There is no need to assume that the 'publication' of the *Panegyricus* was connected with any particular πανήγυρις. Isocrates never says anything to suggest this either in the *Panegyricus* itself or elsewhere. Some scholars have assumed that the scathing denunciation of τὸ πανηγυρίζειν in his later works represents a change of literary technique in Isocrates; e.g. Werner Jaeger, 'The profound change in Isocrates' later views of his mission is shown in *Antid.* 1 and *Phil.* 12—where he abandons his earlier panegyric style, because it would be ineffective in contemporary Greece.'<sup>1</sup> It is wrong to assume such a change. The καινότης referred to in *Antid.* 1 lies in the fact that the work is a μικτὸς λόγος,<sup>2</sup> not in its being addressed to a different type of audience, and when Isocrates expresses his disapproval of τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς<sup>3</sup> and prefers τοὺς ἄλλους εἰὼν πανηγυρίζειν,<sup>4</sup> he is condemning a technique he has never followed himself in fact nor has he pretended to do so as a literary device. This did not, however, prevent him from observing some of the conventions of this kind of literature in the *Panegyricus* (e.g. the title), as he did in the *Panathenaicus*, written after the *Ad Philippum* in his extreme old age, where τὸ πανηγυρίζειν is also attacked and ridiculed.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Paideia*, vol. iii, p. 306.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Antid.* 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Panath.* 263.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad Phil.* 12.



# THE CORINTHIAN ACTAEON AND PHEIDON OF ARGOS<sup>1</sup>

## I. THE AVENGING OF ACTAEON

THE story of Actaeon of Corinth is a slight, rationalized, romantic version of the original Boeotian myth, and as such has occasionally received a brief notice.<sup>2</sup> In the Corinthian story Melissos his father (or Habron his grandfather) had rescued Corinth from an attack by Pheidon of Argos, and was therefore held in great honour by the Corinthians. The boy Actaeon was torn to pieces not by his dogs but by his drunken Bacchiad admirers, and after the murder Melissos, unable to get legal redress from the Corinthians, cursed them publicly at the Isthmian festival and jumped over a cliff. Plutarch and Diodorus name the Bacchiad Archias as the chief culprit, and Plutarch ends with Archias' departure to found Syracuse and his eventual death there. The story has an historical not a mythical setting, and has attracted some slight attention from historians, either in the hope of light on the obscure question of Pheidon's relations with Corinth, or because of the chronological implication that Pheidon reigned a generation or more before the foundation of Syracuse.<sup>3</sup> In neither aspect has its evidence been rated high, and that is not surprising, especially since attention has been concentrated mainly on Plutarch's story. I believe, however, that we can distinguish an earlier version, and that the historical implications of this original are less disreputable.

(a) Plutarch, *Am. Narr.* 2 = *Mor.* 772 c, begins with an Argive Habron, who gave away Pheidon's plot against Corinth and therefore fled from Argos. Melissos was his son, Actaeon his grandson, Archias is the Bacchiad villain, and after the murder and Melissos' suicide we conclude with drought and plague at Corinth and an embassy to Delphi. The oracle said that Actaeon's death must be avenged, and Archias, who was a member of the embassy, prudently did not return to Corinth but sailed away instead to found Syracuse. This is an unlikely account of the reasons for the foundation of Syracuse: and that the main culprit should become the founder of a famous and prosperous city is not a satisfactory vengeance for Actaeon, even though Plutarch lets Archias be murdered in the end at Syracuse.

(b) The scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius 4. 1212 gives a more compressed version: it has probably a lacuna in the middle, but the outline is not in doubt. He begins from the word *Βακχιάδαι* in Apollonius' text, explains who they were, adds that they were expelled from Corinth because of Actaeon's death, and tells the story from that point of view. Here Melissos himself has saved Corinth from Pheidon, no specific Bacchiad villain is named (unless the name is lost in a lacuna),<sup>4</sup> and after the murder and the suicide the Corinthians are afraid to leave Actaeon's death unavenged—there seems again to be an oracle—and they expel the Bacchiads. The closing words *ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Βακχιάδας* echo the introductory words *οἵτινες ἐξεβλήθησαν ἐκ Κορίνθου διὰ τὸν Ἀκταίωνος θάνατον* and round off a self-contained and quite coherent little story about the fall of the Bacchiad aristocracy at Corinth,<sup>5</sup> a story in which Actaeon receives a suitably wholesale vengeance.

<sup>1</sup> The original basis of this article was a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in November 1939, and I owe much to the criticisms made on that occasion, much also to advice from Prof. H. T. Wade-Gery and Dr. F. Jacoby.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii. 127 n. 3; Malten, *Kyrene*, 86, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i<sup>2</sup>. 614 n.; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* i<sup>2</sup>. 2. 195; Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, 180.

<sup>4</sup> Wendel indicates a lacuna at p. 310, l. 4 of his edition, and indeed we need somewhere some direct statement of the fact that Actaeon was Melissos' son.

<sup>5</sup> Apollonius is speaking of the Bacchiad foundation of Corcyra, and the scholiast's concluding sentence names Chersikrates, one of the Bacchiads, as the founder. At l. 1216 he quotes Timaios (*F.H.G.* i. 203, fr. 53) to the same

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Both versions find support elsewhere. Diodorus 8, fr. 10 (Vogel) is an excerpt giving only the central episode, the tearing to pieces of Actaeon, but it names Archias and so in the most important difference sides with Plutarch. But Alexander of Aetolia, fr. 3, ll. 7-10 (Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina*, p. 122) refers to the other version:

... οὐδὲ Μελίσσῳ  
 Πειρήνης τοῖόνδ' ἀλφεισίβοιον ὕδωρ  
 θηλήσει μέγαν νῖόν, ἀφ' οὗ μέγα χάρμα Κορίνθῳ  
 ἔσται καὶ βριαροῖς ἄλγεα Βακχιάδαις.

The interpretation of this is clear—the great joy to Corinth and the grief to the violent Bacchiads are one and the same thing, the liberation of Corinth from Bacchiad oppression,<sup>1</sup> in other words the scholiast's version and not Plutarch's. Otherwise the story is found (so far as I know) only in Maximus of Tyre 24. 1, which might be either version: like Diodorus he gives only the central episode, but he does not name the Bacchiad lover and calls Actaeon's father Aischylos not Melissos.

The traceable pedigree of Plutarch's story goes back perhaps a little farther, since we cannot exclude the possibility that Diodorus read this version in Ephoros.<sup>2</sup> But the pedigree of the scholiast's version goes back far enough to show that it is not merely scholiast's muddle, and the story itself is so much more coherent and satisfactory that I have no doubt that this is the original, whereas Plutarch's source substituted the well-known Archias for an unknown or unnamed Bacchiad and remodelled the end of the tale accordingly. Such substitutions are common enough: an obvious example is the substitution of Solon for the less well known Alkmaion as Athenian commander in the Sacred War.<sup>3</sup>

But if the scholiast's version is the original, the historical implications are widely different. So far from being at least a generation older than the foundation of Syracuse, Pheidon is the contemporary of the last generation of Bacchiads at Corinth. Many modern scholars would agree with this estimate of Pheidon's place in history,<sup>4</sup> but it remains a question whether any ancient chronographic system assigned Pheidon to a date compatible with this position; also, what value is to be put upon those systems which definitely do not.

## 2. PHEIDON'S GENEALOGY

The question of Pheidon's date is beset with irrelevant figures—first Archias, now the Macedonian Karanos. Herodotus and Thucydides agree that the kings of Macedon were descended from Temenos founder of Dorian Argos,<sup>5</sup> and that the original emigrant from Argos to Macedon was the seventh ancestor of Alexander I, whom

effect. But this is not part of the Actaeon story: the scholiast does not even hint at any sort of Plutarchan combination by which Chersikrates might have gone to Corcyra because he, like the rest, had been expelled from Corinth, unless the last words of schol. 1216 can be taken in this sense. (In passing, this last sentence looks to be a separate note, not—as Wendel prints it—part of the quotation from Timaios. The Paris scholia, from which Müller's text is drawn, may be left out of account: cf. Wendel's preface, pp. xiv-xvi.)

<sup>1</sup> In this highly allusive style a reference to the founding of Syracuse might conceivably be extracted from μέγα χάρμα Κορίνθῳ if that phrase stood alone, but Syracuse would not account for βριαροῖς ἄλγεα Βακχιάδαις. For the later reputa-

tion of the Bacchiads see below, p. 78: it would be interesting to know whether Alexander's source included any explicit mention of Kypselos.

<sup>2</sup> It might, alternatively, be Timaios. The idea that Timaios told the Plutarch story with Chersikrates and Corcyra substituted for Archias and Syracuse (cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i<sup>2</sup>. 618, n. 1; Müller, *F.H.G.* i. 203) rests on a misinterpretation of the Apollonius scholiast (see p. 70, n. 5 above), but that does not prove that Timaios was not the source of Diodorus.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Solon* 11. 2.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.* iii. 539-43 and 761-2, *Perachora*, i. 257-61; Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, 154-83.

<sup>5</sup> Herod. 8. 137. 3, cf. 5. 22. 2; Thuc. 2. 99. 3.

Herodotus names Perdikkas:<sup>1</sup> neither author mentions Pheidon in this connexion. Later authors put in one or three more kings before this Perdikkas I, taking us back to a new founder Karanos, the son or brother of Pheidon and about seventh in descent from Temenos.<sup>2</sup> These writers might thus be said to date Pheidon. But two facts warn us against taking them too seriously: they operate with a bogus Macedonian founder who is incompatible with the main fifth-century tradition; and a variant in Syncellus gives an entirely independent version of the descent of Karanos from Temenos, six names between the two which do not recur in any form of the Argive genealogy and have nothing to do with Pheidon. Karanos is no guide to genuine tradition about Pheidon: most probably the origin of all this is just the desire to concoct a more satisfactory pedigree for the later kings of Macedon, and the connexion between Karanos and Pheidon was made only because Pheidon was the best-known name in the Argive list of Temenids.

Perhaps independent of these Macedonian entanglements is Ephoros' statement that Pheidon was tenth in descent from Temenos. It occurs in a purely Peloponnesian context, Strabo's long summary of Ephoros' account of early Elis,<sup>3</sup> and as it stands shows no particular sign of having been manipulated in any irrelevant interest. So far as our limited information goes, it might be genuine tradition—genuine in the sense that this is what fifth-century Argives<sup>4</sup> believed about Pheidon, even conceivably what Pheidon believed about himself. But even granting what cannot be proved, that the genealogy is in such a sense genuine, does that help us to date Pheidon?

We may indeed try calculating Ephoros' date for Pheidon. His date for the return of the Herakleidai, and thus for Temenos, is one of the very few well-attested Ephoran dates,<sup>5</sup> and on almost any estimate of the length of a generation the tenth from Ephoros' Temenos will come somewhere in the eighth century. But to say positively that Ephoros dated Pheidon to the eighth century has a meaning only if we credit him with a chronological system, expressed in generations but making a conscious equation between particular generations and particular periods of years; as for instance the scheme popularized by Eduard Meyer,<sup>6</sup> by which Ephoros had the early history of Greece spaced out in eighteen Spartan generations, three to a century, beginning with the return of the Herakleidai in 1069 and ending with the death of Pausanias in 469, a scheme in which Pheidon's generation begins or ends in 769 according as you make Temenos' generation begin or end in 1069. It is certainly

<sup>1</sup> Herod. 8. 137–9. Thuc. 2. 100. 2 gives eight kings before Archelaos, which agrees exactly with Herodotus' six before Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> Syncellus 373, 498 (Karanos as brother of Pheidon); Sync. 499 = Diod. 7 fr. 17 Vogel = Theopompos, *F.Gr.H.* 115 F 393, and Satyros, *F.H.G.* iii. 165, fr. 21 (genealogies from Temenos to Karanos). The details are irrelevant here (for tables and discussion see esp. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* i<sup>2</sup>. 2. 191, iii<sup>2</sup>. 2. 49, and Jacoby on Theopompos, loc. cit.), as also the question what any of these lists, even the earliest, may really mean for Macedonian history: the point here is simply the instability of the Macedonian part of the list down to a date at least well on into the fourth century. A further sign of this instability is that Euripides was able to ascribe the foundation to an Archelaos (in his play of that name, Nauck<sup>2</sup>, pp. 426 ff.), who never reappears and is probably quite distinct from Karanos: cf. Momigliano in

*Atene e Roma*, xii (1931), 203 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *F.Gr.H.* 70 F 115 = Strabo 8. 358.

<sup>4</sup> There will have been families extant in classical Argos which traced their descent from Temenos if not from Pheidon, that is, it is certainly possible that such 'genuine' tradition should have survived till Ephoros; though there is no means of proving that this is what Ephoros actually represents.

<sup>5</sup> *F.Gr.H.* 70 T 10 (Diod. 16. 76. 5) and F 223 (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 139. 3), with Jacoby's comment: this will be the same as Isokrates' 700 years of Spartan history (*Archidamos* 12), roughly 1070–370.

<sup>6</sup> *Forschungen*, i. 178–9. I take this simply as an example—indeed it is the origin—of current ideas about Ephoros' chronology: its special difficulties, e.g. those connected with the terminal date, are considerable but here irrelevant.

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conceivable that a Greek of Ephoros' time or earlier should have set up such a scheme, and even if it seems temperamentally unlikely that Ephoros made the calculation himself, we may easily suppose that he took it over from another writer. Yet I do not think he did. His system of writing *κατὰ γένος*<sup>1</sup> could only be combined with a rigid chronological scheme if he gave a fair number of chronological cross-references in the course of his narrative, but although such cross-references and synchronisms are among the main interests of the later authors to whom we owe our fragments, these authors do not quote synchronisms from Ephoros, and so it seems unlikely that there were any to quote.<sup>2</sup> This impression is somewhat strengthened by the study of Diodorus 11-13, which very strongly suggests that Ephoros gave no dates of any recognizable kind in the fifth century. Therefore, though Ephoros was certainly capable of using genealogies in a chronological argument,<sup>3</sup> I do not think they had in general a strong chronological connotation for him—and indeed Greeks were interested in genealogies for their own sake and not only as props for chronological systems.<sup>4</sup>

But this is by no means the end of the matter. Suppose Ephoros did have some such fixed chronological scheme, and suppose we really could say that within this scheme he dated Pheidon to what we call the eighth century: then, either Pheidon's place in the genealogy is itself the reason why Ephoros assigned him this place in the chronological scheme, in which case we are no farther on, the whole construction is just a more elaborate way of saying that Ephoros called him tenth from Temenos and gives us no fresh light on Pheidon's date; or his place in the chronological scheme is the reason for his place in the genealogy, that is, Ephoros had some independent evidence which expressed the date in non-genealogical terms (e.g. Olympiads, or reference backwards from a fixed point like the dates in Thucydides 1) and translated this into terms of his own genealogical system by calling him tenth from Temenos, since the interval between the two was approximately that multiple of his length for a generation. In that case we have fresh evidence about Pheidon's date, but we are not in a position to say certainly what it was<sup>5</sup> or whether it was valid, any more than we know how Thucydides arrived at his date for Ameinokles' shipbuilding,<sup>6</sup> and even believers in an Ephoran system of chronology might hesitate to take Pheidon's date on trust from Ephoros in the way we mostly take Ameinokles' date on trust from Thucydides.

The other alternative sounds the more probable, that the genealogy determined the

<sup>1</sup> A good example of the *κατὰ γένος* method in early history is F 115 = Strabo 8. 357-8 on Elis.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Jacoby puts the point very clearly in *F.Gr.H.* ii. C 27, which I venture with his consent to translate: 'Unfortunately we do not know if and how Ephoros overcame the chronological difficulties unavoidable in an arrangement by subject-matter. The fragments provide only quite few absolute datings . . . but no indications at all of synchronisms, though these can hardly have been entirely lacking.' It is only the last clause I would question.

<sup>3</sup> F 149 = Strabo 10. 481, on the priority of the Cretan founder Althaimenes to Lycurgus.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Herodotus' Macedonian genealogy (8. 139), of which he makes no chronological use. My main point could best be proved by a direct collision between two Ephoran genealogies, e.g. a case of two contemporaries who stand on different genealogical levels. The nearest to such a case is that of Archias (cf. Jacoby, *Marmor*

*Parium*, 158-62 and *F.Gr.H.* 239; Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.* iii. 761; p. 74, n. 3, below) and the other Sicilian founders: if it could be conclusively shown that Ephoros made Archias 11th from Herakles and his contemporaries 10th from Troy, then it would be clear that Ephoros had not a rigid chronological scheme of generations.

<sup>5</sup> It can of course be suggested (e.g. Jacoby, *Marmor Parium*, 160) that Pheidon's interruption of the eighth Olympiad would constitute the sort of evidence required. For the text of Pausanias 6. 22. 2, see p. 76 below. I do not think it very likely that Ephoros gave the number of Pheidon's Anolympiad: he mentioned indeed that the Eleans left it out of their list—F 115, where Strabo writes *οὐ μὲν τοὺς γε Ἑλλείους ἀναγράφει τὴν θέσιν ταύτην*—but if he had given the number Strabo would probably have reproduced it as he reproduces 'tenth from Temenos'.

<sup>6</sup> I. 13. 3.



date; or in my belief it would be truer to say that he did not really date Pheidon at all but recorded the genealogical fact for its own sake: in either case we have stopped talking about the evidential value of Ephoros' dating of Pheidon and are talking now of the evidential value of the genealogy itself, if it is in any sense genuine. In assessing this we need not respect Ephoros' date or the date of any ancient writer for the return of the Herakleidai, and if anyone wishes to go on with the game of counting generations, let him decide on his own date for Temenos and proceed from that. For myself I would go no farther than to suggest<sup>1</sup> a comparison between the Temenid genealogy and its nearest surviving relatives in Sparta. Taking the oldest extant version of the Eurypontid list<sup>2</sup> and equating Temenos with his brother Aristodemos, Pheidon stands on a level with Theopompos' son Anaxandridas, roughly at the end of the eighth century. This may not be so far out, but it would require a very lively faith in the reliability of genealogies and the regularity of generation intervals to build on this exiguous foundation.

That, I rather hope, exhausts the formal possibilities of inferring historical fact from Ephoros' statement that Pheidon was tenth in descent from Temenos. The same arguments apply to Theopompos and Satyros, if there is any question of taking their lists seriously: and the chronographers' dates for Pheidon,<sup>3</sup> since they appear to be based on the genealogies, are subject to the same limitations. There would be something to be said for omitting this whole category of evidence from the discussion of Pheidon's date.

### 3. PHEIDON'S DATE

Genealogies apart, there are four main lines of approach to the question:

(a) Herodotus 6. 127. 3, in his list of the suitors of Kleisthenes' daughter Agariste, introduces Leokedes son of Pheidon, and adds enough detail to make sure this is the great Pheidon. If this is fact,<sup>4</sup> then Pheidon was roughly the contemporary, probably the elder contemporary, of Kleisthenes, and flourished about 600. The general difficulty of fitting an Argive conqueror into the age of Kleisthenes and Periander is obvious enough: and in particular the presence of an Argive suitor is surprising in view of Kleisthenes' war with Argos and his exaggerated hostility to Argives, which appear to belong to the later phase of his reign,<sup>5</sup> the very period of the marriage of Agariste.

(b) Aristotle, *Politics* 1310<sup>b</sup>19 and 27, appears to be incompatible with Herodotus, since he draws a chronological distinction between the earlier class of tyrants represented by Pheidon, the kings who exceeded their traditional powers,<sup>6</sup> and the later

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion referred to in *Perachora*, i. 260 n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Herod. 8. 131. When Soos is adopted into the Eurypontid list the position is altered: again, in the longer Agiad list (Herod. 7. 204) the king—Alkamenēs—who corresponds to Pheidon is one place farther away from the datable kings of the sixth century. Comparison with other remoter genealogies would show greater divergences.

<sup>3</sup> *Marm. Par.* epp. 30–1, where we should accept Jacoby's drastic rearrangement (Lenschau's alternative—*P.W.* s.v. 'Korinthos', col. 1013, *Philologus*, xci (1936/7), 388–9—is unconvincing in itself and does not explain this text) and therefore take Pheidon's date as c. 790; Eusebius (*Jer.*) 789.

<sup>4</sup> It has often enough been taken as fiction. Grote for instance (*History of Greece*, iii, pt. ii,

c. ix) thought of an Alkmaionid parody of the poem about Helen's suitors (cf. esp. Hesiod, fr. 94 and 96 Rzsch), and the parallel cannot be overlooked—though it was conceivably Kleisthenes himself who originated it, setting out deliberately to copy mythical precedent (cf. Macgregor *T.A.P.A.* lxxii (1941), 266 ff.). The suitors are an extremely odd group, hard to explain if the whole thing is later fiction: but equally, if they are taken as a genuine historical group, they have so far defied satisfactory analysis.

<sup>5</sup> Delphi is already hostile to Kleisthenes in Herod. 5. 67. 2, which should mean a date later than the Sacred War.

<sup>6</sup> Viedebantt, *Philologus*, lxxxi (1925/6), 200 ff., disposes of this by maintaining that Aristotle's



class represented by Panaitios, Kypselos, and Peisistratos, the tyrants who were demagogues. This is of course a classification and not a chronological table, but Aristotle does make the distinction in time (*αἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἥδη τῶν πόλεων ἡρξημένων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἔκ τε τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβαλόντων τὰ πατρία κτλ.*) and we have some right to expect that the typical example of the earlier category<sup>1</sup> will precede the typical examples of the later category, though Aristotle will not tell us by how much. At least the idea that Pheidon ought to be earlier than Kleisthenes and Periander is not a purely modern idea.

(c) Herodotus describes Pheidon as the man who made the measures for the Peloponnese, *τοῦ τὰ μέτρα ποιήσαντος Πελοποννησίοισι*, and Ephoros asserts that he invented not only these Pheidonian measures but weights and coinage as well,<sup>2</sup> striking his coins in Aegina.<sup>3</sup> There is also later evidence, probably of Aristotelian origin,<sup>4</sup> that Pheidon on this occasion dedicated some of the old iron spit currency to Hera at Argos, and the discovery of spits at the Argive Heraion and of a dedicatory inscription at the Corinthian Heraion at Perachora show that this evidence must be taken seriously. The case set out by Professor Wade-Gery in *Perachora*, i. 257-61 for accepting Pheidon as the original author of Aeginetan coinage is a strong case as seventh-century evidence goes.

It is not perhaps a very serious objection that the *Φειδώνεια μέτρα*, which alone of Pheidon's alleged inventions later bore his name, were certainly smaller than the corresponding Attic measures, therefore quite a lot smaller than the Aeginetan.<sup>5</sup> Measures and weights are not necessarily linked, and Pheidon might be the author both of coins of Aeginetan weight and of non-Aeginetan measures. The question is rather of the date implied by the invention of coinage, for the dating of the first Aeginetan coins to the early seventh century is perhaps too early,<sup>6</sup> and a revised date might well make the inventor the contemporary and not the predecessor of the great Isthmian tyrants.

Herodotus states quite firmly that the tyrant who seized the Olympic festival was one and the same man as the author of the measures. The finds at the two temples of Hera supplement one another and give much support to the idea of a dedication of the old currency at the time of the introduction of the new. But I suppose it is possible that the introduction of silver coinage to Argos was the work of a later reign, and was falsely ascribed to the great Pheidon who imposed the measures.<sup>7</sup>

account of Pheidon is just a compromise between Herodotus' view of him as a tyrant and Ephoros' idea that he was a legitimate Temenid: and that Pheidon as a tyrant must be dated to the age of tyrants, i.e. after 650. This is altogether too cavalier, and Herodotus is not so exact in distinguishing *βασιλεύς* and *τύραννος* (cf. e.g. 5. 44, 6. 23).

<sup>1</sup> Pheidon is the typical example: who were the others? One perhaps was Charilaos of Sparta, *Pol.* 1316<sup>a</sup>34.

<sup>2</sup> F 115 = Strabo 8. 358: cf. *Marm. Par.* ep. 30.

<sup>3</sup> F 176 = Strabo 8. 376.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, fr. 481 Rose.

<sup>5</sup> Theophrastos, *Char.* 30. 11; *Fouilles de Delphes*, III. v, p. 39, no. 3, col. ii, l. 1 = *Tod* 140, ll. 80 ff.; *Αθ. Πολ.* 10; and Plutarch, *Solon* 15. 3-4 (Androtrion, *F.H.G.* i, p. 375, fr. 40), which at least agree that Solon's measures were larger than their precursors', which according to *Αθ. Πολ.* were Pheidonian.

<sup>6</sup> It is tied to the dating of the earliest Lydian coins to c. 700, which depends on Hogarth's dating of the deposit in the base of the cult statue of the Ephesian Artemision: and that certainly needs review. What understanding I have of these difficult questions I owe to the lucid and patient exposition of Mr. E. S. G. Robinson and Dr. P. Jacobsthal, to whom I am most grateful. It is clear that the historical implications of a later date must at least be seriously examined.

<sup>7</sup> The dedicator of the spits (see *Perachora*, i. 261 l. 2) may have been the Argive state, *τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι*, with no individual named; the fourth century supplying the name of Pheidon. Mr. Robinson has pointed out to me that the dating of the Perachora inscription is not entirely secure so far as it depends on the fragments of a single middle or late Protocorinthian kotyle (p. 257), which should be taken as having been broken in use, perhaps appreciably later than the

(d) Herodotus identifies Pheidon for his readers partly by the familiar measures, partly by his most notorious action, the seizure of the Olympic festival. This last is a very Hydra, with the strangest theories for heads: I am no Herakles, and give only a table of the evidence with a brief discussion.

- (i) Strabo 8. 355: the first 26 Olympiads without a break under Elean presidency (776-676), then a continuous Pisatan interlude of unspecified length (672-?).
- (ii) Africanus ap. Euseb. *Chron.* 1. 196: a single Pisatan Olympiad at Ol. 28 (668), then a continuous Pisatan interlude from Ol. 30 to Ol. 52 (660-572).
- (iii) Pausanias 6. 22. 2, who alone mentions Pheidon, gives no continuous Pisatan interlude, but two Pisatan Anolympiads held by force: with Pheidon's help at Ol. 8 (748), and by the Pisatan tyrant Pantaleon at Ol. 34 (644). Besides these he records a suspicion of trouble with Damophon son of Pantaleon at Ol. 48 (588), and an undated later war with Damophon's brother Pyrrhos. His three Pisatan tyrants cover roughly the period of Africanus' Pisatan interlude, and it may be relevant that in 5. 9. 4 he dates the institution of a second Hellanodikas to Ol. 50 (580).

Strabo and Africanus tell near enough the same story, and Falconer in his edition of Strabo proposed to bring Pausanias into line by emending 8th to 28th, i.e. 748 to 668; less plausibly, others have wanted to emend the other Anolympiad (Ol. 34 = 644) to bring it more exactly into line with the opening of the Pisatan interlude in Strabo and Africanus. The main question is how far there was a single Olympic tradition, what range of variation is permissible. The framework of the victor-list itself seems to have remained substantially unaltered since Hippias first published it c. 400. It seems unlikely that he published a bare list without introduction or comment, but these would be less stable, for the list passed through many hands, and the point of new editions would be a different introduction,<sup>1</sup> a new or enlarged comment, as well as a continuation of the list itself beyond the date reached by a predecessor. Theory about Pheidon or Pantaleon could alter the comment, and it has been suggested that Pausanias' 8th Olympiad is due to an Ephoran date for Pheidon.<sup>2</sup> But Pausanias claims to be following Elean records, and his conception of single Anolympiads is perhaps nearer to Hippias' ideas than the conception of a continuous Pisatan tenure of the games;<sup>3</sup> the Eleans are not likely to have introduced a break into an unbroken series of early Elean Olympiads simply for love of Ephoros' chronology, so that if Pausanias' 8th Olympiad is to be defended, it had better be defended as the earlier version later overlaid by other theories. As historical fact it is not specially plausible, since the games were hardly worth interruption in 748, while they were still of purely local importance; and one of the most pleasing features of the extant list is that it does not start the games off in a blaze of glory but records only local victors in the early stages. So it does not seem very likely that Hippias in the earliest version of the list assigned Pheidon's Anolympiad to 748, and there is that much to be said in favour of Falconer's emendation. There is less ground for emending Pausanias' other Anolympiad, Pantaleon's in 644, for the enlargement of the single Anolympiads to a long continuous Pisatan interlude is a radical alteration, and if Pausanias with his single Anolympiads is following Hippias, there is no reason to try and make him agree closely with Africanus, who believed in the continuous interlude.

date of its manufacture, not as a votive dedicated when new.

<sup>1</sup> As Phlegon's introduction, *F.Gr.H.* 257 F 1, certainly differs from anything Hippias could have written.

<sup>2</sup> For the reverse idea, that the 8th Olympiad

is responsible for Ephoros' date, see p. 73, n. 5 above.

<sup>3</sup> As Dr. Jacoby has pointed out to me, the two conceptions are certainly not reconcilable. The origin of the second is obscure, but it is hardly the earlier.

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Pausanias 2. 24. 7 records an early defeat of Sparta by Argos, near Hysiai on the pass which leads up from the Argive coast into the centre of the Peloponnese, and dates it to 669/8. In isolation, with no context but the bare reference, the date is not of a kind whose value can easily be assessed: but an Argive victory over Sparta in this early period is likely to be that victory by which, in Ephoros' view, Pheidon robbed Sparta of the hegemony of the Peloponnese,<sup>1</sup> and the date would then be part of a system which placed Pheidon's Anolympiad in 668, after the battle of Hysiai had opened up the way across Arcadia to Olympia. A most illuminating conjecture of Professor Wade-Gery's<sup>2</sup> tends both to confirm the existence of such a system and to improve its credit, namely the suggestion that the Spartan festival Gymnopaïdiai owes its origin to the defeat at Hysiai. The classical ritual included commemoration of the victory over Argos at Thyrea,<sup>3</sup> but the festival was older than this sixth-century occasion, and the commemoration must be an addition to the original ritual. Why to the Gymnopaïdiai? Eusebius takes the institution of the festival back to 669 (Jerome) or 665 (Armenian version), the very period of Pausanias' battle of Hysiai, and Wade-Gery suggests that it was brought in because of this defeat, one of many examples of a new ritual introduced to propitiate the gods in time of disaster.<sup>4</sup>

These look like traces of a coherent system—Hysiai, the Gymnopaïdiai, the Anolympiad of 668. By contrast the eighth-century Pheidon has little substance—the unemended text of Pausanias 6. 22. 2, Ephoros' 'date' for Temenos, the inferior version of the Actaeon story. The ninth-century and earlier Pheidons have no substance at all.<sup>5</sup> Our choice lies between the early seventh century, a date *c.* 670 based on the evidence last discussed and on Aristotle; and the end of the seventh century, a date *c.* 600 based on Herodotus and perhaps the coinage. Even within Herodotus choice is necessary, between Pheidon the father of Agariste's suitor and the Pheidon who seized the Olympic festival, for the chief difficulty about the late seventh-century Pheidon is to fit into the period of the powerful tyrants of Corinth and Sikyon the Argive king whose power reached across the Peloponnese,<sup>6</sup> worse still if Pheidon 'reunited the scattered heritage of Temenos',<sup>7</sup> for Sikyon itself is part of this heritage and cannot have been ruled at one and the same time by Pheidon and the Orthagorid tyrants.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4. THE SETTING OF THE ACTAEON STORY

In the romance of the Corinthian Actaeon the background includes Pheidon plotting against Corinth not long before the Bacchiads fell. If the real Pheidon intervened at Olympia in 668, he may well have had designs on Corinth in the period not long before *c.* 655, and it might even be true that he met his death in some faction fight in Corinth,<sup>9</sup> a part perhaps of the troubles which led to Kypselos' tyranny. The background is possible history.

<sup>1</sup> F 115 = Strabo 8. 358.

<sup>2</sup> See Professor Wade-Gery's note on p. 79 ff. of this number.

<sup>3</sup> Sosibios *F.H.G.* ii, fr. 5 = Athen. 15. 678 b: cf. *C.A.H.* iii. 569.

<sup>4</sup> For a Greek instance cf. the public funeral instituted at Athens after the disaster at Drabeskos, recently discussed by Jacoby in *J.H.S.* lxiv (1944), 37.

<sup>5</sup> I should perhaps mention the expedient of doubling Pheidon, which still has its adherents: it cannot be proved impossible, and one may, if one will, litter all the early centuries with alternative Pheidons, but it will scarcely commend itself. There is also Pheidon of Kleonai, Mac-

gregor, *T.A.P.A.* lxxii (1941), 275.

<sup>6</sup> To bring the Corinthian tyranny down to a later date, as some scholars have wished, will not resolve the difficulty. Kleisthenes is not so easily moved, or if he is he brings Leokedes with him.

<sup>7</sup> Ephoros F 115.

<sup>8</sup> I have assembled the main, direct evidence only. For the early war between Aegina and Athens see Ure, *op. cit.*, Dunbabin, *B.S.A.* xxxvii. 83: for Megara and Phleious see *C.A.H.* iii. 541-2 and 550.

<sup>9</sup> Nik. Dam. *F.Gr.H.* 90 F 35. Jacoby, *ad loc.*, robustly asserts that the wording would permit this to be the very early Corinthian lawgiver Pheidon (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1265<sup>b</sup>13), but the phrase

In the foreground are the wicked Bacchiads whose fall avenged Actaeon's death: and no doubt in fact the Corinthians had reason to complain of their rule. They had a bad name generally in antiquity, and even though the Kypselid Periander became a standard instance of the evil of tyranny, tradition never rehabilitated Kypselos' opponents. Strabo uses the term tyrants to describe the Bacchiads themselves;<sup>1</sup> Aristotle reports that Kypselos was a popular ruler who needed no bodyguard;<sup>2</sup> Nikolaos, following Ephoros, says much the same.<sup>3</sup> Even the Herodotean account, which makes a bloodthirsty monster out of Kypselos, still cites oracles of quite another colour,<sup>4</sup> oracles which perhaps owe their place in this very unsympathetic context to the fact that they were genuinely old, current before Delphi turned hostile to the tyrants. All this derives in the end from contemporary feeling about the Bacchiads, for no later theory had any ground to glorify Periander's father or to blacken his enemies.

Actaeon is not history, but the tale seems to have quite reasonable ideas about the historical position of Pheidon and about seventh-century Corinth.<sup>5</sup> One might even speculate that the story began in Periander's Corinth, for though later conditions are evidently right for the conservation of stories hostile to the Bacchiads, yet it may be doubted if later generations would trouble to adapt old myths to their discredit and invent romantic reasons for their downfall. If that goes too far, still perhaps the story was worth the trouble of sifting.

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κατὰ φίλιαν στασιάζουσιν Κορινθίους βοηθῶν still sounds more like intervention from outside: the end of Ephoros F 115 needs further examination. (The Corinthian lawgiver and the Argive king must be kept distinct: any confusion is possible in the minds of the scholiasts on Pindar—schol. Pind. *Ol.* 13. 21, 27—but Aristotle is another matter.)

<sup>1</sup> Strabo 8. 378.

<sup>2</sup> *Pol.* 1315<sup>b</sup>28.

<sup>3</sup> Nik. Dam. 90 F 57-8: for the source see Jacoby's commentary.

<sup>4</sup> Herod. 5. 92 β 2. Aetion, Kypselos' father, deserved more honour than he got: the Bacchiads

were arbitrary rulers (μούναρχοι, an unfriendly word, cf. Solon, fr. 10 l. 3 Diehl, Theognis 52): and of Kypselos himself, δικαιώσει δὲ Κόρινθον (which in the context suggests just punishment, though Herod. 3. 29. 3 shows that δικαιῶν can be pretty much dissociated from the idea of justice). The second oracle (92 β 3) is less friendly, but the first two lines of the third (92 ε 2) show someone thinking highly of Kypselos.

<sup>5</sup> It does not suggest that Pheidon actually occupied Corinth, rather that Bacchiad Corinth was and remained independent of Argos. But concealment of an Argive conquest might be deliberate.

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## A NOTE ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SPARTAN GYMNOPAIDIAI

In an important article on Spartan festivals in *Rh. M.* lxxviii (1929), pp. 124-43, Bölte has corrected some current misunderstandings of the Gymnopaïdai. From Xenophon (*Hell.* 6. 4. 16) and Plato (*Laws* 633 B-C) he shows that the festival lasted some days, that it was competitive, that adults took part, that it was exceedingly arduous: more specifically, that each day saw the performance of one team from each age-group.<sup>1</sup> From Sosibios, in *Athen.* 678 c, he constructs the programme for each day: the boys' team performed in the early morning (πρὸς ἔω<sup>2</sup>), the men's in the afternoon (ἐξ ἀπείρου), and since these teams no doubt represented Obai, there would probably be five days, one for each Oba. He rightly distinguishes these competing teams from the *trichoria*, a co-operative performance by old men, young men, and boys:<sup>3</sup> I am not certain, however, that the *trichoria* may not have formed one distinct part of the Gymnopaïdai. The name *Gymnopaïdai* means the 'unarmed dances':<sup>4</sup> and since they took place in the midsummer heat and probably in open sun,<sup>5</sup> Plato rightly counts them amongst the four chief means whereby the Spartans were accustomed to warlike endurance: δεινὰ κατερήσεις τῇ τοῦ πνίγους ῥώμῃ διαμαχομένων.<sup>6</sup>

Sosibios in the above-named passage (*Athen.* 678 B-C) says that the leader of each team (or of each file: τοῖς προστάταις τῶν χορῶν) wore the *Feather Crown* (called also the *Thyreatic Crown*) in memory of the victory at Thyrea, sc. the Battle of Champions in c. 544 B.C. (Hdt. 1. 82). Bölte will not allow this as a feature of the classical Gymnopaïdai, for the reason following. The Battle of Champions was fought at a place called Parparos in Thyreatis: the victory was celebrated at Parparos in an athletic meeting (which included dances): the meeting was called Parparonia, and existed in the fifth century B.C.<sup>7</sup> After Leuktra the Spartans lost Thyreatis<sup>8</sup>: in Pliny, *N.H.* 4. 17

<sup>1</sup> When the news of Leuktra arrived, the men's team of the last day was performing, and was allowed to finish its competitive performance. Xenophon twice uses the singular (τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χοροῦ ἕνδον ὄντος: τὸν μέντοι χορὸν διαγωνίσασθαι εἶπεν) and his words can scarcely be understood otherwise than as Bölte wishes. But they make his hypothesis of a third age-class difficult; see the next note.

<sup>2</sup> So Wilamowitz for MS. πρὸσω: the passage then needs no further correction, and there is no lacuna. Bölte posits a lacuna, since he believes there was a third age-class of unmarried men (εἰρῆνες) who performed in the evening. This is not only gratuitous but accords rather ill with Xenophon's narrative (see note 1 above): the men's performance on the last day was evidently the close of the festival.

<sup>3</sup> Pollux 4. 107: τριχορίαν δὲ Τύρραϊος ἐστῆσε, τρεῖς Λακωνίων χοροὺς καθ' ἡλικίαν ἐκάστην παῖδας ἀνδρας γέροντας: Plutarch, *Lycurg.* 21. 3, quotes the three iambic lines; cf. the other passages cited by Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica* ii, *Carmina popularia*, 17. It is nowhere explicitly connected with the Gymnopaïdai.

<sup>4</sup> From γυμνός and παῖζω. A high proportion of the early uses of παῖζω are in the sense of *dance*: *I.G.* i<sup>2</sup>. 919; *Odyssey* 8. 251; 23. 147;

Pindar, *Ol.* 13. 86 (cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones under παῖζω I. 2): less explicitly (in *Od.* 6. 100, 106; 7. 291) Nausikaa and her girls, and Artemis' nymphs to whom they are compared, do something very like *dance*. Cf. Anakreon 2 and 5 (συμπαῖζ.), 88; Alkman 36 (Diehl's numbers). In γυμνοπαῖδαι the basic sense of being light-hearted is pretty well forgotten, as Plato *Laws* 633 C shows.

<sup>5</sup> Leuktra was fought in July, at the time of the Gymnopaïdai. The performance was in a theatre (Hdt. 6. 67. 3, cf. Plutarch, *Agesil.* 29. 3), but it is unlikely that the stage was shaded, especially at midday. The boys whose performance was at dawn (πρὸς ἔω: cf. Aristoph. *Eccles.* 312) had the cool of the day.

<sup>6</sup> The opposite of the σκιητροφιή which Herodotus imputes to the Ionians, 6. 12. Cf. Plato, *Republic* 556 D.

<sup>7</sup> Bekker, *Anecd.* 1408: Πάρπαρος: τόπος ἐν ᾧ περὶ Θυρεῶν ἐμαχέσαντο Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Hesychios Πάρπαρος: ἐν ᾧ ἀγὼν ἤγετο καὶ χοροὶ ἴσαντο. *I.G.* v (1). 213 lines 44-9, 62-4, the fifth-century agonistic inscription of Damonon, names boys' foot races and a horse race at the Parparonia. The confrontation of these passages is due to Bölte, loc. cit., pp. 131-2: the same argument in *P.W.* iii A, s.v. 'Sparta', col. 1510.

<sup>8</sup> Probably at once, if we read (or understand)

Parparus comes among the mountains of Argolis. Bölte holds that the Thyreatic features belonged properly to the Parparonia and *were only transferred to the Gymnopaïdai after Thyreatis was lost*. It is this concluding inference (the italicized words) which I question: it seems to me gratuitous. No doubt the Parparonia celebrated the victory: the question is whether the Gymnopaïdai did not also.

The Gymnopaïdai are older than 544 B.C.: they were not *founded* to celebrate the victory of Thyrea. They were founded, according to our tradition, in 668 B.C.<sup>1</sup> I do not think it is coincidence that the year before, 669, is the traditional date of the battle of Hysiai (Pausanias 2. 24. 7), the Argive victory which gave Thyreatis to Argos for over a century, until Sparta recovered it by the Battle of Champions in 544. The Gymnopaïdai were instituted in the hour of defeat, to rebuild the Spartan morale, to train for a reversal of the defeat.<sup>2</sup> The defeat was reversed in 544; it seems to me natural that the team (or file) leaders should wear their Feather Crowns thenceforward.<sup>3</sup> Sosibios says that the dancers sang the poems of Thaletas and Alkman and the *paean*s of Dionysodotos the Lakonian: the two first poets belong to the seventh century, the unknown Dionysodotos will have written those 'paean' in honour of the Thyrea dead' which we must suppose added in 544.<sup>4</sup>

Was the date, or the occasion, of the first Gymnopaïdai authentically known? The occasion will surely have appeared in the poems (Thaletas was no doubt contemporary with the event): whether the date was authentic, opinions may well

Θυρεάτιδος for the unintelligible Τεγεάτιδος in Diod. 15. 64. 2: but anyway in the course of the 4th century. See Bölte in *P.W.* iii A, s.v. 'Sparta', col. 1304.

<sup>1</sup> Jerome's version of Eusebios (ed. Fotheringham), p. 165, under *Ol.* 28. 1: *Nudipedalia primum acta in Lacedaemone*. That he means the Gymnopaïdai is clear from the parallel passage from Syncellus (401. 20) quoted by Schöne, ad loc. (*Eusebi Chronicon Canonum quae supersunt*, p. 86) γυμνὴ παιδεία πρῶτον ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ ἤχθη: also from the Armenian version.

<sup>2</sup> In p. 79, n. 6, I have stressed the military side of this ἡλίσκος (opposed to σκητροφίη) as a toughener of physique and morale: so far the Gymnopaïdai may be compared with the measures taken by Lykourgos at Athens after Chaironeia. But they were also a religious festival, and for this we may compare the cult of Orestes instituted after the defeat in Arkadia (Hdt. 1. 66-8) and perhaps the institution of the public funeral at Athens after the calamity at Drabeskos (see Jacoby in *J.H.S.* lxiv (1944), p. 55): religious innovations used (instinctively rather than deliberately) to mark the profound social changes which calamities demand.

<sup>3</sup> Sosibios says *φιλίνους νῦν ὀνομάζεσθαι ὄντας ἐκ φοινίκων* 'the crowns are now called *φίλινοι* [rather than Thyreatic] and are made of palm leaves'. This does not show that *φίλινος* means 'made of palm leaves': it almost certainly means 'of feathers', cf. Pausanias 3. 19. 6 *φίλα καλοῦσιν οἱ Λωρεῖς τὰ πτερά*, and Hesychios *φίλος* and *φίλιον*. The word is no doubt a dialect form of *πίλον*. *Ψιλοποιοί*, makers of these crowns, in late Spartan inscriptions, *I.G.* v (1). 208 line 4, 209

line 24: in 212 line 63 the *σκιφατόμος* is perhaps the same. The wearer (the leader of a file in the dance) is called *φιλεύς* or *φίλας*: see Suidas *φιλεύς*, Hesychios *φιλεύς* and *φίλας* (rhotacism for *φίλας*). This use of the Feather Crown is not confined to the Gymnopaïdai and is certainly older than 544: Suidas s.v. *φιλεύς* quotes *φίλο-φίλος* from Alkman for a girl who likes to have this place in a dance, *ἡ φιλοῦσα ἐπ' ἀκροῦ χοροῦ ἵστασθαι*; and the extravagant Feather Crowns worn by Karneian dancers on a Tarentine vase (Trendall, *Frühitaliotische Vasen*, Tafel 26) perhaps reflect an early Spartan custom. I hope later to have the necessary help to write about the series of Spartan bronzes of the third quarter of the sixth century (sc. just after 544), naked young men wearing these crowns: Semni Paspaspiridi, *Guide du Musée National, Marbres Bronzes et Vases* (Athens, 1927), fig. 33, museum no. 13056; Langlotz, *Frühgriechische Bildhauerschulen*, Tafel 49 b and e. I owe my knowledge of these to my wife. They may be from the Parparonia: I should have thought more likely from the Gymnopaïdai.

<sup>4</sup> Bekker, *Anecd.* 32. 18 (*γυμνοπαῖδια*), *παῖνας ἦδον εἰς τιμὴν τῶν περὶ Θυρέας*: parallel passages in Suidas, Timaeus, *Etym. Mag.* under *γυμνοπαῖδια* are quoted by Bölte, p. 130 n. 6. Timaeus and Suidas write *ὑμνος* instead of *παῖνας*: *Etym. M.* gives *παῖνας* but writes *εἰς τοὺς περὶ Πυλαίαν πεσόντας*: this does not mean (as inferred, for example, in *C.A.H.* iii, p. 569) that they honoured the Thermopylai dead as well, it merely means that the *Etymologicum* has corrupted *Θυρέαν* to *Πυλαίαν*: see Bölte, pp. 130-1.

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differ. But a date, authentic or not, was probably determined fairly early, perhaps by Hellanikos in his *Karneonikai*: our traditional date for Hysiai will be consequent on that. And the Hysiai date, in its turn, so I suppose, helped Hippias in his *Olympionikai* to fix the date of Pheidon's intervention at Olympia. Ephoros had the work of these scholars before him. His extant narrative, quoted by Strabo 8. 3. 33 (*F.Gr.H.* 70 F 115), is concerned with Olympia, and consequently Hysiai is not narrated; but it seems clearly enough indicated. After Pheidon has forcibly conducted the festival at Olympia, the Eleans turn forcibly against him: Sparta joins, perhaps grudging Elis her immunity from war,<sup>1</sup> perhaps wanting allies against Pheidon *πρὸς τὸ καταλῦσαι τὸν Φεῖδωνα ἀφηρημένον αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῶν Πελοποννησίων* (*ἣν ἐκεῖ*) *νοὶ προεκέκτηντο*. Sparta (so Ephoros believed, no doubt wrongly) had had the hegemony of Peloponnese, Pheidon had 'taken it from her'. Ephoros will hardly have imagined this otherwise than by some signal defeat, and I do not think he knew of any signal Spartan defeat at Argive hands except Hysiai.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps he narrated Hysiai in its appropriate context more fully than in frag. 115, but he will not have given any absolute date. Our absolute dates are due to the heortologists: *Ol.* 28. 1 for the first Gymnopaïdiai, the same (so I believe)<sup>3</sup> for Pheidon's Olympiad, *Ol.* 27. 4 for Hysiai. A signal victory of Argos over Sparta had two consequences: for the victors, Pheidon's appearance at Olympia, for the losers, the institution of the Gymnopaïdiai at Sparta.

H. T. WADE-GERY.

<sup>1</sup> This cynical observation, with its reference to the doctrine of Elis 'sacred neutrality', suggests that Ephoros here draws on Hippias of Elis: see *C.Q.* xxxix, p. 23 n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> In Pausanias 3. 7. 5 the Hysiai war (*ὁ περὶ τῆς Θυρεάτιδος καλουμένης χώρας Λακεδαιμονίους ἀγὼν πρὸς Ἀργείους*) is put at the end of Theopompos' reign, after the conquest of Messenia: 'Theopompos took no part'. The misfortune was probably ascribed to King Polydoros, whose end was mysterious (3. 3. 2-3) and his son's reign uneventful (ib. 4) since Messenia did not revolt *καὶ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀργείων οὐδὲν σφισιν ἀπήντησε νεώτερον*. Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 231 E.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias' words are (6. 22. 2) *ὀλυμπιάδι μὲν τῇ ὀγδόῃ*: the article is unusual. The insertion after *ὀγδόῃ* of (*ἐπὶ ταῖς εἴκοσι*) will bring the phrase into line with 5. 21. 18 and 10. 36. 9. In *C.A.H.* iii, p. 761 I wrote that 'all such harmonistic emendations are open to very grave objection: it may be wiser to leave in Pausanias an error which Ephoros had made before him'. If after twenty years I am bolder it is because Mr. Andrewes has in that interval persuaded me that Ephoros did not make the error. See *Perachora*, i, p. 260 n. 3, and *The Corinthian Actaeon and Pheidon of Argos* on pp. 65-78 of this volume.



# NEW LIGHT ON GALEN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (FROM A RECENTLY DISCOVERED ARABIC SOURCE)

## I

THE first publication of a hitherto lost work on moral philosophy by Galen deserves the attention of scholars interested in the thought of one who was the last great physician of antiquity, who by a peculiar chain of circumstances became the teacher of the Middle Ages in scientific medicine, and who in his own day enjoyed also success as a philosopher. Posterity, it is true, did not regard his philosophical work with the favour it bestowed on his achievements in medicine, and hence a very small number of his philosophical writings has survived to the present day either in the original text or in Arabic translations.

It is one of Galen's fundamental convictions that medical research and therapy must be based on philosophy and that the best physician must also be a philosopher.<sup>1</sup> Hippocrates is, in Galen's view, the prototype of this perfection of medical art, being the first to hold that there could be no medicine without astronomy, which in its turn is based on geometry, and without scientific logical demonstration.<sup>2</sup> But the physician must not only be a 'companion of truth', be steeped, that is, in theoretical philosophy; he must show himself at the same time self-controlled and just and immune to the temptations of pleasure and money; he must embody all the different characteristics of the moral life which are by their very nature interdependent.<sup>3</sup> Galen, accordingly, wanted to educate future doctors on these lines, and many of the philosophical works composed may have been meant particularly for them.<sup>4</sup>

In his *De libris propriis*, which is a survey of his whole literary output down to A.D. 192, he enumerates no less than twenty-three items on moral philosophy,<sup>5</sup> of which we have preserved in their original text two treatises on self-control and self-education: the *De affectuum dignotione* and the *De peccatorum dignotione* (*Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐκάστου παθῶν καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων διαγνώσεως*).<sup>6</sup> The *De moribus* (*Περὶ ἠθῶν*), an Arabic summary of which was published by my friend the late Paul Kraus<sup>7</sup> in 1939,<sup>8</sup> was of a more scholarly character; it dealt in four books with one of the principal

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the treatise *Quod optimus medicus sit etiam philosophus*, vol. i, pp. 53-63 Kühn = *Scripta minora*, vol. ii (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 1-8 Müller.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., cap. 1, and, for example, in the newly discovered text *De moribus*, p. 43. 12 Kraus and the quotation of the full text of Galen in Ibn Abi Uṣaibi'a, *Valuable Information on the Classes of Physicians*, i, p. 43. 17 Müller (= p. 18. 15 ff. Kraus). Cf. *De plac. Hippocr. et Platonis*, i, p. 133 f., no. 5 Müller.

<sup>3</sup> *Scr. min.* ii, p. 6. 4 ff. M. (= vol. i, p. 59. 9 ff. Kühn).

<sup>4</sup> A fresh examination of his philosophy, in the light of our improved knowledge of hellenistic and neoplatonic thought, is long overdue.

<sup>5</sup> Cap. 12 (*Scripta minora*, ii, pp. 121. 5-122. 6 Müller = vol. xix, p. 45. 9-46. 10 Kühn).

<sup>6</sup> Recent edition by W. de Boer in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, v. 4. 1. 1 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1937). This edition of the very corrupt text is far superior to the editions of Kühn

(vol. v, pp. 1-103) and Marquardt (*Scripta minora*, i, pp. 1-81). The work was known also to the Arabs, cf. Ḥunain ibn Ishāq, *Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, xvii. 2; Leipzig, 1925), no. 118 Bergsträsser. For Arabic translations of other ethical treatises by Galen cf. Ḥunain, op. cit., nos. 120, 121; Ibn Abi Uṣaibi'a, op. cit. i, p. 87. 1 Müller; Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyā ar-Rāzi, *Opera Philosophica*, i (Cairo, 1939), p. 35 Kraus; G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Ishāq und seine Schule* (Leiden, 1913), pp. 24, 70; M. Meyerhof, 'Autobiographische Bruchstücke Galens aus arabischen Quellen', *Archiv f. Geschichte d. Medizin*, xxii (1929), p. 85 f.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, lxxv (1945), p. 68 f.

<sup>8</sup> *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt*, vol. v. 1 (1937), Sectio Arabica (published Cairo, 1939).

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topics of moral philosophy, with character, ἦθος.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately Kraus published only the Arabic text (27 pp.) with a twenty-four-page preface also written in Arabic, and for this reason his edition has remained entirely unnoticed by Western classical scholars and historians of medicine. I intend to publish a complete translation of the text and to explain its philosophical importance in detail, but in this paper my purpose is no more than to show why it deserves our interest, filling as it does a gap in our knowledge of Greek ethics and elucidating Galen's position in the history of ancient civilization.

The main source of the Arabic text is a unique but on the whole good Egyptian manuscript, probably of the fourteenth or fifteenth century A.D.<sup>2</sup> The summary<sup>3</sup> is based on the translation made by Hunain ibn Ishāq for a famous Muslim mathematician, probably before A.D. 842.<sup>4</sup> Only a few references to the *De moribus* can be traced in Galen's extant works. One occurs in the *De affectuum dignotione*,<sup>5</sup> and the Arabic summary enables us to connect with it at least two more pages of the same work.<sup>6</sup> There is also good reason to assume that the 'other works' referred to in chap. 2 of Galen's strongly platonizing treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body* are the four books *De moribus*.<sup>7</sup> Further it emerges from the first chapter of the summary that the *De moribus* depends on the earlier work *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, a concordance of the views of Galen's main authorities among thinkers of the classical period.<sup>8</sup> Since this book was not completed before A.D. 176,<sup>9</sup> the *De moribus* evidently belongs to the later period of Galen's life. But an explicitly dated reference to the death of the Praetorian prefect Tigridius Perennis in A.D. 185 in *De moribus* i provides us with better evidence, making it plain that he wrote the *De moribus* at Rome, after completing his fifty-sixth year, between A.D. 185 and 192.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ ἡθῶν τέτταρα: *De libr. propr.*, p. 121.

<sup>10</sup> M. = vol. xix, p. 45. 12 K.

<sup>2</sup> Codex Taimūr Pāshā 290. 6 Akhlāq, fols. 191-235. In addition we have a few references to and even some verbal quotations of the full text in later Arabic writers, particularly in Abū 'Alī Miskawāh's (died A.D. 1030) *Kitāb tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, an interesting work on moral philosophy which deserves a special analysis (cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, ii, col. 429).

<sup>3</sup> It was not unusual to compose summaries of Syriac and Arabic translations of Greek works, cf. Hunain, op. cit., nos. 10, 57, 72, 92, 95, 102, 104; H. Ritter-R. Walzer, *Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken* (Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1934), p. 832 (46).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hunain, op. cit., no. 119; *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Mūsā, banu'. The work, of which there is no trace in later Greek literature, appears to have been rather popular in the Eastern world.

<sup>5</sup> Cap. 6. 1-9 (vol. v, pp. 27. 6, 30. 3 Kühn = p. 19. 8 ff. de Boer).

<sup>6</sup> Cap. 7. 7-17 (vol. v, pp. 37. 4-40, ii. Kühn = p. 25. 15 ff. de Boer), *De moribus*, i, pp. 28. 15-31. 9 Kraus. Cf. below, p. 91.

<sup>7</sup> Vol. iv, p. 768. 6-14 Kühn = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 32. 14-33. 4 Müller. For cap. 11 (vol. iv, pp. 814. 8-822 Kühn = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 73.

3-79) cf. below, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> p. 26. 6 Kraus: 'I have shown in my book *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* and explained there that there is something in man in which thinking takes place, and something else which is the source of anger, and a third which is the source of appetite.' This work is also one of our principal sources of the moral philosophy of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, cf. L. Edelstein, 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius', *American Journal of Philology*, xlvii (1936), pp. 286 ff., 305 ff.; K. Reinhardt, *Posidonios* (München, 1921), pp. 263 ff.; K. Pohlenz, *Posidonios' Affektenlehre und Psychologie* (Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1921), pp. 163 ff.; K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (München, 1926), pp. 388 ff.

<sup>9</sup> S. Vogt, *De Galeni in libellis κατ' ἐντροπὸν commentariis* (Dissertation Marburg, 1910), p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> p. 23. 7 Kraus. Ibn Abī Usaib'a, op. cit. i, p. 76. 19-23 M.; A. Müller, 'Zur Geschichte des Commodus', *Hermes*, xviii (1883), pp. 623 ff., also Th. Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, iv, p. 514 f.; Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, s.v. *Tigridius Perennis*. We can thus fix also the hitherto uncertain relative date of the treatise *De affectuum et peccatorum dignotione* in which the publication of the *De moribus* is presupposed (cf. J. Ilberg, 'Über die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios (!)

## II

According to Hunain's brief account<sup>1</sup> Galen dealt in the *De moribus* with the different *ἡθῆ*, their causes (*αἰτίαι*), signs (*σημεῖα*), and treatments (*θεραπεῖαι*).<sup>2</sup> The summary agrees with this description. The subject is *Περὶ ἡθῶν*, and Galen keeps to it fairly closely. But he also mentions the 'resemblance to God' as the final goal of human life and rejects the unjustified claims of hedonism,<sup>3</sup> stressing the importance of connecting contemplative and active life and dwelling with approval upon the Platonic conception of the philosopher-king;<sup>4</sup> he explains the different excellences (*ἀρεταί*) which result from an adequate education of the inborn *ἡθῆ* and neatly distinguishes the noble from the good, the bad from the base, etc. The general background of his eclectic thought is Platonic, while he does not confine himself to rigid argument but intersperses exhortations to the reader in a manner not uncommon in Hellenistic philosophy.<sup>5</sup>

The first book contained Galen's general theory of *ἡθος* and those *ἡθῆ* which originate in the spiritual soul, the second concerned the *ἡθῆ* deriving from the appetitive soul, and the third the form of training which all three souls require. The fourth book was mainly devoted to *ἡθῆ* which are domiciled in the rational soul.<sup>6</sup> I propose to deal in this paper with the introductory part of Book I, which contains the greatest amount of new material.

Galen starts with a definition of *ἡθος* as an inborn irrational disposition of the soul. He emphasizes that differences of *ἡθος* are due neither to differences of environment nor to differences of education alone but to the inherent nature of men. It is therefore incorrect both to minimize the importance of the inborn qualities as Chrysippus did and to assume that all are equally susceptible of moral and intellectual education, and to hope that an originally bad *ἡθος* can be entirely uprooted even by continuous moral training. Galen's reasoning is based on Plato's trichotomy of the soul,<sup>7</sup> which he restores to its former status. The three 'souls', as he calls the Platonic 'parts' of the soul, differ by nature in strength and quality in different human beings. The observation of animals and of small children in the first three years of life is used as an argument for this conception of *ἡθος*, and a variety of 'lives' (*βίαι*) shows itself as the result, the highest being plainly the life of the philosopher guided by his rational soul.

Galenus', *Rhein. Mus.* lii [1897], p. 611) and strengthen the case for a late date (after A.D. 193) of the treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body* (cf. *ibid.* xlvii [1892], p. 510; li [1896], p. 189). <sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, no. 119.

<sup>2</sup> Seneca, *Epist.* 95. 65: '(Posidonius) . . . ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusdam virtutis; hanc Posidonius ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon appellant signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus inter se similia discriminantur.'

<sup>3</sup> Cf. for example ii, p. 41. 1 Kraus: '... man is free and master of his will. And what could be worthier for him . . . than to put his soul in the highest rank of honour. And there is no greater honour (of this kind) than the imitation of God within the limits of human capacity. And this goal is reached by disregarding present pleasures and giving preference to the noble.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. for example ii, p. 35. 17 Kraus: 'Everybody praises and admires . . . those who dedicate their life-time exclusively to the activities of the rational soul like Socrates, Plato, and others, or,

for *φιλανθρωπία*'s sake (cf. N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Empire* [London, 1925], p. 70) to the work of politics and legislation, as Solon and others did for the benefit of mankind, or to philosophy and government alike: these are the best people.' No representatives of the third group are recorded in the summary, and one may well doubt whether Galen mentioned any particular philosopher-king in the full text of his work. I can find no exact parallel to this statement, and I am almost sure that it does not represent an original view of Galen's but goes back to some earlier source.

<sup>5</sup> The most impressive example is to be found p. 39. 20 ff. Kraus, where the rather pedestrian style of philosophical argumentation rises to the level of literary prose. I shall deal with this section in a special study.

<sup>6</sup> Ten pages in Kraus's edition of the summary refer to bk. 1, 7 to bk. 2, 3 to bk. 3, 7 to bk. 4.

<sup>7</sup> As explained in *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*.

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Students of Greek thought will agree that Galen's approach is rather unusual and will note particularly that he is interested in a problem not dealt with satisfactorily by Aristotle; they will realize at the same time that it is very unlikely that he was the first to establish this doctrine of *ἥθος*. It certainly deserves closer examination and the selection of a few passages for quotation and detailed discussion.

As far as I know, no other Greek work entitled *Περὶ ἡθῶν* has survived at all. Philodemus, it is true, published an epitome of the Epicurean Zeno's work *Περὶ ἡθῶν καὶ βίων* and two sections of it, *On freedom of speech* (*παρρησία*) and *On anger* (*ὀργή*), have been recovered from Herculanean papyri,<sup>1</sup> but this work seems to have nothing essential in common with Galen's treatment of the subject.<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, Galen's interest in the irrational background of moral conduct is to be connected with the refined analysis of emotions and of the first inborn traces of human excellence which we note in the early Peripatos and particularly in Stoic philosophy after Chrysippus. His ultimate source must, however, be later than Chrysippus. His work may profitably be compared, for example, with the fifth book of Cicero, *De finibus*,<sup>3</sup> and with Plutarch's small treatise *On moral virtue*,<sup>4</sup> although the subject is a different one in these two cases.

The first sentence of the epitome runs as follows: 'Character, *ἥθος*, is that condition of the soul which induces man to perform actions arising out of his soul without reflection and accurate knowledge. Evidence of this is that some people get alarmed and astonished when a terrifying sound suddenly strikes them, and that they smile involuntarily when they see or hear something ridiculous; sometimes they even want to refrain from it but cannot. It is for this reason that philosophers inquire whether *ἥθος* belongs to the irrational soul alone or whether any part of it is linked with the rational. We shall see quite clearly that all the indications are that our *ἥθη* are to be assigned to the irrational soul; for what we find here are those movements of the soul which cause us to desire and avoid things, to feel pleasure and pain, etc., and it is precisely this with which our *ἥθη* are concerned.'<sup>5</sup>

Galen's definition of *ἥθος* as an inborn and irrational condition of the soul comes very near to the definition which Arius Didymus, the court-philosopher of Augustus,

<sup>1</sup> Philodemus, *Περὶ ἡθῶν καὶ βίων*. Φιλοδήμου τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομὴν ἐξεργασμένων περὶ ἡθῶν καὶ βίων ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν, ὁ ὅστις περὶ παρρησίας, ed. A. Olivieri, Leipzig, 1914; Philodemi *De ira liber*, ed. C. Wilke, Leipzig, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., however, Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2. 2. Galen's work has nothing in common with Theophrastus' *Χαρακτῆρες*.

<sup>3</sup> We learn, for example, from this book that Antiochus was also interested in the irrational faculties of the soul and liked arguments based on *ἐνάργεια*, manifest facts and empirical observation. But Antiochus claimed to revive early Peripatetic thought, whereas Galen relies on Plato's views on *ἥθος* or what he believes to have been Plato's views. Cf. also R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 188 ff., 201, 219, 224 n. 2; H. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts* (Philologus, Suppl.-Bd. 30, Leipzig, 1937).

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, however, presupposes the renewed study of Aristotle's lecture courses inaugurated, during Cicero's lifetime, by the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes. The author on whom Galen depends does not care much more for

Aristotle than did Cicero, for example, and may have lived before the time of Andronicus and the school of commentators which followed him.

<sup>5</sup> Miskawaih (cf. above, p. 83, n. 2) appears to refer to the same passage and to have preserved another section of the same argument. He says (p. 25. 17 ff. Cairo edition): '*Ἡθος* is a condition (*διάθεσις*) of the soul which induces it to its actions without consideration and reflection. This disposition is divided in two parts. One of them is inborn (*φύσει*), based on the temperament (of the body) (cf. Galen's work referred to above, p. 83, n. 7), like the man whom the smallest thing incites to anger and who is roused by the most unimportant cause, and like the man who is faint-hearted on account of a trifling thing as he who is frightened at the slightest sound which affects his ear or is terrified by news which he hears, and like the man who laughs excessively over the most unimportant thing which excites his admiration, and like the man who is grieved and sad about the most trifling thing which affects him.'



reports as that adopted by the Academy of his time: 'Ἡθος is a quality of the irrational part of the soul which is in its turn accustomed to subordinate itself to reason.'<sup>1</sup> Plutarch refers to the same Academic definition in his Aristotelizing treatise *On moral virtue*.<sup>2</sup> Hence we are entitled to connect Galen's work with 'Middle Platonism' and to place it in a philosophical tradition of the Academy which seems to have started with Philo of Larisa and more especially with Cicero's teacher Antiochus of Ascalon.

That this definition of ἦθος is supported by the reference to involuntary reactions of different people<sup>3</sup> in different circumstances helps us further to ascertain to which particular philosopher Galen is ultimately indebted for his surprising approach to the problem. The discussion of obvious facts of this kind is traditional, and only their interpretation varies. Chrysippus, the leading representative of Stoic thought in the second half of the third century B.C., dealt with them at length,<sup>4</sup> and he was censured, in the first century B.C., by Panaetius' pupil and successor Posidonius of Rhodes<sup>5</sup> for having held that their causes could not be rationally explained.<sup>6</sup> Posidonius, having attained a new comprehension of the irrational elements in the soul, had explained their causes in his famous work *On emotions*, *Περὶ παθῶν*. That an argument used in his theory of emotions could also be helpful in a theory of ἦθος is shown by the passage of Galen which we have just examined. We know of this controversy between Chrysippus and Posidonius mainly from Galen's earlier work *De placitis*.<sup>7</sup> It is, at this stage of our argument, at least plausible to assume that the same controversy is the background of the *De moribus*, and that this work derives its *differentia specifica* in the history of 'Middle-Platonic' moral philosophy from the influence of Posidonius.<sup>8</sup>

The same section of Posidonius' *Περὶ παθῶν*, quoted by Galen in the *De placitis*, provides us at once with a second parallel between Posidonius and the *De moribus*. Galen says there at the end: 'Not only Aristotle or Plato held this opinion but earlier philosophers as well, particularly Pythagoras, which is what Posidonius maintains when he says that the theory was first stated by the latter, while Plato worked it out thoroughly.'<sup>9</sup> Galen's words at the end of the first chapter of the *De moribus*, although considerably shortened by the Arabic epitomist, reveal just the same attitude to different periods in the history of Greek ethics. I quote:<sup>10</sup> 'It is for this very reason that the ancient philosophers'—i.e. Pythagoras(?) and Plato—'said that ἦθος belonged to the irrational soul. Aristotle and others hold that the ἦθος are partly linked up with the rational soul but that for the greater part they belong to the irrational. More recent philosophers (νέωτεροι), however, have said that all the ἦθος belong to the rational soul; and they have even gone so far as to connect with it such affections as anger, desire, fear, love, pleasure, and pain. But the evidence shows their view to be

<sup>1</sup> Stobaeus, vol. ii, p. 38. 3-15 Wachsmuth.

<sup>2</sup> *De virt. mor.* 4, p. 443 C; 444 b.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above and p. 85, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* coll. H. v. Arnim, vol. iii, no. 466.

<sup>5</sup> For Posidonius' lifetime cf. F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ii. C (Berlin, 1926), p. 154 f.

<sup>6</sup> Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, iv (p. 400. 14 Müller = vol. v, p. 424. 17 Kühn): ὅθεν κἀπειδὴν λέγει (ὁ Χρύσιππος) 'οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίοντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίουσιν, ὅταν ὁμοίως τὰ ὑποκείμενα φαντασίας ποιῇ' τὴν αἰτίαν ἐρωτᾷ κἀνταῦθα ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δι' ἣν πολλοὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι πολλάκις κλαίουσιν ἐπισχεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι τὰ δάκρυα, καὶ ἄλλοι κλαίειν ἐτι βουλόμενοι φθάνουσι παύεσθαι· γίγνεσθαι δὲ φησι διὰ τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις ἢ σφόδρα ἐγκειμένας ὥς μὴ

κρατεῖσθαι πρὸς τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ παντελῶς πεπαιγμένας ὥς μήκερ' ἐπεγείρεσθαι δύνασθαι πρὸς αὐτῶν οὕτω γὰρ ἡ τε τοῦ λόγου μάχη καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸ πάθος εὐρεθήσεται, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ δυνάμεις ἐναργῶς σωθήσονται, οὐ μὰ Δία, ὥς Χρύσιππος φησι, διὰ τινος αἰτίας ἀσυλλογιστοὺς τούτων γινόμενων ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰρημένας. Cf. also Strabo 2. 3. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Edelstein, op. cit., pp. 305 ff. and above, p. 83, n. 8.

<sup>8</sup> This controversy was by no means a mere controversy of two hundred years ago taken up by Galen for some scholarly reasons; the antagonism between the new Platonism and orthodox Stoic thought was still quite alive, and the old dispute helped the present issue.

<sup>9</sup> Galen, *De plac.* iv, p. 401. 11-15 M. = p. 425. 13-17 K. <sup>10</sup> p. 26. 1-5 Kraus.

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<sup>1</sup> 7, p. 44

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Galen, p. 421. 7-9

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untenable.' It is *παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ αἰσθησιν*, as Plutarch says in the *De virtute morali*.<sup>1</sup> But Plutarch follows Aristotle while rejecting Chrysippus, whereas Galen and Posidonius keep close to Plato.

It is well known that Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' interpretation of *πάθη* with an emphatic restatement of Plato's tripartition of the soul.<sup>2</sup> Galen based his work *De moribus* on the same tripartition, and tried to arrange his material on this principle.<sup>3</sup> He refers to Plato as his patron,<sup>4</sup> but it is, at first sight, surprising that he connects his account of *ἦθος* too with him. There is no explicit theory of *ἦθος* to be found in Plato's dialogues; and Hellenistic philosophers knew no more than we do about Plato's private lecture courses. But their attitude was not unlike that of the commentators on Aristotle under the Empire, and they were convinced that Plato had built up a closed and complete philosophical system and had been aware of every problem touched on by later philosophers. They expected him to have answered questions which had not existed for him, and succeeded in discovering passages in the dialogues to provide the necessary answer. They did this, for example, for Plato's famous formulation of the *τέλος*, which became, at least from the time of Eudorus of Alexandria, the accepted doctrine of the Academy, and was adopted also in the *De moribus*.<sup>5</sup> They studied Plato carefully to construct his theory of the categories, and found him to have recognized two only, substance and relation.<sup>6</sup> The same method could clearly be used in the case of *ἦθος*; it is quite possible to deduce a theory of *ἦθος* from numerous passages of the dialogues, and it is plain that this was done from the first century B.C., and taken over by later Platonizing moralists like Galen. We actually find passages where Plato not only presupposes *ἦθος* as an inborn and unalterable disposition of the soul but explains it as well by referring to the analogy of animals and small children—as Galen does in a more methodical and deliberate way.<sup>7</sup> I refer in particular to a passage from the 12th book of the *Laws*, where he explains that the *ἦθος* of animals and very small children display courage; 'in fact a soul may become courageous by mere native aptitude independently of reason' (*ἀνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχῇ*).<sup>8</sup> On the whole the ancients appear to have appreciated the importance of the irrational elements in Plato's thought much better than many of his modern interpreters.<sup>9</sup>

It is interesting to remember that the early Peripatos already judged Plato's achievement from the standpoint adopted more consistently by Platonists from the first century B.C. onwards. The author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*, a contemporary of Theophrastus and a minor representative of the first generation of Aristotelians,<sup>10</sup> gives a short critical history of ethics in the first chapter of his course,<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 7, p. 447 a; 10, p. 449 d.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Galen, *De plac.* iv, p. 397, 1-3 M. = p. 421. 7-9 K.; op. cit. v, p. 405. 5-14 M. = p. 429. 10-430. 2 K.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 83, n. 8 and p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> In a passage preserved by Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī, cf. p. 22. 2 ff., 8 ff. Kraus. Cf. also Al-Fārābī, *Concordance of Plato and Aristotle* (cf. recently, P. Kraus, 'Plotin chez les Arabes', *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, xxiii, 1942, p. 269 f.) in 'Philosophische Abhandlungen', pp. 16, 20 (transl. p. 27) Dieterici. Al-Fārābī simply substitutes Plato for Galen.

<sup>5</sup> Eudorus of Alexandria (1st cent. B.C.) ap. Stob. *Anthol.*, vol. ii, pp. 49. 8-50. 10 Wachsmuth.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. H. Dörrie, 'Der Platoniker Eudorus von Alexandria', *Hermes*, lxxix (1944), pp. 31 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 2. 375 c 6 ff., and, for example,

*Rep.* 6. 490 c, 496 b and passages concerning the *φύσις φιλόσοφος* such as 486 b 3, 486 d 10, 487 a 3; *Politicus* 308 e, 310 a. Cf. *Phaedo* 82 b. *De moribus*, p. 28. 4 Kraus: 'not every dog and horse can be trained'.

<sup>8</sup> *Leges* 12. 963 e; cf. *Laches* 196 e ff.; *Rep.* 4. 430 b; *Epin.* 975 e, and R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin, 1929), p. 207 f. But all these passages deal only with *φυσική ἀνδρεία*.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E. R. Dodds, 'Plato and the Irrational', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, lxxv (1945-7), pp. 16 ff., particularly pp. 18 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. O. Regenbogen in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Supplementband, VII, s.v., Theophrastos, col. 1488.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. R. Walzer, op. cit., p. 77.

He says (I. 1, 1182<sup>a</sup>15): 'After Pythagoras came Socrates . . . but even he was not successful. For in making the virtues sciences (*ἐπιστήμαι*), he does away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also with both *πάθος* and *ἥθος*; so that in this respect he is unsuccessful in his treatment of the virtues. Next Plato divided the soul into a rational and an irrational part—and in this he was right—assigning appropriate virtues to each.' A statement like this may help us to understand better why Galen and his predecessors choose to attack the intellectualism of Chrysippus in the name of Plato.

## III

Observation of animals and small children, who either lack reason by definition or whose reason is still undeveloped, provides Galen with additional evidence for assigning *ἥθος* to the irrational soul. It helps also towards a full and satisfactory understanding of the working of the three souls which shapes the *ἥθος* of the grown-up man. Galen lays it down as his principle of inquiry always to examine first those *ἥθη* which can be seen in the behaviour of animals and small children, to facilitate the distinction of pure animal movements from those mixed with some element of opinion and thought. For animals are naturally unable to give priority to the rational soul, and small children are as yet unsusceptible of moral and intellectual training, of the quadrivium, and of logic.<sup>1</sup> But whereas the character of the different species of animals is uniform and constant, human beings as such have various *ἥθη* by nature, as we learn already from the observation of children in their earliest years.

I shall illustrate Galen's method by two passages from the introductory section of the first book *De moribus*; both appear to be without parallel in extant Greek texts and are therefore of special interest. The first deals with the *ἥθη* of animals, the second with the gradual development and growth of the child's soul during the first three years of life when it is still exclusively in the care of illiterate nurses.

(a) Having based his first argument for the irrational character of *ἥθος* on the observation of involuntary smiling, crying, etc., Galen continues in the same context (p. 25. 10 ff. Kraus): 'H $\eta$ θη as they are observed in small children (*βρέφη*) and irrational animals show the same thing.<sup>2</sup> We see that some animals are cowardly like the hare and the stag, others brave like the lion and the dog, others cunning like the fox and the monkey; that some associate with man like the dog (*συνανθρωπεῖ ὡς οἱ κύνες*)<sup>3</sup> and others keep away from man (*ἐκποδῶν νέμεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων*)<sup>4</sup> like the wolves; some love solitude (are *μονότροπα*)<sup>5</sup> like the lion and others tend to congregate (are *συναγελαστικά*)<sup>6</sup> like the horse, while others live in pairs like the stork; some gather their food and keep it for use like the bees and ants,<sup>7</sup> while others secure their food from day to day like the pigeon; some like the magpie steal useless objects—for it steals jewels, signet-rings, drachmae, and denarii, and hides them. It is for this reason that the ancient philosophers said that the *ἥθη* belong to the irrational soul.' There is quite a variety of animal *ἥθη* mentioned, the common factor in all the attitudes surveyed being that they come into existence without deliberation, thought, or instruction and express a permanent *ἥθος*. Hence it is that the observation of animals yields an argument for Galen's definition of human *ἥθος*.

There is no similar list of animal *ἥθη* to be found in extant Greek texts, so far as I have been able to ascertain, and, certainly, animal *ἥθη* were nowhere else used for a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. iv, p. 45. 1 ff. Kraus.

<sup>2</sup> The epitomist appears to have omitted the sections on children and starts at once with the *ἥθη* of animals.

<sup>3</sup> Porphyry, *De abstinence*, 3. 9 (p. 199. 8 Nauck).

<sup>4</sup> Porphyry, op. cit. (p. 199. 4 Nauck).

<sup>5</sup> Galen, *De usu part.* i. 2 (vol. iii, p. 2. 5 ff. Kühn = vol. i, p. 1. 13 ff. Helmreich). It is interesting to compare this text with the first chapter of the *Περὶ ἡθῶν*.

<sup>6</sup> Porphyry, op. cit. (p. 200. 23 Nauck).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Galen, *Quod an. virt.* 7 (vol. iv, p. 792. 17-793. 2 K. = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 52. 19-53. 2 M.).

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similar argument. There is, however, sufficient evidence for all the single traits mentioned, scattered in cognate texts of the Hellenistic period.<sup>1</sup> The observation of animals goes back a long way in Greek literature,<sup>2</sup> but what matters for the understanding of the passage just quoted is the extensive use made of it in moral philosophy. Aristotle's *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, for example, do not use many examples taken from the animal kingdom.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle does not co-ordinate his zoological research and his ethics.<sup>4</sup> The Early Peripatos seems to have gone farther in this direction and to have paid special attention to the character of animals and small children. We infer this from the later books of the *Historia Animalium*, which are now generally assumed to have been composed by Aristotle's pupils,<sup>5</sup> from Theophrastus' *Ethics*, and from the titles of his two—lost—monographs *Περὶ ζώων φρονήσεως καὶ ἥθους* and *Περὶ τῶν ζώων ὅσα λέγεται φρονεῖν*. The beginning of *Hist. Anim.* 8. 1 and the whole of Book 9 are instructive, particularly when the former is compared with the Peripatetic ethics of Arius Didymus in Stobaeus 2, p. 116. 21 ff. Wachsmuth and Cicero, *De fin.* 5. 41 ff., 55.<sup>6</sup> This interest in the characteristics of animals increases in the non-zoological philosophical literature of the Hellenistic age and, accordingly, references to animals are relatively common in later philosophical texts such as Plutarch's *Moralia* or the philosophical writings of Seneca.<sup>7</sup> One expects to find the closest parallels to Galen's argument in the treatises *On the intelligence of animals*, some of which are preserved. But comparison with Philo of Alexandria,<sup>8</sup> Plutarch,<sup>9</sup> and Porphyry<sup>10</sup> serves only to bring out the individuality of Galen. He neither looks for rudiments of intelligence and virtue in animals—as those authors do—nor uses, like Chrysippus, the rich material at his disposal in order to show that animals are simply irrational while man as a rational being should extirpate from his soul all that he has in common with animals. Galen's conception of the human soul is more adequate, and while demanding the mere control (not the elimination) of its irrational elements he can quote the observation of animals for support, and thus strengthen his case considerably. The same attitude towards animals can be seen in Posidonius,<sup>11</sup> and it is very tempting to connect Galen's view with his teaching. We know that Galen appreciated and, within limits, accepted the *Περὶ παθῶν* of Posidonius, and it becomes now increasingly reasonable to use the new text *De moribus* for a cautious reconstruction of Posidonius' views on ἦθος. The task is rendered difficult by the

<sup>1</sup> Much relevant material has been collected by C. Tappe, *De Philonis libro qui inscribitur 'Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχειν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα quaestiones selectae*, Dissertation Göttingen, 1912.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. Snell, 'Die Entdeckung des Geistes', *Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen* (Hamburg, 1946), pp. 173, 180.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 87, n. 8.

<sup>4</sup> One may mention the descriptions of the character of certain animals, referred to also by Galen, which occur in his zoological writings: lion (H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* [Berlin, 1870], p. 429<sup>b</sup>28), hare (op. cit., p. 421<sup>a</sup>25), stag (op. cit., p. 235<sup>a</sup>15), dog (op. cit., p. 418<sup>b</sup>28). Galen, however, draws on much more comprehensive research. Cf. R. Walzer, op. cit., p. 200.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1934), p. 352; O. Regenbogen, op. cit., col. 1423.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Cicero *De fin.* v. 39 ff.; cf. H. Dirlmeier *Zur Ethik des Theophrast*, *Philologus*, xc (1935), p. 248 ff. On Galen's references to plants cf.

below, p. 93 and n. 5. The comic poet Philemon is under the influence of a similar doctrine, cf. Stob. *Anthol.*, vol. iii. 2. 26 (p. 183. 13 Hense) = fab. inc. fr. 3 *Com.* iv, p. 32 M.; R. Walzer, 'Zum Hautontimorumenos des Terenz', *Hermes*, lxx (1935), pp. 197 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf., for example, Plutarch, *De invidia et otio* 4; *De tranquillitate animae* 13.

<sup>8</sup> *Alexandros ἢ Περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχειν τὰ ζῷα* (Philo ed. Richter [1828–30], vol. viii: translation from the Armenian). Cf. H. Leisegang, *Philologus*, xcii (1937), pp. 152 ff.; A. D. Nock, *Classical Review*, lvii (1943), p. 78.

<sup>9</sup> *De sollertia animalium*, Πότερα τῶν ζώων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἐνδρα.

<sup>10</sup> *De abstinentia*, Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων.

<sup>11</sup> Galen, *De plac.* v. 6 (p. 457. 2–9 M. = p. 476. 11–477. 2 K.). Cf. also op. cit. v (p. 438. 1 M. = p. 459. 1 7 K.); iv, p. 400. 5 (= p. 424. 7 K.); vi, p. 490. 1 ff. M. (= p. 505. 1 ff. K.), etc., pp. 133 ff. M.



omission from the Arabic Epitome of all but the commonest Greek names, whereas the *De placitis* gives explicit quotations of Posidonius.

(b) The section in which Galen deals with the moral and mental development of small children starts as follows:<sup>1</sup> 'The dispositions (*ἔξεις*, *διαθέσεις*) of man's soul which are praiseworthy are called excellences (*ἀρεταί*) and those which are blameworthy are called vices (*κακίαι*). These dispositions are of two kinds: the one originating in the soul from deliberation, thought, and discrimination, and called knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) or opinion (*δόξα*) or view (?), the other arising in the soul without deliberation, and called moral disposition (*ἥθος*).'

Moral excellence and evil are the result of inborn moral disposition and deliberation, thought, and discrimination. Galen's interest in this chapter is evidently not fixed on the rational but rather on the irrational part of *ἀρετή*; a summary of his psychology of the mind, which is deeply under Stoic influence, is to be found at the beginning of the fourth book of the *De moribus*.<sup>2</sup>

'Some *ἥθη* manifest themselves in babies as soon as they are born, before the period of deliberation; almost at once they feel pain in the body and discomfort (*λύπη*) in the soul. These make them cry, because every baby has the faculty of imagining (*φαντασία*) what accords with it and what is contrary to its fancy, and of loving the agreeable and hating the contrary. This exists also by nature in irrational animals, I mean that they perceive by their senses (*αἰσθάνεται*) what occurs to their body and that they fancy that part of it is in accordance with them and part of it contrary to them; and that they desire what is agreeable to them and avoid what is contrary.'<sup>3</sup>

'Small children of two years often attempt to strike with their hands and feet anyone they believe to be harming them. This indicates that they now have, together with the imagination of what is favourable to them and of what is contrary, the imagination of its efficient causes (*αἰτίαι ποιητικαί*). With that they have moreover desire for vengeance upon what has harmed them and love for anyone who has removed the source of harm. For then they smile and laugh at their nurses and wish to strike and to bite the person who has harmed them. And this occurrence (*συνμυβητικός*) is called anger (*ὀργή*). There occurs with it a burning redness in the eyes, and in the whole face redness, heat, and rush of blood. It is thus evident that the desire for revenge upon one's assailant is not acquired by teaching but is inborn, like the desire of avoiding what gives pain and the desire for what is pleasant. For small children do not deliberate and form an opinion that revenge upon one who harms them is right, but this is in them by nature, like the tendency towards what is pleasant and the avoidance of what is harmful.'

'When small children come to their third year, traces (*ἵχνη*)<sup>4</sup> of shame (*αἰδώς*)<sup>5</sup> and shamelessness appear in them, and you may see one blushing and not raising his eyes towards the face of one who blames him for some action forbidden him, and rejoicing at praise, while another acts in the opposite way; and this is evident in those who have not yet been educated by blows and fear. And a child who is fond of honour (*φιλότιμος*) takes pains over any work from which he hopes for praise. And if he is fond of honour by nature and not from fear of any visible thing (*αἰσθητόν*) nor for the sake of obtaining some visible reward, he will prosper; in the opposite case he will not prosper, and will not be taught nor imbibe moral training.'

<sup>1</sup> p. 28. 15 Kraus. <sup>2</sup> p. 45. 3 ff. Kraus.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also Posidonius ap. Galen, *De plac.* v. (pp. 438. 12-439. 3 M. = p. 460. 10-17 K.); Cicero, *De off.* 1. 105. Cf. below, p. 95, n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Arist. *Hist. Anim.* 8. 1. 588<sup>a</sup>18: *ἐνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἵχνη τῶν περὶ ψυχῇ τῶν τρόπων ἀπερ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*

*φανερωτέρας ἔχει τὰς διαφορὰς*. <sup>31</sup> 9. 1. 608<sup>b</sup>4. Cicero, *De fin.* 5. 43; R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik*, p. 200 f. Cf. above, p. 89, n. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Galen wrote a special treatise on shame, in two books, *De libr. propriis* 12 (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 121. 21 M. = vol. xix, p. 46. 4 K.).

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'One of the further indications of the fact that some small children tend without reflection and deliberate decision to virtue and others to vice is that when one of them is harmed by his playmate, some take pity on him (are ἐλεήμονες)<sup>1</sup> and help him, while others laugh at him and rejoice at his misfortune (are ἐπιχαιρεκάκοι)<sup>2</sup> and perhaps take their share in harming him. And it can be observed that some children will rescue a companion from hardships (being φιλόφρονες), while others, on the contrary, push him into dangerous spots and cause him harm and pain. Some are niggardly with their possessions (ἀνελεύθεροι), and some again are envious (φθονεοί) and some not.'<sup>3</sup>

Traces of different and even opposed ἥθη appear at this age, and together with their appearance the limitations of all future education. We can supplement the defective summary from a section of the *De affectuum dignotione*, which, however, does not refer to the gradual development of children's character. That the passage actually depends on the *De moribus* is beyond doubt<sup>4</sup> (cap. 7. 9-14: p. 25. 24-7. 5 de Boer): 'That human individuals are very different by nature can clearly (ἐναργῶς) be learned from the observation of children who are not yet able to walk (ἐπὶ τῶν παραφερομένων παιδίων). We observe that some are bright and cheerful, others sullen; some always ready to smile, others prepared to cry for insignificant reasons; some have everything in common, others are rapacious; some are violently enraged at trifles and bite and kick and fight their companions with sticks and stones, when they believe themselves to have been harmed; others are forbearing and gentle and neither get angry nor cry unless great harm is done to them. . . . (12) In addition, one may observe that some children are shameless and some bashful, that some have good memories, others bad, and others are forgetful; that some take pains over what they are taught, while others are careless and precipitate, etc. . . ., some are fond of honours, others not (ἀφιλότιμα); some are fond of the noble, others are not (ἀφιλόκαλα).' He concludes: 'In the same way we observe that some children are by nature given to falsehood, others to truth, and that children have many other differences of character (πολλὰς ἄλλας ἔχοντα διαφορὰς ἡθῶν).' We note that φύσις and ἥθος are used by Galen almost as synonyms and wonder who first suggested their identity.<sup>5</sup>

Galen refers again to the natural differences of character in a chapter of the second book *De moribus*, which differs slightly and adds a new element: 'Everyone has by nature the rational, the spirited, and the vegetative soul', since human nature is based on them. They develop gradually. 'People's characters differ because the appetites of these three souls may be strong or weak, and their relative strength (μᾶλλον and ἥττον) constitutes the individual ἥθος.'<sup>6</sup> The limbs of the human body offer a welcome analogy to what is meant by this statement. 'All human bodies are alike in that they have the same limbs, but differ in the strength and weakness of their actions. Some, for example, see and hear well, others are weak-sighted and hard of hearing; some are provided with clear and fluid speech, others stammer and their voice is indistinct; some run quickly, others slowly. Others are between the extremes, some of them closer to them, others more distant from them. In the same way small children already have different dispositions of the soul (διαθέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e. ἥθη) from the time of their birth, such as greed, rage, shamelessness, and their contraries, sincerity or falsity, intelligence or stupidity, memory or forgetfulness.' These words of Galen appear to be a late echo of the ethics of Panaetius, Posidonius' teacher, who dealt so successfully

<sup>1</sup> *Quod an. virt.* ii (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 13 = μὴν (fr. 119 Diels), cf. Alexander Aphrod. *De fato* 6 (p. 170. 16 Bruns) and *De anima libri mantissa*, p. 186. 28 B. Theophrastus made this statement in his *Καλλισθένης ἡ περὶ πένθους*. Cf. O. Regenbogen, op. cit., col. 1484; Eraclito, ed. R. Walzer (Firenze, 1939), p. 149. Cf. also the verses of Eupolis, below, p. 93, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p. 75. 13 M. = p. 817. 4 K.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., p. 75. 12 M. = p. 817. 3 K.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. above, p. 83, nn. 5 and 6.

<sup>5</sup> It is probable that this philosopher was Theophrastus, who understood δαίμων as φύσις in Heraclitus' famous saying 'Ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαί-

<sup>6</sup> p. 38. 10 Kraus.

with the moral life of the individual and the average human being, the προκόπτων of the Porch, the τυχών ἀνὴρ of Aristotle's *Ethics*.<sup>1</sup> I quote from Cicero's *De officiis* I. 107: 'Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius qua antecellimus bestiis a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, alios videmus velocitate ad cursum alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse aliis venustatem, sic in animis existunt maiores etiam varietates.'<sup>2</sup> There follows a list of ἡθῆ such as *lepos*, *severitas*, *hilaritas*, *ambitio* with examples from Greek and Roman history; *εἰρωτες*, *callidi*, *simplices et aperti* are mentioned. 'Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque,<sup>3</sup> minime tamen vituperandum.' I think the comparison of these two passages allows us, in our search for Galen's spiritual ancestors, to go beyond Posidonius and to connect him also with Panaetius, who was the first to revolt against the logical and conceptual rigidity of the early Porch. We have, however, no reason for thinking that Posidonius did not share his master's view.<sup>4</sup>

In the summary of the *De moribus* Galen neither states a parallelism between moral and physical qualities nor explains that ἡθῆ and other faculties of the soul are conditioned by the 'temperaments' of the body, which in its turn is influenced by climatic factors. But it is very likely that Galen dealt with this aspect of the problem in the complete work. As things are at present, we can only refer to the later treatise, *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*, which recapitulates in addition the section of the *De moribus* we have just discussed.<sup>5</sup> He dwells there not only on the view that not every human being has the same hereditary character but stresses particularly the fact that we often observe very wicked babies (μικρὰ παιδία πονηρότατα).<sup>6</sup>

## IV

We can now examine the implications of Galen's observation of animals and small children. I quote from the section of the *De moribus* which follows the chapter just considered: 'All this is preliminary to moral training (παιδεία). And, in general, there are no actions nor "accidents" (i.e. emotions, πάθη) nor moral dispositions (ἡθῆ) in the mature man which did not exist in him in boyhood. This disproves that all "accidents" come from thought and reflexion; for what comes from thought and reflexion is not "accident" but is either false or true opinion or else knowledge. But an "accident" is a movement such as exists in animals too, without reflexion, thought, and deliberate action.' The Stoic doctrine is thus definitely rejected. Ἡθῆ, though irrational, are no more 'accidental' than emotions; they are to be found in animals as well and are 'naturally' inborn in man though capable of development through training and instruction. Habit may produce a kind of second nature.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf., for example, Cicero, *De off.* I. 46: 'quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus...'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. L. Labowsky, *Die Ethik des Panaitios* (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 37 ff., 115 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 90, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De off.* III. 8; L. Edelstein, op. cit., nn. 97-100.

<sup>5</sup> Galen, *Quod an. virt.* 7-8. For Posidonius cf. *De plac.* v, pp. 442. 11-443. 1 M. = p. 464, 4-8; L. Edelstein, op. cit., nn. 83, 86. Cf. above, p. 85, n. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Scr. min.* II, p. 75. 6 M. = IV, p. 816. 14 K.

<sup>7</sup> p. 30. 1 Kraus.

<sup>8</sup> A more specific statement may be compared with these sentences, to be found in the section on the ἡθῆ of the spirited soul (p. 33. 5 Kraus): 'Courage consists in the avoidance of what is base and ugly (αἰσχρόν) rather than in the avoidance of what is disadvantageous and evil (κακόν). An example of this attitude is the man who prefers death to defeat in war and who endures torture rather than bear false witness against his friend. This was observed in the case of the slaves of Perennis (cf. p. 83, n. 10) and their attitude to their late master; although they had not been educated, they acted like freeborn men; since they were free by nature. This indicates

If *ἦθος* is then inborn and hereditary, the possibilities of education must be limited. This implies further disagreement with orthodox Stoicism and its optimistic view that early influences and instruction alone form the moral character of man. I quote again from the introductory section of the *De moribus* (p. 30. 21 Kraus): 'It is necessary in an adult to look at his actions and their causes. For you find that the cause of some is *ἦθος*, and of others thought. The cause of what results from nature or habit is *ἦθος*, but the cause of what springs from reflexion and deliberation is thought. When you have shown by reasoned explanation the falsity of evil opinions, you have uprooted them from the soul. But if they spring from nature or habit, such arguments will break but scarcely uproot them. *ἦθος* is conditioned not only by nature but also by constant habit, by what a man establishes in his soul and what he does every day. . . . But the relation between the youth and the old man, so far as concerns the correction of their *ἦθος*, is that between the newly planted tree and the same tree when it has reached its perfection. For, in the primary phase, it can be easily inclined in the right direction: while when it has reached its perfection, its direction is difficult and sometimes impossible to alter.' *ἦθος* is, as Galen puts it in the *De affectuum dignotione*,<sup>1</sup> the product of nature (*φύσις*) and assimilation to one's surroundings (*ἡ τοῖς συνῶσιν ὁμοίωσις*), and later of training (*δασκαίωσις*) and reason (*δόγματα*).<sup>2</sup> Educability corresponds to the different *ἦθος* which we observe already in small children: 'Some of them easily imbibe good education, others derive no benefit from it.'<sup>3</sup> We should not, however, despair of education.<sup>4</sup> 'If the nature of children draws upon the advantages provided by education, they may become good men when mature, if not, we have at least done our duty. For the management of children is in a way similar to the care we bestow on plants.<sup>5</sup> No planter will ever succeed in making a bramble bush bear grapes,<sup>6</sup> because its nature does not admit of such a completion (*τελείωσις*). On the other hand, if you neglect vines which are apt to bear their proper fruit and leave them to nature alone, they will bear either bad fruit or no fruit at all. The same applies to animals: You can train a horse and make it useful for many things; but a bear, even when it appears to have become tame, will never acquire domesticity as a lasting quality; vipers and scorpions will always remain savage and are quite untameable.' There is nothing to do but to destroy them, like human beings who are by nature bad beyond remedy.<sup>7</sup>

Again we feel tempted to compare this appreciation of individuality with Panaetius' attitude in the first book of Cicero, *De officiis*, where, however, he does not, like Galen, deal exclusively with the subject of *ἦθος*. There appears to be no fundamental difference between their views, except that Panaetius is more original and more subtle.<sup>8</sup>

The main issue behind all these questions is the origin of evil in man. Galen was very much interested in this problem, as we learn from Miskawaih's book on moral philosophy that the love of the noble (*φιλοκαλία*) exists in some people by nature . . . and refutes what some people assert, namely, that nobility arises solely from corrective education.' It had become more or less common in the Hellenistic age to consider a slave as a human being and not merely as a living tool. But to use this view as an argument for this doctrine of *ἦθος* appears to be unique and without a parallel in our tradition. Should we attribute this interesting innovation to Posidonius?

<sup>1</sup> 7. 8 (p. 25. 22 de Boer = v, p. 37. 12 K.).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Scr. min.* ii, p. 74. 11 M. = iv, p. 815. 17 K. Cf. also the quotation from the 5th-century comic poet Eupolis in the same context of Galen 7. 10 (p. 26. 6 de Boer = v, p. 38.

7 K.); it was introduced into philosophical discussion by some previous philosopher (Theophrastus?). Cf. Meineke, *Frsgm. Com. Graec.* ii, 1, p. 457; fr. 91, i. 280 Kock. Cf. above, p. 89, n. 6.

<sup>3</sup> 7. 14 (p. 27. 6 de Boer = v, p. 39. 13 K.).

<sup>4</sup> 7. 15-17 (p. 27. 7-14 de Boer = v, p. 39. 14-40. 5 K.).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 6. 491 d; Cicero, *De fin.* v. 39-40: 'earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium'. Cf. above, p. 89, n. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De tranq. an.* 13 (472 e); St. Luke vi. 44.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Scr. min.* ii, p. 74. 1-15 M. = iv, p. 815. 7 ff. K.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De off.* i. 110, 112.



sophy<sup>1</sup> and the eleventh chapter of Galen's treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*. We are allowed to supplement the defective summary from these two works which both presuppose the complete text of the *De moribus*. Miskawaih<sup>2</sup> first mentions the philosophers of the Porch who believe that all are good by nature but are afterwards corrupted by bad surroundings and dominated by bad desires which are unrestrained by appropriate education. Other unspecified people, prior to the Stoics, 'believed that men were created from the lowest matter, namely the slime of the world, and they are therefore bad by nature; they become good by education and instruction, but those among them who are very bad cannot be so corrected; those, however, who are not incurably bad can change from bad to good through education from childhood and afterwards through the company of good and excellent men.'<sup>3</sup> Galen's opinion—according to Miskawaih—was 'that some people are good by nature, some bad, and some midway between the two extremes. Then he rejected the two earlier opinions mentioned, attacking the first one in the following way: "If all people were good by nature and only became bad by instruction, they would necessarily learn the bad things either from themselves or from others. If they learn them from others, their teachers are bad by nature. Hence not everybody is good by nature. If they learn it from themselves, there is in them either only a faculty (*δύναμις*) by which they desire the evil, and hence they would be bad by nature; or there is in them, in addition to the faculty by which they desire the evil, another faculty by which they desire the good, but eventually the faculty which desires the evil overpowers and subjugates that which desires the good. And thus again they would be bad by nature."<sup>4</sup> The second view he overthrew by a similar argument. He said: "If all men were bad by nature, they might learn the good from other people or from themselves." And we repeat the first argument in exactly the same way.<sup>5</sup> Having refuted the opinions of these two schools, Galen strengthened his own view with what is clear and evident (*τὰ ἐναργῆ*). For it is obvious that some few people are good by nature and cannot be corrupted; and that there are many who are bad by nature and cannot become good; and there are others in an intermediate state who are rendered good by the company and the admonitions (*ὑποθήκαι*) of the good, but become bad when they associate with the bad and are enticed into evil by them.<sup>6</sup>

It is evident that the Arabic writer of the tenth century and Galen in the treatise referred to draw from the same source; sometimes Miskawaih gives more than Galen, sometimes Galen has preserved arguments and material not included in the Arabic account of the larger work.<sup>7</sup> The main additional information which we find in Galen's small treatise concerns the author of the antistocic argument of the *De moribus*, on which he and Miskawaih depend: it is wrong to assume with Chrysippus that everybody is capable of virtue. It is quite surprising to learn that the philosophers of the Porch explain wickedness as a perversion of the soul due to bad surroundings; for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, p. 83, n. 2; p. 85, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 26, 8-27, 18 Cairo edition. Kraus did not see that this section, in Miskawaih's work, is also to be referred to the *De moribus*.

<sup>3</sup> This corresponds roughly to the statements in the *Quod an. virt.* 2 (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 73, 6-12 = iv, p. 814, 10-16 K.); pp. 74, 21-75, 1 M. = iv, 816, 7-10 K. For those philosophers who believe in the original wickedness of mankind cf. p. 76, 7-16 M. = iv, 818, 1-10 K. Miskawaih reports a special theory underlying the views of these philosophers.

<sup>4</sup> Galen expressly states in his later treatise

that he does not give all the arguments used against the Stoic theory (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 75, 1 M. = iv, p. 816, 10 K.). The argument referred to by Miskawaih is not to be found elsewhere (but cf. *Scr. min.* ii, 77, 5 ff. M. = iv, p. 819, 2 ff. K.).

<sup>5</sup> No argument against this school is preserved in the *Quod an. virt.*

<sup>6</sup> This is a remarkable statement which I should also like to ascribe to Posidonius (cf. below). Plato's view, as expressed in the *Phaedo* (90 a), is much less pessimistic.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. notes 2-5.

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<sup>1</sup> *Scr. n.*  
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<sup>2</sup> Op. c.

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<sup>5</sup> Op. c.

<sup>6</sup> Op. c.

<sup>7</sup> Op. c.

<sup>8</sup> Op. c.

<sup>9</sup> Op. c.

<sup>10</sup> Op. c.

<sup>11</sup> Op. c.

<sup>12</sup> Op. c.

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<sup>16</sup> Op. c.

<sup>17</sup> Op. c.

<sup>18</sup> Op. c.

<sup>19</sup> Op. c.

<sup>20</sup> Op. c.

<sup>21</sup> Op. c.



this argument can neither be applied to the first men (*πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι*)<sup>1</sup> nor to small children, among whom one plainly meets with some who are very wicked. Posidonius, 'the most learned of the Stoics', had already blamed them for neglecting these obvious facts.<sup>2</sup> He did not share their view that wickedness enters the human soul later from outside: 'it has a root of its own in our souls from which it starts, sprouts, and grows; the seed of wickedness is in ourselves'. Instead of avoiding bad company we ought to follow those able to purify us and to check the growth of wickedness in us.<sup>3</sup> Posidonius expounded this at length in two of his works on moral philosophy, in the work *On emotions* and, in greater detail, in that *On the difference of virtues*.<sup>4</sup>

## V

It is now evident that Galen's whole theory of *ῥθος* and its implications is based on Posidonius' restoration of Plato's psychology in the face of Chrysippus' denial of the irrational in man. His theory is coherent in itself, and having established Posidonius' authorship in various cardinal points we are entitled to draw the obvious inference. We could refer Galen's psychology of early childhood to Posidonius even if there were no independent evidence for attributing it to him. But, thanks to Galen's interest in Posidonius' theory of emotion and the long quotations from it in Galen's *De placitis*, we can compare similar observations of children discussed by Posidonius. According to this evidence he was concerned not only with the primitive expressions of desire and ambition in animals and children but also with the gradual development of the human soul.<sup>5</sup> He showed also a special interest in those parts of Plato's *Laws* which deal with early childhood and even with children in the prenatal state, 'and composed a kind of summary of Plato's views in the first book of his work *On emotions*'.<sup>6</sup> In the same passage, Posidonius stated that man reaches maturity at the age of fourteen. This is in itself not a surprising statement, and it may be traced as far back as a famous poem of Solon.<sup>7</sup> For Posidonius this is the age in which all the three faculties of the soul are fully grown and developed and should now become well balanced.<sup>8</sup> I should like to assume that these lines refer to the same section of Posidonius' work which started with the psychology of early childhood in the first three years of life, which we read in the summary of Galen's *De moribus*.

We can therefore use the whole introductory part of Galen's *De moribus*, altered and changed as it may be, in a future collection of the remains of Posidonius' ethics, and feel tempted to ascribe other startling statements in Galen's new work to the same author, even if there is no equally convincing evidence. We should, however, be careful not to identify Galen and Posidonius too closely. On the whole, there is a long distance between Posidonius, the precursor of Neoplatonism, and Galen, the scientist and metaphysical sceptic. Posidonius was an Aristotelian philosopher dedicated to research of every kind and at the same time a keen and original 'theologian', a metaphysician of a high order. He was a philosopher like Cleombrotus the Lacedaemonian whom Plutarch describes in the *De defectu oraculorum*.<sup>9</sup> Galen was, like

<sup>1</sup> *Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 2-5 M. = iv, p. 816. 10-13 K., cf. p. 77. 15 M. = 819. 2 f. K.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 77. 17 M. = iv, p. 819. 13 K.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 8-15. For the words *ρίζα*, *σπέρμα* cf. above, p. 90, n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 2: *κατὰ τὴν Περὶ τῶν παθῶν πραγματείαν*. *Diog. Laert.* 7. 91: *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου*. *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 4: *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀρετῶν*.

<sup>5</sup> *De plac.* iv (pp. 437. 3-438. 12 M. = v, p. 459. 3-460. 10 K.).

<sup>6</sup> *De plac.* iv (p. 445. 8-12 M. = v, p. 466.

12 K.). For his interest in Plato's *Laws* cf. also Edelstein, *op. cit.*, n. 109.

<sup>7</sup> Solon fr. 2 Diehl, *Aetius* 5. 23, Galen, *De aff. dign.* 8. 3 (p. 28. 9 de Boer = v, p. 41. 10 K.). Galen received his first philosophical instruction at this age.

<sup>8</sup> *De plac.* iv (pp. 445. 13-446. 7 M. = v, p. 466. 17-467. 8 K.).

<sup>9</sup> 2, p. 410 a: *... πολλὰ πεπλανημένος... οὐ κατ' ἐμπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνὴρ φιλοθεάμων καὶ φιλομαθῆς οὐσίαν δ' ἔχων ἱκανὴν καὶ τὸ πλεῖον τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν οὐκ ἄξιον πολλοῦ ποιούμενος ἐχρήτο τῇ σχολῇ*

Strabo, mainly impressed by his capacity for inquiring into causes, τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτελεῖζον.<sup>1</sup> There is also a considerable distance in time between Galen and Posidonius, more than two centuries. We do not know very much about the intermediate stages and the development of certain schools of 'middle-platonic' moral philosophy under Posidonius' influence. We may say confidently that Galen's Platonism in ethics and his work *De moribus* is strongly influenced by Posidonius, but there is no reason to suppose that he reproduces Posidonius' doctrine in full.

It was beyond Galen's intention and capacity to attempt a restoration of the inward spirit of Plato's philosophy as Plotinus did in the third century A.D. He preserved the spirit of Greek science and medicine and represented it through a millennium of European civilization, whose originality was confined to other activities of the human spirit. But he was, rightly, never appreciated as a philosopher of the first order like Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, *i maestri di color che sanno*.

RICHARD WALZER.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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<sup>1</sup> Strabo 2. 3. 8. Cf. above, p. 86, n. 5.

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